马克·扎克伯格在 Acquired 现场访谈：新时代开启

你今晚之前看了多少场马克的采访？

So how many interviews with Mark do you think you watched before tonight?

为了准备，大概三四十场吧。最好的那些是 2004 到 2006 年的，但每场都不一样。几乎每隔三四年就是一个新时代，和之前截然不同。

To prepare, yeah, 30 to 40. The best ones are the '04 to '06 vintage, but they're all different. It's almost like every three to four years is a new era that is markedly different from all the previous eras.

完全同意。而且我觉得我们可能刚刚在台上亲眼见证了一个新时代的开端。

Totally. And I think we might have witnessed the beginning of a new era right in front of us on stage.

哦，是的，绝对。好了，我们开始吧？

Oh yes, absolutely. All right, should we do this?

开始吧。谁掌握了真相？是你吗？是你吗？是你吗？现在谁掌握了真相？是你吗？是你吗？是你吗？坐下，直说。又一个故事……欢迎收听《Acquired》2024 年秋季节目，一档关于伟大公司及其背后故事和策略的播客。我是 Ben Gilbert。我是 David Rosenthal。我们是你们的主持人。听众们，今天我们有一份非常特别的礼物：我们在 Chase Center 的 Acquired Live 上对 Mark Zuckerberg 的采访。Mark 是我们这个时代标志性的创始人兼 CEO，这场对话太精彩了，我们不想再等。所以我们赶在发布整场活动的完整视频之前，尽快放出这段内容。说到完整活动，那真是精彩绝伦。我们有惊喜嘉宾 Jensen Huang、Daniel Ek、Emily Chang，当然还有独一无二的 Mike Taylor，他现场演唱了《Who Got the Truth》。太不可思议了。我们基本上在幕后制作了一整部电影，除了 Mark 的采访之外还有 90 分钟的内容。我们会在接下来几周内发布，敬请期待。首先，衷心感谢本季的合作伙伴。我们的呈现合作伙伴 JPMorgan Payments。我们还很高兴迎来两位回归的赞助商：Statsig，全球首个产品加速平台，从 OpenAI 到 A 轮初创公司，数千家公司依赖它快速交付、学习更多、做出明智决策。你可以在 statsig.com/acquired 了解更多。还有 Crusoe，全球最符合气候目标的 AI 云和数据中心运营商，引领 AI 的工业建设。更多信息请访问 crusoe.com/acquired。一如既往，之后欢迎在 Slack 中与我们讨论：acquired.fm/slack。如果你想在每集发布时收到通知，请在 acquired.fm 注册。好了，采访前还有一件事。我们要对 JPMorgan Payments 的整个团队表示巨大的感谢，他们为我们争取到了 Chase Center，并策划了整个晚上。我们今年的合作绝对令人难以置信，我认为远远超出了我们任何人的想象。是的，对于那些不了解 JPMorgan Payments 的人，他们帮助企业收款、持款、付款、防止欺诈，并从资金流中获得独特洞察，助力公司成长。是的，具体到支付业务，像 JPMorgan 的大多数业务一样，它是全球最大、最值得信赖的支付提供商。他们每天处理 1 万亿美元，几乎占全球经济中美元支付流量的 25%。我们在《Acquired》中报道的几乎每家公司都以某种方式与 JPMorgan Payments 合作。你永远不会超出他们的服务范围。他们与像我们这样的初创公司和小公司合作，一直到财富 500 强中的最大企业。是的，本季我们将分享更多关于他们新支付产品和技术的信息，比如我们在 Chase Center 现场看到的 Pay by Face 生物识别支付。是的，那非常酷。是的，这样你就可以了解哪些产品适合解决你的支付挑战并发展业务。我们还要说的是，Ben 和我全年都与他们出色的团队并肩工作，才促成了这个晚上，我们真正了解了他们：Max、Umar、Dustin、Hannah、Vinnie、Nick、Amy、Carly 等等。我们就像一个团队。你们太棒了。是的，我们第一次体验到了如果《Acquired》是一个大型世界级组织，而不仅仅是我们的小团队，会是什么样子。在 Chase Center 发生的一切正是这种体验的实体体现。感谢你们成为我们能想象到的最佳合作伙伴。特别感谢 JPMorgan Payments 的 CMO Dustin Sedwick，他是节目的长期听众，也是我们的好朋友，他是这一切的推动力。没有他，就不会有 Chase Center。我们非常感激与你和整个 JPMorgan 的非凡关系。是的，请享受我们与 Mark Zuckerberg 的对话。接下来，有请 JPMorgan Chase 的董事长兼 CEO Jamie Dimon。

Let's do it. Who got the truth? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Who got the truth now? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Sit it down, say it straight. Another story on the... Welcome to the Fall 2024 season of Acquired, the podcast about great companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. I'm David Rosenthal. And we are your hosts. Listeners, we have something very special for you today: our interview with Mark Zuckerberg from Acquired Live at Chase Center. Mark is the iconic founder CEO of our time, and this conversation was just too good to hold on to any longer. So we are getting it out quickly before we release the full video of the entire show. Which, speaking of the full show, was utterly amazing. We had surprise appearances from Jensen Huang, Daniel Ek, Emily Chang, and of course we had the one and only Mike Taylor, the artist who sings "Who Got the Truth," performing live. It was incredible. We've got basically a whole film production that's now happening behind the scenes with another 90 minutes of content beyond just this Mark interview. We should have that out in the next couple weeks, so stay tuned for that. First, though, a huge thank you to our partners this season. You know, our presenting partner JPMorgan Payments. And we are also pumped to have two more great returning sponsors this season: Statsig, the world's first product acceleration platform that thousands of companies from OpenAI to Series A startups rely on to ship fast, learn more, and make smart decisions. You can find out more about them at statsig.com/acquired. And Crusoe, which is the world's best climate-aligned AI cloud and data center operator that is leading the industrial buildout of AI. Find out more about them at crusoe.com/acquired. As always, come to discuss this afterwards with us in the Slack: acquired.fm/slack. And if you want to be notified when every new episode drops, sign up at acquired.fm. Alright, one more thing before the interview. We need to say a huge, huge thank you to the entire JPMorgan Payments team for securing the Chase Center for this, for orchestrating the entire evening. Our partnership this year has been absolutely incredible and gone, I think, way beyond what either of us ever could have imagined. Yeah, for those who don't know about JPMorgan Payments, they empower businesses to accept money, hold money, send money, protect money from fraud, and gain unique insights from money flows to help your company grow. Yep, and the payments business specifically, like most things at JPMorgan, is the largest and most trusted payments provider in the entire world. They move $1 trillion a day. That's almost 25% of all US dollar payment flows in the global economy. Pretty much every single company that we cover on Acquired works with JPMorgan Payments in some way. You can never outgrow them. They partner with startups and small companies like us, like you, Ben, all the way up to the largest enterprises in the Fortune 500. Yeah, we've got more to share about their new payments products and technology this season, like the Pay by Face biometric payments that we saw live at Chase Center. Yeah, that was super cool. Yep, so that you can learn which may be the right fit to solve your payments challenges and grow your business. The other thing we got to say is like, Ben and I really worked side by side all year with their incredible team to make this evening happen, and we really got to know them: Max, Umar, Dustin, Hannah, Vinnie, Nick, Amy, Carly, and so many others. It's like we were one team. You guys rock. Yeah, for the first time we actually got to experience what it would be like if Acquired was a large world-class organization and not just, you know, our little team. And what happened at Chase Center is really the physical embodiment of that. Thank you guys for being the best partners we could ever imagine. And a very special shout out to Dustin Sedwick, JPMorgan Payments CMO, who's a longtime listener of the show and a good friend of ours, and he's just been the driving force behind all of this. Without him, Chase Center wouldn't have happened. We're so grateful for our incredible relationship with you and all of JPMorgan. Yep, so please enjoy our conversation with Mark Zuckerberg. And to take us in, the Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, Jamie Dimon.

《Acquired》的听众们，大家好。欢迎来到 Chase Center，欢迎来到 Acquired Live。我是 JPMorgan Chase 的董事长兼 CEO Jamie Dimon。我很高兴今晚为节目开场，欢迎大家来到我最喜欢的场馆之一。过去一年，JPMorgan Payments 和《Acquired》之间建立了伟大的合作伙伴关系，共同讲述和传播一些全球最伟大公司的故事。对于其中许多公司，就像在座的各位一样，我们很荣幸称你们为公司的朋友和合作伙伴。很抱歉今晚不能亲临现场，但我希望大家享受这场演出。Ben 和 David，交给你们了。

Hello, Acquired listeners. Welcome to the Chase Center and to Acquired Live. I'm Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, and I'm happy to kick off the show tonight and welcome all of you to one of my favorite arenas. It's been a great partnership all year between JPMorgan Payments and Acquired, storytelling and educating about some of the greatest companies in the world. For many of them, just like many of you in the crowd, we're thrilled to call you friends and partners of the firm. Sorry I couldn't be there in person tonight, but I hope everyone enjoys the show. Ben and David, over to you.

Mark，很高兴你来到这里。

Mark, it's great to have you here.

很高兴来到这里。

It's great to be here.

你知道，我看了 Jensen 纠正言论的视频，我心想，我们可能需要为今晚我要道歉的所有事情预订下一场了。开个玩笑。

You know, I was watching Jensen's video correcting the record, and I was thinking to myself, we might need to book the next one of these for all the things I'm going to have to apologize for I'm going to say tonight. Just kidding.

嗯，我现在不道歉了。

Well, I don't apologize anymore.

我们注意到了。

We've noticed.

好吧，等等。问题是：如果你知道今天所知道的一切，你还会创办 Facebook 吗？

Well, okay, wait, wait. Here's the question: if you knew what you knew today, would you have started Facebook?

哦，天哪。我的意思是，David，你一开始就来了个猛的。我是说，他确实开始了。我觉得 Jensen 最初的观点有些道理：创业之旅非常艰难，尤其是早期运营初创公司的时候。你知道，总有一种感觉，你做的事情随时可能失败，波动性极大，一切都会把你折腾得够呛。而且，显然你回头看时会有很多美好的回忆，但那并不是旅程中最有趣的部分，也不是我人生中希望重来一遍的部分。所以，我确实认为 Jensen 说的有些道理，我觉得那非常诚实。我第一次听到他说的时候，我就想，是啊，我理解，对吧？我想有很多人，如果事先知道一路上会有多痛苦，就不会开始了。但这也是人性的优点之一：你会低估事情会有多痛苦，这样你才能去做好事。

Oh god. I mean, look, I think coming out hot, David. I mean, wait, he started it literally. I think there's something to Jensen's original sentiment, which is that the entrepreneurial journey is very challenging, especially the early days when you're running a startup. And you know, there's the sense that what you're doing could just die at any moment, and the volatility, everything is just going to thrash you so much. And it's not... you obviously look back, you have all these fond memories, but it was not the most fun part of the journey or the part of my life that I wish I could go back and relive. So I mean, I do think that there's something to what Jensen was saying that I thought was very honest. And when I heard him say it the first time, I was like, yeah, I get that, right? I think there were a lot of people for whom, you know, if you knew how painful it would be along the way, you wouldn't get started. But then, you know, I think that's one of the things that's good about human nature: you can underestimate how painful things are going to be, so that way you can go and do good things.

嗯，关于这个话题，我们有很多要聊的。

Well, on that topic, we have a lot to talk about.

是的，我觉得这非常合适。首先我们得问问你的衬衫和你穿的是什么。

Yeah, I think this is actually very appropriate. First we have to ask you about your shirt and what you're wearing.

是的，你知道，我开始和一些人合作设计自己的衣服。我想，我们要设计眼镜，还要设计人们穿戴的其他东西，那就得把这方面做好。这件衬衫是我和一位很棒的时装设计师 Mike Amiri 合作的，他有个很棒的故事。如果哪天你采访他，我不会感到意外。这件衬衫是我开始做的一个系列，上面印着我最喜欢的古典格言。这句是“Pathei Mathos”——通过苦难学习。这是我们家族的一个小格言。

Yeah, you know, I started working with people to design some of my own clothes. And so I figure, look, we're going to design eyewear, we're going to design other stuff that people wear. Let's get good at this. And so this one I actually worked with this great fashion designer Mike Amiri, and he's got a great story. I wouldn't be surprised if you're doing one of these with him one day. And this one is—I've started working on this series of shirts with some of my favorite classical sayings on them. So this one is "Pathei Mathos"—learning through suffering. It's a little family saying.

这是你成长过程中的家族格言吗，还是你家的？

Was that your family saying growing up, or is that your family?

只是我姐姐。好吧，不，我们来聊聊这个——我保证不是双关。对你来说，“通过苦难学习”意味着什么？

Just my sister. Well, no, let's pull that thread—no pun intended, I promise. What does "learning through suffering" mean to you?

嗯，我认为你通过反复在挑战中碰壁，才学会什么对你真正重要，以及你在世界中的位置。我觉得这就是旅程本身，对吧？这就是创业之旅。这也是创造事物之美的一部分。Jensen 也经常谈到这一点。就像，当你创办一家公司时，每个人都会写下他们希望拥有的价值观，但价值观不是写在墙上的东西，而是你实际的行为。只有当你必须做出艰难的权衡并面对挑战时，你才真正了解自己在乎什么。所以是的，最重要的东西是通过面对挑战学到的。

Well, I think you learn what matters to you and what's important and kind of your place in the world through repeatedly hitting your head against different challenges. I think that is sort of the journey, right? That's the entrepreneurial journey. It's also part of the beauty of building things. And this is something that Jensen talks a lot about too. It's like, when you go to start a company, everyone kind of writes down what they would like their values to be, but values are not what you write down on the wall. It's your lived behaviors. You only really learn what you care about when you have to make hard trade-offs and face challenges. So yeah, you learn the most important things through facing challenges.

说到面对挑战，我们想聊聊其中的一些。因为在我看来，你在前 20 年里经历的生存危机比历史上任何一家有意义的公司都多。不过首先，这是个可疑的荣誉。我们会向你说明理由并列举出来。你还在这里。但首先，我觉得——就像耐克那个迈克尔·乔丹的老广告，他说他一次又一次失败，这就是他成功的方式——那个广告也让我很有共鸣。所以感谢你们，今年夏天我得到了一副这个，我真的很喜欢。给我们讲讲它们是怎么来的吧。

Well, speaking of facing challenges, we want to talk about a number of those because I think you have faced more existential challenges than any meaningful company in history through your first 20 years. First though, it's a dubious distinction. We will make our case to you of why and enumerate them. You're still here. But first, I kind of think my—you know, like that old Nike Michael Jordan ad where he's talking about how he's failed over and over and over again and that's how he succeeds—that one really resonates with me too. So thanks to you guys, I got a pair of these this summer, and I genuinely love them. Tell us the story of how these came to be.

是的，谢谢。我也很兴奋。你知道，在 Meta，我们构建社交体验已经 20 年了。最初是网站形式，然后是移动应用。但问题是，我从未把我们看作一家社交媒体公司，对吧？我们不是社交应用公司。我们是一家社交连接公司。我的意思是，我们谈论的是构建人类连接的未来，而这不会永远局限于你在手机上能做的事情，对吧？在小屏幕上。所以当你思考时，我们开始时只是一群孩子。我们没有资源或时间去定义下一个计算平台是什么。而且，Facebook 最初起步时，正好是早期智能手机和那些平台开始的时候，所以我们并没有真正参与开发那个平台。我们下一篇章的一个大主题是，我希望能够构建我认为理想的体验，而不仅仅是在别人构建的平台上被允许构建的东西。而是从第一性原理出发，什么是理想的社交体验？所以我认为你想要的不是一部你低头看的手机，那种会把你的注意力从周围事物和人身上移开的设备。不仅仅是一个小屏幕。我认为理想的是眼镜。通过眼镜，一方面，眼镜可以看到你所看到的，听到你所听到的。这样一来，它们可以成为你完美的 AI 助手，因为它们了解你正在做的事情的上下文。但另一方面，眼镜还可以将图像——基本上是全息图——投射到现实世界中。这样，你与他人的社交体验就不会局限于手机屏幕上的那些小互动。在不久的将来，你可以想象——因为你们已经演示过我们做的一些东西——一个版本是我们像这样交谈，但也许我们中的一个人甚至不在这里，他们只是一个全息图，而我们戴着眼镜。这里有一个问题，就是传递真实的临场感。在围绕人类临场感和与他人同在的感觉构建社交体验的领域里，有一些神奇的东西。这种物理感知，对吧？我们是物理存在。人们喜欢把一切理性化，但我们的很多体验是非常物理的。这种与他人一起在物理世界中做事的物理临场感，你将能够通过全息图、通过眼镜来实现，而不会从你正在做的其他事情中抽离。只是把它与世界的其余部分混合在一起。我认为这将是终极的数字社交体验。我也认为这将是 AI 的终极化身，因为你会进行这样的对话：好吧，有一些人——也许我本人在这里，有一个人是全息图，还有一个 AI 以某种具身形式存在。而眼镜将实现这一切。

Yeah, thanks. I'm excited about them too. So you know, at Meta, we've been building social experiences for 20 years now. Originally it took the form of a website, then mobile apps. But the thing is, I never thought about us as a social media company, right? We're not a social app company. We are a social connection company. I mean, we talk about what we're doing as building the future of human connection, and that's not only going to be constrained over time to what you can do on a phone, right? On a small screen. So when you think about it, we got started as a handful of kids. We didn't have the resources or the time to go define whatever the next computing platform is. And also, Facebook originally got started around the same time as a bunch of the early smartphones and those platforms got started, so we didn't really get to play any role in developing that platform. One of the big themes for the next chapter of what we do is I want to be able to build what I think are the ideal experiences, not just what you're allowed to build on some platform that someone else built. But what is actually, if you can think from first principles, what is the ideal social experience? So I think what you'd like to have is not a phone that you look down at, that kind of takes your attention away from the things and the people around you. Not just a small screen. I think what you ideally have is glasses. And through the glasses, there's one part where the glasses can see what you see and hear what you hear. In doing so, they can be kind of the perfect AI assistant for you because they have context on what you're doing. But then part of that is also that the glasses can project images, basically like holograms, out into the world. That way, your social experiences with other people aren't constrained to these little interactions you can have on a phone screen. In the not-too-distant future, you can imagine—because you guys have demoed some of the stuff that we've done—a version of this where we're having a conversation like this, but maybe one of us isn't even here, they're just like a hologram, and we have glasses. And there's the question of delivering a realistic sense of presence. There's something magical in the realm of building social experiences around the feeling of human presence and being there with another person. This physical perception, right? We're very physical beings. People like to intellectualize everything, but a lot of our experience is very physical. This physical sense of presence that you have with another person doing things in the physical world is something that you're going to be able to do through holograms, through glasses, without being taken away from whatever else you're doing. Just kind of have that mixed in with the rest of the world. It's going to be, I think, the ultimate digital social experience. And I think it's also going to be the ultimate incarnation of AI because you're going to have conversations where it's like, all right, there's some people—maybe I'm physically here, there's a person as a hologram, there's an AI that is kind of embodied as someone there. And the glasses will enable this.

好的，那么我们如何实现这个目标？构建这个就像是一个巨大的项目。我们已经为此努力了 10 年。要达成目标，需要解决很多不同的挑战。比如，你必须构建一个全新的显示栈，对吧？这不仅仅是手机里那种屏幕。它与电视和显示器中长期存在的屏幕有着悠久的渊源。供应链已经进行了大规模优化。需要为全息显示创建一个全新的显示栈，然后它们需要被放入眼镜中，需要小型化。而且眼镜中还需要容纳芯片、麦克风、扬声器、摄像头、眼动追踪以了解你在做什么、电池以维持全天使用、全新的射频协议。是的，这是一个相当大的挑战。所以我们想，好吧，让我们去尝试做大事，对吧？我们已经为此努力了一段时间，而且我们非常接近能够展示……

Okay, so how are we going after this? Building this is like some huge project. We've been working on it for 10 years. And there are a lot of different challenges to solve to get there. There's like you have to build a novel display stack, right? It's not just screens like the kind that are in phones. There's this long lineage connected to the screens that have been in TVs and monitors for a long time. There's been this massive optimization of the supply chain. There's like a brand new display stack for holographic displays that basically need to get created, and then they need to be put into glasses, they need to be miniaturized. And you also in the glasses need to fit chips, microphones, speakers, cameras, eye tracking to be able to understand what you're doing, batteries to make it last all day, new novel RF protocols. Yeah, it's like a pretty big challenge. So we're like, all right, let's go try to go for the big thing, right? And we've been working on that for a while, and we're pretty close to being able to show off kind of the...

那是我们的第一个原型，我对此非常兴奋。同时，我们也从这个角度出发：有很多新技术需要开发，而且眼镜必须好看，所以要在这么小的外形里塞进很多东西。那么，如果我们只跟一个优秀的合作伙伴 EssilorLuxottica 合作呢？他们生产雷朋，还有很多标志性眼镜。看看我们今天能在眼镜里装进什么，让它们尽可能有用。实际上，刚开始做的时候，我有点觉得这几乎是为终极目标练手的项目。

First prototype that we have of that and I'm really excited about that. At the same time, we also came at it from this lens of all right, so that's a lot of new technology that needs to get developed, a lot to pack into a form factor because the glasses have to be good-looking too. So what if we just constrain ourselves to working with a great partner, EssilorLuxottica? They make Ray-Ban, they make a lot of the iconic glasses. Let's see what we can fit into glasses today and make them as useful as possible. And I actually kind of thought when we were getting started with those that it was almost like a practice project for the ultimate.

你当时觉得 Facebook 就是那个终极目标，对吧？

Which is what you thought Facebook was, that's true.

没错。确实，有人说那是你真正的创业项目。对，没错。不，我们稍微跑个题。我在学校创办 Facebook 后，和 Dustin 以及当时一起工作的几个人来到了硅谷。我们这么做是因为硅谷是所有创业公司的发源地。我记得我们下了飞机，开车沿着 101 公路，心想：哇，eBay、雅虎，太棒了，这么多伟大的公司。也许有一天我们也能建成这样的公司。而我已经创办了 Facebook，我当时想：我们现在做的这个项目肯定不是一家公司。那时 Facebook 已经有一定规模了。

That's true, yeah. I did, like for your real startup, some say. That's true, yeah. No, this is—let's go on a tangent there for a second. When I started Facebook in school, I came out to Silicon Valley with Dustin and a handful of people working on it at the time. And we did that because Silicon Valley is where all the startups came from. I remember we got off the plane, we were driving down 101, we're like, 'Wow, eBay, Yahoo, this is amazing, all these great companies. One day maybe we'll build a company like this.' And I'd already started Facebook, and I was like, 'Surely the project that we're working on now is not a company.' And Facebook had some scale at this point.

哦不，不，那是个很棒的项目。只是我当时没有把它变成公司的野心。事情就那么发生了。

Oh no, no, it was a great project. I just didn't have the ambition to turn it into a company at the time. That just kind of happened.

但不管怎样，显然付出了很多努力，但当时我有点觉得：不，我不认为这就是终极目标。

But anyway, a lot of hard work obviously, but at the time I was kind of like, 'Yeah, no, I don't think this is it.'

好吧，这就是你对“你会不会创办”的回答——你其实并没有试图创办 Facebook。我不知道。

Well, that's your answer of would you have started—you actually didn't try to start Facebook. I didn't know.

所以，至于眼镜——我们想，好吧，我们想和 EssilorLuxottica 合作，这样就能开始制造越来越先进的眼镜。它们真的很棒，外观也很好。然后就是 AI，AI 的巨大变革。记住，对听众来说，我们要非常清楚：你们在我手里这个产品是在大语言模型之前，或者至少在公众意识到 ChatGPT 时刻之前就发货了。而且它们并不是作为 AI 设备制造和发货的；那是后来它们已经在市场上之后的事了。

So yeah, the glasses though—we thought, all right, we want to get working with EssilorLuxottica so we can start building more and more advanced glasses. And they're really good, they look good. And then AI, the massive transformation in AI. Remember, for listeners, let's just be really clear: you guys shipped this product that I'm holding before LLMs, or at least before the public consciousness was aware of the ChatGPT moment. And these were not manufactured and shipped as an AI device; that came later when they were already in market.

是的，几年前我会预测 AR 全息图会在全面 AI 之前出现。但现在我认为顺序可能相反。所以现在，好吧，这实际上是个很棒的产品，因为它有摄像头，能看到你所见的，有麦克风，有扬声器，你可以跟它说话。我记得我打电话给 Alex Himel，负责这个产品组的人，我说：嘿，我觉得我们应该调整方向，让 Meta AI 成为它的主要功能。然后我记得我下周去的时候，他们周二就做出了一个原型，我当时想：好吧，不错，这很好，这会是一个非常成功的产品。

Yeah, a few years ago I would have predicted that AR holograms would have been available before kind of full-scale AI. And now I think it's probably going to be the other order. So now it's like, all right, great, well this is actually a great product because it's got the cameras so it can see what you see, it's got the microphone, it's got the speakers, you can talk to it. I remember calling Alex Himel, the guy who runs the product group running it, and I'm like, 'Hey, I think we should probably pivot this and make Meta AI the primary feature of it.' And I remember I came in the next week and they built a prototype of it on Tuesday, and it was like, all right, good, yeah, no, this is good, this is going to be a very successful product.

他跟我们讲了一个更惊险的版本。他说：我正和孩子们在高速上，周六接到 Mark 的电话，他说，那副眼镜，我们能不能把 Meta AI 放进去，在设备上运行，然后尽快发货，这样我们就能看看这是不是个好主意。

He told us a much more high-stakes version of that story. He said, 'I was on the highway with my kids and I get this call on a Saturday from Mark and he's like, those glasses, could we put Meta AI in them running on device and ship that soon so we can see if that's a good idea or not.'

对，差不多，我就是这么说的。听起来没错。

Yeah, that tracks, that's what I just said. Sounds right.

好的，谢谢你用故事开场。今晚我想尝试回答的问题是：为什么 Meta 能如此惊人地成功？我是说，它是世界上最有价值的公司之一，经历了多次迭代、多次技术浪潮，击退了——让我们列举一下那些人们说“Facebook 和 Meta 完蛋了”的浪潮：Myspace、第一代 Twitter、Instagram、Snapchat、WhatsApp、TikTok、苹果的 App 跟踪透明度（这本身就算一类），还有现在的 ChatGPT。一共九个。每次都有一种广泛流传的公众叙事：Snapchat 发现了 Stories，或者有什么东西让人们觉得：哦，Facebook 做过的酷东西现在已经过时了，他们就要完蛋了。但你显然没有完蛋。你认为公司 DNA 中哪条主线让你能不断获胜？

Okay, so thank you for opening up with a story. The question that I would like to try to answer tonight is: why has Meta worked as spectacularly well as it has? I mean, one of the most valuable companies in the world, through multiple iterations, multiple technology waves, fighting off—let's name all the waves in which people said, 'Oh, Facebook and Meta are so screwed,' and yet that is not the way it looks today. Myspace, Twitter gen one, yep, Instagram, Snapchat, WhatsApp, TikTok, Apple app tracking transparency put in its own whole category, and now ChatGPT. That's nine. There is a widely held public narrative every single time: Snapchat discovers stories or there's something where people are like, 'Oh, the cool thing that Facebook did is just obsolete now and they're going to go away.' You very much haven't gone away. What do you think is the through line of the DNA of the company that allows you to keep winning?

我认为是因为我们是一家专注于人类连接的科技公司，而不是特定类型的应用。所以我们从不把自己看作一个网站或社交网络之类的。对我来说，制造这种眼镜，让人们无论身在何处都能感受到彼此的存在，是我们今天构建的应用的自然延续。但这取决于你如何定义自己，然后你需要弄清楚如何让自己具备实际去做的能力。我认为这就是一家强大科技公司的关键。因为很多公司，我认为，把自己定义得太狭隘了，比如：好吧，我们就是做这一件事的。而我们之所以能构建所有这些，是因为我们有非常强大的技术基础。其中一部分原因是我自己以及我思考问题的方式。我在创业之前是工程师。我在大学里主要上的是系统工程类的课程。所以你提到 Friendster 和 Myspace，以及他们在做图计算时遇到的所有扩展挑战，比如：好吧，你认识这个人吗？应该给他们展示他们的页面吗？

I think it's that we're a technology company that is focused on human connection, not a specific type of app. So we never thought about ourselves as a website or a social network or anything like that. For me, building this kind of glasses to enable the future of people being able to feel present with another person no matter where they actually physically are is the natural continuation of the kind of apps that we build today. But it depends on how you define what you are, and then you need to figure out how to give yourself the competence to actually go do that. And that's where I think being a strong technology company comes in. Because a lot of companies, I think, think about themselves too narrowly in terms of, 'Okay, we're this one kind of thing.' And the reason why we can build all these things is because we have a really strong technology foundation. And some of that is just me and how I think about stuff. I was an engineer before I got started. I mostly took systems engineering type classes when I was in college. So you talk about Friendster and Myspace and all the scaling challenges they had doing the graph calculations of, 'All right, do you know this person? Should you show them their page?'

对，实际上，你能带我们回顾一下吗？我们想问问你那个时代的故事。我是说，现在 Friendster、Myspace 看起来有点过时了。但你学的是计算机科学、图网络、社交图谱。那是一个非常非常困难的计算，是产品问题和技术问题的结合。

Yeah, actually, can you take us back? We want to ask you the story of that time. I mean, it seems quaint now, Friendster, Myspace. But you study computer science, graph networking, social graphs. That is a very, very difficult computation, a combination of a product question and a technology question.

我认为你可以把产品定义得过于宽泛，以至于技术变得几乎无法解决。所以你需要一个聪明的产品定义，但同时你需要在技术上比所有人都强。我认为这是我们一直坚持的，并围绕它建立了一个良好的组织。这也是我来到硅谷后观察到的一件事：所有那些自称科技公司的公司，实际上并不是那样运作的。对吧？就像我刚才提到的那些公司——CEO 不懂技术，董事会里没有技术背景的人，管理团队里只有一个负责工程的人懂技术，其他人都不懂。那好吧，如果这就是你的团队，那你不是一家科技公司。

I think you can define the product in such a general way that the technology becomes basically impossible to solve. So you want to have a smart product definition, but then you want to be competent and better than everyone else at the technology. And I think that's something that we've held ourselves to and built a good organization around. And it's one of the things that I observed as soon as I came out to the Valley: all these companies that called themselves technology companies were not really set up that way. Right? It's like the companies I was talking about—they had the CEO wasn't technical, the board of directors had no one technical on it, they had like one dude on the management team who was the head of engineering who was technical, and everyone else wasn't. It's like, all right, if that's your team, then you're not a technology company.

我一直非常谨慎的一件事是，我们管理团队中的很多人都是通过公司内部不同的技术路径成长起来的。我认为这需要平衡：你不可能让每个人都成为工程师，因为其他事情也很重要，但如果公司里工程师的比例不够，那你就不是一家科技公司。这对董事会和公司内部文化都很重要。一个非常根本的点是，我们能够从一个平台跨越到另一个平台，做各种不同的事情，是因为我们投资并关心底层技术。我们在其上构建的产品体验是具体的实现，它们也很重要。我认为我们也是一个非常好奇且注重学习的组织。我把产品策略更多地看作是如何尽可能快地迭代和学习，为我们要服务的人把每件事做得更好，而不是某个具体的计划。如果我把我们的策略定义为“我们能比任何其他公司学得更快”，那我们就会赢。我们会打造出更好的产品，因为我们能率先或尽早推出，有良好的反馈循环，收集大量反馈，比其他人更了解用户喜好，然后随着时间的推移，到第三、第四或第五版——其实它们甚至不是离散的版本，因为我们发布得如此频繁——你只是学得更快。所以我认为基本公式就是：成为一家科技公司，打好基础，从世界关注的事物中学习，然后尽可能快地迭代。

I think one of the things that I've always been pretty careful about is that a lot of the people on our management team come up through different technical pathways at the company. I think there's a balance: you don't want everyone to be an engineer because other things matter too, but if you don't have enough engineers in your share of the company, then you're not a technology company. That's important for the board and culturally inside the company. It matters a lot. One of the things that has been really fundamental is that we're able to go from platform to platform and do these different things because we've invested in and cared about the underlying technology. The product experiences we build on top of that are an implementation, and they matter. I think we are also a pretty curious and learning-focused organization. I view product strategy less as any one specific thing and more as how we iterate and learn as quickly as possible to make each thing better for the people we're trying to serve. If I define our strategy as we can learn faster than every other company, we're going to win. We're going to build a better product because we'll get it out first or early, have a good feedback loop, get a bunch of feedback, learn what people like better than others, and over time, by version three, four, or five—they're not even discrete versions because we ship so frequently—you just learn faster. So I think that's basically the formula: be a technology company, build a good foundation, learn from what people are focused on in the world, and iterate as quickly as you can.

我在为这次访谈做准备时，有个人形容你是一位战略大师，这一点我们大家现在都承认。有人对我说：马克之所以是这么出色的战略家，是因为他把公司当作回合制策略游戏来玩，他确保自己比任何人都获得更多回合，并且确保每个回合他学到的都比下一个玩家多。你觉得这个描述概括了你的策略吗？

One of my research calls to prep for this, someone described you as a master strategist, which we all sort of acknowledge at this point. The comment someone made to me was: the reason Mark is such a good strategist is because he plays the company as if it's a turn-based strategy game, and he just makes sure he gets more turns than anybody else, and he makes sure that he learns more from each turn than the next player does. Do you feel like that encapsulates your strategy?

确实感觉我下注的方式是：如果我们有出色的工程能力，那就能搞定速度部分——很多次迭代或多次击球。但出色的工程能力和速度与迭代实际上是两个不同的价值观；它们不一定矛盾，但我认为有很多优秀的工程组织试图构建超高质量的东西，并且在这方面能力很强。我知道有一种性格是愿意在东西还没完全打磨好之前就推出去。听着，我并不是说我们的策略或方法是唯一有效的。在很多方面，我们和苹果相反，显然他们的东西也做得非常好。他们采取的方法是：花很长时间，打磨好，再发布。也许对他们做的事情来说，这行得通，也符合他们的文化。但对我们来说，内部有很多讨论，你几乎会因为发布的东西而感到尴尬，因为你希望尽早推出以获取好的反馈。你显然想测试合理的假设；如果效果太差，那你测试的就不是一个好假设。但我确实认为我们很多讨论都是这样的：好吧，如果我们再花几个月时间，可以把这做得更好。我只是觉得，你想要一种文化，它更看重发布、推出和获取反馈，而不是总希望从别人那里得到好评。如果你总想等到被赞扬，你就会错过很多本可以学到有用东西并融入下一个版本的时间。关键是要确保公司的名声或品牌能够承受因发布不够成熟的东西而带来的小损伤。

It does kind of feel like the way I make bets is: if we have great engineering, that can take care of the speed part—many iterations or multiple at-bats. But great engineering and speed and iteration are actually two different values; they're not necessarily at odds, but I think there are a lot of great engineering organizations that try to build things that are super high quality and have good competence around that. I know there's a certain personality that goes with taking your stuff and putting it out there before it's fully polished. Look, I'm not saying our strategy or approach is the only one that works. In a lot of ways, we're like the opposite of Apple, and clearly their stuff has worked really well too. They take this approach: we're going to take a long time, polish it, put it out. Maybe for what they're doing, that works and fits their culture. But for us, there are a lot of conversations internally where you're almost at the line of being embarrassed about what you put out, because you want to put stuff out early enough to get good feedback. You obviously want to test things that are reasonable hypotheses; if it's so ineffective, then you're not testing a good hypothesis. But I do think a lot of our conversations are like: okay, we can get this to be a lot better if we work on it for another couple of months. I just think you want to have a culture that values shipping and getting things out and getting feedback more than needing always to get great positive accolades from people when you put stuff out. If you want to wait until you get praised all the time, you're missing a bunch of time when you could have learned useful stuff and incorporated that into the next version. It's just about making sure that what the company is known for, or its brand, can withstand all the little damage you do by shipping stuff that's not quite ready.

嗯，我希望这对品牌没有损害。

Well, I would like to hope that it's not damaging to the brand.

嗯，本质上是的。当你因为发布了一款不够好的产品而感到难过时——我不想夸大其词。我们不会发布我们认为糟糕的东西，但我们希望确保尽早发布，以便获得好的反馈，看看它们最会被用来做什么。比如，我们现在正在构建的很多 AI 产品：很明显 AI 将对很多不同领域产生变革性影响，但很多非常有价值的东西的初始用例其实并不明确。所以一部分是：你推出一些东西，想看看它在哪些方面引起共鸣。如果你推出的东西很糟糕，你就收集不到好数据，因为人们不会用它做任何事，因为它太烂了。但你对人们可能真正想用它做什么有假设，而这些假设不会全部正确。你希望在这方面尽早行动。

Well, innately it is. When you feel bad because you shipped a product that wasn't good enough—I don't want to overstate it. We don't ship things that we think are bad, but we want to make sure we're shipping things early enough to get good feedback to see what they'll be most used for. For example, a lot of the AI stuff we're building now: it's pretty clear that AI is going to be transformative for a lot of different things, but it's actually less clear what the initial use cases will be for many of these things that are super valuable. So part of it is: you put something out, you want feedback on where it's resonating. If what you put out is bad, you won't collect good data because people won't use it for anything because it sucks. But you have hypotheses for what people might really want to use it for, and they're not all going to be right. You want to go early enough on that.

所以我引出这个问题：产品创造是一种发明行为还是发现行为？大卫是否一直在大理石里，你只需要……

So I'm building to this question: is product creation an act of invention or discovery? Is David always inside that marble and you just need to...

你是先在脑中构想出大卫像，然后说“我要把它做出来并推向世界”吗？还是说必须二选一？

Do you conceive of David in your head and say, 'I'm going to make this and put it in the world'? Does it have to be one or the other?

我认为是两者结合。你基本上是带着某种价值观——要么是你自己的价值观，要么是你认为世界上应该存在的某种价值——然后试图构建与之对齐的东西，同时努力让它与最能引起人们共鸣的事物相匹配。如果只做后者，你就没有足够的信念去坚持完成困难的事情；如果只做前者，你可能就无法实现产品市场契合或优化你的产品，因为你不够关注客户。所以两者可能都很重要。

I think it's a combination. You're basically taking some kind of values—either values that you have or a value for something that you believe should exist in the world—and trying to build something that's aligned with that, while trying to match it up with what is going to resonate the most with people. If you just do the latter, then you don't have enough conviction to see through hard things. If you just do the former, then you probably don't get to product-market fit or optimize what you do because you're not focused enough on your customers. So both probably matter.

当我仔细研究所有这些历史案例时，有市场发现了 Stories 格式，然后整个世界突然觉得“天哪，这就是我们所有人互动的方式”。那是一个非常纯粹的发现。但其他时候，比如你在 Reality Labs 投入的超过 500 亿美元，感觉就像是“我们要凭意志让这个东西存在，因为我对世界应该是什么样子有自己的想法”，并没有真正征求太多反馈。

As I pore through all these historical examples, there's the market discovering the Stories format, and suddenly the whole world is like, 'Oh my God, that is the way that we all interact.' That's a pretty pure discovery. But other times, like everything you're trying to do in Reality Labs—over $50 billion you've put into it—it feels like 'we're going to will this thing into existence because I have an idea of the way I want the world to be.' I'm not really asking for that much feedback.

这是两者结合。我们确实有很多东西是首次发明或创造的。2006 年，我们构建了第一个版本的 News Feed，在此之前社交网络基本上只是个人主页。我们想，“嘿，人们其实想看到更新，让我们展示给他们。如果我们对它们进行排序，就能帮助人们快速浏览。”今天很难想象任何社交产品没有信息流。所以其中一些东西是开创性的——我不想称之为发明，而是我们率先建立的模式。还有一些是别人先做的，我们为能从世界上有效的事物中学习而感到自豪。我们并不羞于学习别人先发现的东西，然后构建更好的版本。没有哪家公司能发明一切。如果你什么都不发明，就很难成为一家成功的公司。但这是混合的。公司外部的聪明人比内部多。如果你不学习市场上发生的事情，你就会错过很多从社区和客户那里获得有价值信号的机会，了解他们希望你做什么。

It's a combination. There are certainly a lot of things that we've invented or created for the first time. In 2006, when we built the first version of News Feed, before that social networks were basically profiles. We thought, 'Hey, people actually want to get updates, let's show them that. And if we rank them, then we can help people parse through quickly.' Today it's hard to imagine any social product without a feed. So some of these things are sort of seminal—I don't want to call it an invention, but patterns that we established first. And some of them are ones that other people did, where we take pride in learning from what is working in the world. We're not embarrassed about learning from things that other people discovered first and then building a better version. No one company is going to invent everything. If you don't invent anything, it's hard to be a successful company. But there's a mix. There are more smart people outside your company than inside. If you're not learning from what's going on in the market, you're missing a lot of opportunities to get valuable signal from the community and customers about what they want you to be doing.

这正好印证了 Facebook 是一家科技公司——Meta 是一家科技公司的论点。我们稍后再谈这个。Ben 和我一直在讨论，Ben 提出 Meta 是现代世界开源技术的最大受益者。我很好奇你是否同意这一点，以及你能否谈谈你与开源的关系。

Which speaks to the thesis of Facebook is a technology company—Meta is a technology company. We'll get to that later. Ben and I have been having a conversation, and Ben posited that Meta has been the largest beneficiary of open source technology in the modern world. I'm curious if you would agree with that and if you would comment on your relationship to open source.

目前几乎所有主要科技公司都在主要使用开源技术栈。没有开源，我们根本无法建立起来。我认为对于自 1990 年代末以来创建的任何新公司来说，这很可能都是如此。对我们来说，开源一直非常重要且有价值。我们是第一家建立在 LAMP 堆栈上的大公司。它使得快速开发和迭代变得非常容易。但我们也与开源有着有趣的关系，因为按时间顺序，我们是在 Google 之后出现的公司。Google 是第一家构建分布式计算基础设施的伟大公司，所以他们将其保持为专有，因为这对他们来说是一个巨大的优势。然后我们也需要这个，但我们构建了它，然后意识到这对我们来说并不是优势，因为 Google 已经拥有了。所以我们不如将其开源。通过开源，你就能让整个社区围绕它进行构建。拥有这项技术并不会帮助我们在所做的任何事情上与 Google 竞争，但通过像 Open Compute 这样的项目，我们能够让它成为行业标准。现在所有这些云服务平台基本上都使用 Open Compute，因此供应链围绕我们的设计实现了标准化，这意味着供应量更大，生产成本更低。我们节省了数十亿美元，而且我们使用的产品质量也提高了。这是双赢。但我对此并不狂热。我们做了很多开源的东西，也做了很多闭源的东西。开源非常有价值，但由于我们在市场中的地位，它对我们来说也很有意义。AI 也是如此。我们希望确保能够获得领先的 AI 模型。就像我们希望构建硬件，以便在未来 20 年构建最佳的社交体验一样。我们在其他平台上经历了太多事情，无法完全依赖任何其他人。我们是一家足够大的公司，不需要这样做。我们可以构建自己的核心技术平台，无论是 AR 眼镜、混合现实还是 AI。所以这对我们来说是一种必然。但这些事情不是单一的软件；它们是生态系统。当其他人使用它们时，它们会变得更好。所以对我们来说，有巨大的好处，而且在哲学上与我们现在的立场一致。我确实有第一手经验，试图在移动平台上构建东西，而平台只是说“不，你不能构建那个”。这很令人沮丧。

Almost all of the major technology companies at this point are primarily using open source stacks. We wouldn't have been able to get built without open source. I think that's probably true for any new company created since the late 1990s. For us, open source has been important and valuable. We were the first big company built on the LAMP stack. It makes it super easy to develop stuff quickly and iterate quickly. But we've also had an interesting relationship with this because sequentially as a company we came after Google. Google was the first of the great companies that built this distributed computing infrastructure, so they kept it proprietary because it was a big advantage for them. Then we needed that too, but we built it and then realized it wasn't an advantage for us because Google already had that. So we might as well just make it open. By making it open, you get this whole community of people building around it. It wasn't going to help us compete with Google for any of the stuff we were doing to have that technology, but what we were able to do with things like Open Compute was get it to become the industry standard. Now all these cloud service platforms basically use Open Compute, and because of that the supply chain is standardized around our designs, which means it's way more supply, way cheaper to produce. We've saved billions of dollars and the quality of the stuff we get to use goes up. That's a win-win. But I'm not a zealot on this. We do a lot of open source stuff and a lot of closed source stuff. Open source is very valuable, but it also sort of makes sense for us because of our position in the market. The same for AI. We want to make sure we have access to a leading AI model. Just like we want to build the hardware so we can build the best social experiences for the next 20 years. We've been through too much stuff with other platforms to fully depend on anyone else. We're a big enough company that we don't have to. We can build our own core technology platforms, whether that's AR glasses, mixed reality, or AI. So that's somewhat of an imperative for us. But these things are not monolithic pieces of software; they're ecosystems. They get better when other people use them. So for us, there's a huge amount of good, and it philosophically lines up with where we are. I definitely have firsthand experiences of trying to build stuff on mobile platforms where the platforms just say, 'Nah, you can't build that.' That's frustrating.

我们能不能快速岔开一下？怎么回事？我真的想问你点事。我们可以岔开。好，你岔开了，我们这就岔开。帮帮我们的研究。IPO 前夕。好，这岔得可真远。等等，真够远的，你这是真抢方向盘啊。这跟前面有关吗，还是你只是决定该你说话了？抱歉，我有点激动。这是要回到——我觉得有关，真的。Facebook 在手机上用的是 HTML5。嗯哼。2012 年，2012 年。对，对。我想问你，Facebook 用 HTML5 做移动端就上市了，你当时是怎么想的？后来发生了什么？你以 1000 亿美元市值上市，接下来三个月跌了 50%，很可能就是因为这个。但我想，跟我们现在聊的相关的问题是：这对你如今做 AI 的方法有多大影响？那是个很不一样的技术问题。

Can we take a real quick detour? What's up? I really want to ask you something. We can take a detour. Okay, you took a detour, we're going to take a detour. Help us with our research here. The eve of the IPO. Okay, this is quite a detour. Wait, quite a detour, really grabbing the wheel here. Is this connected or did you just decide that it was your turn to talk? I'm sorry, I was like really wound up. It's to get back to—I think it's related, I really genuinely do. Facebook on mobile is HTML5. Uh-huh. In 2012, 2012. Yeah, yeah. I want to ask you what you were thinking going into the IPO with Facebook on mobile being HTML5 and what happened. You IPO at a $100 billion market cap, over the next three months you have a 50% drawdown, probably because of that. But I guess the related question to what we're talking about now is: how much is that informing your approach here with AI? It was a pretty different technical issue.

我的意思是，我们的传统是在 Web 上为网站构建产品，我们非常习惯构建一个东西然后持续部署，这符合我们的迭代风格等等。所以突然之间，这种应用模式出现了，我们得为每款手机构建不同的版本，还得通过审批才能发布，要等好几周才能上线。这太糟糕了。所以我们想，好吧，我们有个主意：构建一个基于 Web 的平台，你基本上做一个原生外壳，里面放一个基于 Web 的平台，这样我们就能每天更新应用，一次发布，然后在 Android、iPhone、Blackberry、Windows Mobile 以及当时存在的所有平台上更新应用，因为当时市场还没整合。我们想，基本上，就算没有最原生的体验会带来一些劣势，我们也能用速度来弥补，并且把更多精力集中在一个平台上。好吧，我们错了。事实证明，原生集成对于让交互感觉良好至关重要。所以我们经历了一段时期，不得不从头重写应用，而这正好赶上移动端迅猛增长，而移动端我们没有任何收入。因为看起来可能差不多，但有一个很大的区别：在桌面上，你基本上有应用和侧边栏，我们可以放广告；而在移动端，我们需要弄清楚把广告放进体验里意味着什么。明确说，信息流广告当时还没被发明出来。是广告团队做的。而且广告主有他们喜欢的特定格式，我们突然说，好吧，现在你的广告看起来会像一条信息流故事，这对广告主来说是个大挑战。而对用户来说，你本来有一个最重要的有机信息流，现在我们要往里面放广告，这对使用产品的人来说也是个挑战。所以我们需要解决这个问题，还需要把应用做得更好。我们基本上花了——我想大概一年左右——我们直接说，看，我们要暂停公司的功能开发，因为重写本身就够难了，对吧？如果你看看科技行业的历史，有很多例子，比如 Netscape，他们试图重写，需要重建技术平台，同时又想添加功能，结果基本上永远没完成。所以那是个真正的风险，对吧？当你完全改变底层平台时，有可能搞砸。所以我们想，好吧，我们必须把这种可能性降到最低，所以我们不发布任何新功能，只重写，让它更快。但在这个过程中，移动端在增长，所以我们可货币化的流量比例在缩小，因为 Web 在萎缩，移动端在增长，而那是你唯一的商业模式。是的。我当时想，好吧。问题是，其实我们很清楚需要做什么。是的。我认为从战略上讲，很多时候当你赢的时候，反而更难知道该做什么。当事情顺利时，你会想，下一步怎么从赢到赢更多？但当你输的时候，通常很清楚该做什么。而且我认为很大程度上，只是你有没有承受痛苦的意愿。所以很大程度上，团队说，好吧，我们要上市了，投资者肯定不会喜欢我们一年半不赚钱。而我的想法是，一年半在全局来看很短，我们干吧。我们做了，那是痛苦的一年半，然后我们走出来，状态非常好。所以我认为公司内部的人更早感觉好多了，因为大家很清楚我们在做正确的事，而且知道我们在负责任地执行，专注做正确的事。但我认为，真正文化上困难的是，当你有一个东西运行得很好，你在一座小山上，需要跳到另一座小山的时候。但这一次，我觉得并不好玩。公司有过一段时期——一系列时期——不是最好玩的时期。但尽管那样，回想起来，看起来还不错，没那么糟。你的市值只是被腰斩了一年半。太棒了，太棒了，我接受。

So I mean, our legacy was building on web for websites, and we were very used to building one thing and being able to continuously deploy it, and it fits with our iteration style and all that. So now all of a sudden this app model comes along, and it's like we have to build different ones for each phone, and you have to go through approval to get it shipped, and we have to wait like weeks before it can ship. It's like, this sucks. So we're like, all right, we have an idea: let's build this platform where we can get a web-based platform, so you basically build a native shell and you build this web-based platform in it, and we'll be able to just update our apps every day, and we'll ship one thing once and we'll update our apps across Android and iPhone and Blackberry and Windows Mobile and all the stuff that existed at the time, because it hadn't gotten consolidated yet. And like, that's going to be—we're like, basically whatever downside we are going to have from not having the most native thing, we're going to make up for in velocity and by having way more of our energy focused on one platform. Well, we were wrong. It turned out that having the native integration was actually critical for having the interactions feel good. And so we basically went through this period where we had to go rewrite our apps from scratch, and that coincided with mobile growing dramatically, and mobile we didn't have any revenue. Because it may seem like it's pretty similar, but there's a very big difference: on desktop you basically have the app and you have the column on the side that we could put ads, and on mobile we needed to figure out what does it mean to put ads into the experience. Let's be clear, the feed ad had not been invented yet. The ad team did that. And it's like, advertisers have specific formats that they like working with, and the idea that we were just going to be like, all right, now your ad is going to look like a feed story, was a big challenge for advertisers. And the idea that for people, you were going to have this organic feed that was the most important part of the product, and now we're just going to start putting ads in it, was a challenge for the people using the product. So we needed to figure that out, and we needed to get the apps to be better. And we basically took—I think it must have been like a year or something—we're just like, look, we're going to pause feature development of the company, because it's hard enough to do a rewrite, right? If you look at the history of the tech industry, there are all these examples like Netscape and you know, these things that like they tried to do a rewrite, they needed to reestablish their technical platform, and they also tried to add features, they basically just never terminated. So that's a real risk, right? When you're completely changing your underlying platform, there's a risk you're going to miss it. So it's like, all right, we got to minimize the chance that that happens, so we're not going to ship any new features, we're just going to rewrite it, make it faster. But while we're doing this, basically mobile's growing, so the percent of our traffic that is monetizable is shrinking, because web is basically shrinking, and mobile's growing, and that's your only business model. Yeah. And I was like, all right. The thing is, it was actually pretty clear what we needed to do. Yeah. I think strategically, a lot of the time it's much harder to know what to do when you're winning. Like when stuff is going well, it's like, what is the next move to go from winning to winning more? But when you're losing, it's usually pretty clear what you have to do. And I think a lot of it is just, do you have the pain tolerance to go do it? So a lot of this was like, all right, the team was like, okay, well we're going public, and you know, investors really aren't going to like this if we are like not making money for a year and a half. And it's like, well, a year and a half is short in the grand scheme of things, let's do this. And we did it, and it was a painful year and a half, and then we came out of that and we were in great shape. So I think people inside the company had felt a lot better sooner, because it was pretty clear to people that we were doing the right thing, and they knew that we were executing it in a responsible way, and basically focused and we're doing the right thing. But I think it's actually when you have something that's working well and you're on one local hill and you need to jump to another hill, that's the stuff that's really culturally hard. But this one, I think it was not fun. There have been a period—a series of periods throughout the company that were not the most fun periods. But although that one in retrospect, you know, looks pretty good in retrospect, it's like not that bad. It's like your market cap only got cut in half for a year and a half. Like great, great, yeah, I'll take that.

好吧，也许我能——我能联系一下吗？David 问，嘿，你能帮我们做研究吗？我能顺着你刚才说的那条线问吗？你说那次没那么糟。公司做了很多了不起的事，但也受到了很多批评。如果你要自我批评你的公司、你的创造，在这么多年的所有批评中，你认为哪一个最合理，为什么？

Well, maybe can I—so can I connect? So David asked, hey can you help us with our research? Can I follow that thread that you just said, hey that one wasn't so bad. There's been a lot of amazing things the company has done, there's also been like a lot of criticism. If you were to be self-critical of your own company, of your own creation, of all the criticisms that have happened over the years, which do you believe is the most legitimate and why?

我的意思是，我们搞砸的事情太多了，很多批评都是合理的。但如果那算是一年半的错误，我想过去大约 10 年里我反思的一件事是，政治环境发生了巨大变化，对吧？在 2016 年之前，除了 IPO 那段时间，几乎没有一个月公司面临的舆论不是正面的。而 2016 年之后，事情变得两极分化得多。我认为我们没有预料到的一点是，我们构建的工具会被以我们未曾意图的方式大量使用，尤其是在选举和政治讨论方面。我认为，早期我们没有为此承担足够责任的批评是合理的。我们专注于构建功能和增长，没有投入足够精力去理解更广泛的社会影响。这可能是最合理的批评。

I mean, there's so many things that we've messed up, that there are many criticisms that are legitimate. But if that was a year and a half mistake, I think one of the things I reflect on over the last like 10 years or so was, you know, the political environment just changed dramatically, right? It's like before 2016, there was not a month that went by except for maybe this IPO period where the sentiment about the company was anything but positive. And then after 2016, it became a lot more polarized. And I think one of the things that we didn't anticipate was how much the tools we built would be used in ways that we didn't intend, especially around elections and political discourse. And I think the criticism that we didn't take enough responsibility for that early on is legitimate. We were focused on building features and growing, and we didn't invest enough in understanding the broader societal impact. That's probably the most legitimate criticism.

但积极的一面是，2016 年大选之后，有一段时间公司几乎没有一个月是正面评价。我认为很多事情的核心是正确理解你在世界和历史中的位置。我们明白自己是一家科技公司，必须是一家科技公司才能做出这种东西。我们也明白我们不是社交网络公司，而是人类连接公司，这种形式会随着时间变化。政治环境方面，我觉得自己当时不够成熟，从根本上误判了问题。我们确实做错了很多事，也做对了一些。但我回顾时感到遗憾的一件事是，我们接受了别人对我们的一些指责，那些他们声称我们做错或应该负责的事情，我其实并不认为我们真的做了。我们确实搞砸了很多事，需要修复。但我认为有一种观点是，当有人说有问题时，正确的本能是承担责任，说好吧，也许不全是我们的问题，但我们要完全接手这个问题，负责并解决它。但当这是一个政治问题时，实际上很多时候，有些人是在善意地指出问题，希望得到解决，而有些人只是在找替罪羊。我认为在某种程度上，如果你因为觉得这是企业危机而非政治危机而承担责任，你的想法是“好吧，我要为所有这些事负责”，人们基本上是在指责社交媒体和科技行业造成了社会上的各种问题。如果我们说“好吧，我们要尽自己的一份力去解决这些问题”，我知道有一群人就会抓住这一点，说“哦，你承认了，那我再踢你一脚”。老实说，我认为我们应该更坚定、更清楚地表明哪些事我们确实有份，哪些没有。我的猜测是，如果 IPO 是一个一年半的错误，那么政治误判就是一个 20 年的错误。它始于 2016 年，我们一直在努力修复很多问题，并找出正确的基调来应对全国乃至全球各地非常紧张的政治动态。我们基本上已经找到了立足点，明确了原则，知道哪些地方需要改进，但对于那些毫无事实依据的关于科技行业或我们公司影响的指控，我认为我们应该更坚决地反驳。我认为还需要大约 10 年时间，我们才能完全走出这个周期，让品牌恢复到如果没有当初搞砸可能达到的状态。但从大局来看，20 年也不算太糟，我们会挺过去的。我认为我们会变得更强大。但这确实是人们提出的一个更有趣的批评。我们两边都受到批评。有人认为我们承担的责任不够。但肯定有一条批评线是：你承担了太多不该承担的东西。我认为我们需要很长时间才能摆脱这个困境。

But positive and then after 2016 after the election, basically there was not a month for a while where the sentiment about the company was positive. I think so much of this stuff is correctly understanding your place in the world and in history. I think we understood that we are a technology company and that you have to be a technology company to build this kind of thing. I think we understood that we're not a social network company, we're a human connection company, and that will take different forms over time. The political environment, I think I didn't have much sophistication around, and I think I just fundamentally misdiagnosed the problem. There were a lot of things we did wrong, some things we did right. But one of the things I look back on and regret is I think we accepted other people's view of some of the things they were asserting we were doing wrong or were responsible for that I don't actually think we were. There were a lot of things we did mess up and we needed to fix. But I think there's this view where when someone says there's an issue, the right instinct is to take ownership for it, say okay, maybe it's not all our thing, but we're going to fully own this problem, take responsibility for it, fix it. But when it's a political problem, I actually think a lot of the time there are people who are operating in good faith who are identifying a problem that want something to be fixed, and there are people who are just looking for someone to blame. I think to some degree, if you take responsibility for things because you think it's a corporate crisis not a political crisis, and your view is okay, I'm going to take responsibility for all this stuff, people are basically blaming social media and the tech industry for all these different things in society. If we're saying okay, we're going to really do our part to fix this stuff, I know there were a bunch of people who just took that and were like, oh you're taking responsibility for that, let me kick you for more stuff. Honestly, I think we should have been firmer and clearer about which of the things we actually felt like we had a part in and which ones we didn't. My guess is if the IPO was a year and a half mistake, I think the political miscalculation was a 20-year mistake. It started in 2016, and I think we have been working super hard to fix a lot of issues and to figure out the right tone for navigating a very fraught political dynamic across both the country and multiplied across all these places around the world. I think we've sort of found our footing on what the principles are, where we think we need to improve stuff, but where people make allegations about the impact of the tech industry or our company which are just not founded in any fact, I think we should push back on harder. I think it's going to take another 10 years or so for us to fully work through that cycle before our brand and all of that is back to the place it maybe could have been if I hadn't messed that up in the first place. But in the grand scheme of things, 20 years isn't that bad either, and we'll get through it. I think we'll come out stronger. But I do think that is one of the more interesting critiques that people get. We get critiques on both sides. There are people who don't think we've taken enough responsibility. But certainly there's one line of critique which is you kind of bought into too much of the stuff that you shouldn't have. I think it's going to take us a long time to dig out of that.

你现在有没有一个合理的框架，比如“这些是我们确实想负责的事情，而那些不是我们的错”？

Do you have a reasonable framework at this point for like okay here's the stuff where I feel like we actually do want to take responsibility for it and here's the stuff where we're like no that's not our fault?

是的，现在很多问题已经被研究过了。我不想重复所有细节。但经过多年的学术研究，很多问题已经有了结论。挑战在于，我们学到的一件事是，我们应该更早地支持更多学者进行这类研究，因为当你被指控时，你自己站出来说“我不认为我们做了这个”并不太可信。但长期有效的方法是提前做研究，让第三方学者、受人尊敬的人来辩论这些问题，然后结果就是“哦，不，证据根本不显示社交媒体与这种伤害相关”。所以我认为这是双刃剑。

Yeah, I mean at this point I think a lot of the stuff has been studied. I don't want to rehash all the different things. But I think at this point there's been years of academic research on a lot of these things. Part of the thing that's challenging is, and one of the things that we've learned is we actually should be trying to support more academics and doing more of this research ahead of time, because when you get to a point where you're being accused of something, you're not super credible just standing up yourself and being like I don't think we did this one. But what has worked over time is you do the research in advance and you get third party academics, respected folks who get to debate all these different issues, and then it's like oh no, actually the evidence just does not show that social media is correlated with this kind of harm at all. So I think it cuts both ways.

这引出了我们想和你谈的另一个话题。你说 20 年不算长。我年轻，你也年轻，我们都年轻。这是大学辍学的好处。当你 19 岁就开始创业时，希望我们还有超过 20 年的时间，而且希望你有巴菲特那样的持久力。你以一种真正独特的方式设立了公司，可以这样运营并采取这种策略。你是指超级投票权吗？

This brings up another topic we wanted to talk about with you. You said that 20 years isn't that long. I'm young, you're young, we all are. This is the advantage of being a college dropout. When you start when you're 19, hopefully we have more than 20 years left, and hopefully you have like Buffett duration. You set up the company in a truly unique way where you can operate the company and take that approach. Do you mean super voting shares?

超级投票权是技术层面的一部分。还有很多技术细节我们这次不会深入讨论。但你可以用这种视角来看：如果你不是创始人的 CEO，没有你建立的那种结构，你就做不到。我认为在为此做研究时，我们得出的一个结论是，这正是 Meta 的核心基础优势之一。那么在你创立公司时，你那么年轻，甚至上市时也很年轻，为什么这对你如此重要？

Super voting shares is the technical aspect there. I think there are a bunch of technical aspects to it that we're not going to get into in this conversation. But you can take that perspective in a way that if you are a CEO non-founder without a structure that you've set up, you just can't. I think in doing all the research for this, a thesis we've developed is that that is just one of the core fundamental advantages that Meta has. So as you were setting up the company, when you were so young, even when you went public you were so young, why was that so important to you?

嗯，2006 年雅虎想出 10 亿美元收购公司，我们管理团队的所有人都想卖掉。董事会试图解雇我和所有人。基本上接下来一年，管理团队的其他人都离开了，因为我没有做好沟通工作。我的意思是，我不……

Well, in 2006 Yahoo wanted to buy the company for a billion dollars and everyone on our management team wanted to sell it. The board tried to fire me and everyone. Basically in the next year everyone else on the management team left because I hadn't done a good job communicating. I mean I don't...

我当时没能很好地传达长期愿景，因为我那时根本没往那方面想。我没把这件事当作一家公司来思考；我当时觉得，这是个很棒的项目，很酷。很多人喜欢我们在做的事，我觉得这可能会持续一段时间，而且会在世界上相当重要。但我不知道如何从长期财务规划的角度去思考，或者向他们解释为什么这值得。没有讲清楚这些，当雅虎找上门时，很多人觉得这是他们创业梦想成真了，必须接受这个 offer，这完全可以理解。我当时不够成熟，无法清晰地阐述我们长期的走向。当我跟他们说“嘿，我觉得我们应该拒绝，因为我们要做这个”时，可能确实不太能让他们有信心。所以那之后我想，好吧，我不想因为想继续打造公司而被自己创办的公司开除，那就建立一个让这种事更难发生的治理结构吧。

I hadn't done a good job communicating the long-term vision because I wasn't thinking about that at the time. I wasn't thinking in terms of this as a company; I was like, this is a great project, it's awesome. A lot of people like what we're doing, I think this will probably continue for a while, and it's going to be pretty important in the world. But I didn't know how to think in terms of long-term financial plans or explain to them why it would be worth it. Without having made that case, it was understandable that when Yahoo came around, a lot of people thought, this is all their startup dreams come true, you got to take this offer. I just wasn't in a place where I had the sophistication to articulate where we were going longer term. It probably wasn't super confidence-inspiring to them when I was like, hey, I think we should turn this down because we're going to do this. So after that, I thought, all right, I don't want to get fired from my own company for wanting to build it, so let's set up a governance structure that makes it somewhat harder to do that.

所以是从痛苦中学习。而且你们很早就产生了大量现金流，让你手里有了一个真正能持续运营的业务，你根本不需要砍掉自己的胳膊卖给谁才能继续发展公司。

So learning through suffering. And being very cash generative very early, such that you had a very real going concern on your hands, and you just didn't need to cut off your arm and sell it to someone in order to build your business.

是的。我觉得大家对 Facebook 这家初创公司有一个根本性的误解。它是典型的初创公司，你是本世纪标志性的创业创始人。很多人因为那些光鲜的理由想创业。而你讨厌做初创公司，想尽快摆脱初创状态，成为一个持续运营的企业。

Yeah. I think this is a fundamentally misunderstood thing about Facebook the startup. It is the prototypical startup, you are the iconic startup founder of this century. And there are a lot of people that want to start a startup for the glamorous reasons. You hated being a startup and wanted to stop being a startup as fast as possible and be a going concern.

是的，我觉得我们现在开心多了。我能做所有这些事，太棒了。你对那些把创业浪漫化的创始人有什么建议？显然创业本身不是坏事，对吧？我觉得关于怎么做有不同的流派。有些人想，好吧，我要去创业，所以我要一头扎进这个想法里。我觉得这有点危险，因为你必须保持灵活，不断调整，直到找到可行的东西。早期我不认为 Facebook 会成为那家公司，部分原因是我在学校时做了大概 12 个不同的东西，都是我想让它存在的东西。就像，好吧，这个好玩，好，我们再做一个。这个好玩，人们还在用，那我就维护一下。但我还有很多其他想做的点子。所以我当时不知道如何思考一家公司会变成什么样。我觉得保持灵活性是有帮助的。一旦你雇了很多人，当你能在自己脑子里开会决定方向时，事情就容易多了。而且当你只是说“好吧，我要改变方向”时，人们的自尊心和固执会少很多。他们不会把自我投入进去，说“不，我们本来是这个方向，现在你必须说服我”。所以我确实认为你要保持精简，能够做到这一点。这也是我们试图让公司回到大公司中最精简版本的原因之一。但我确实认为，没有资源去做你想做的事显然不是特别有趣，但让比当前阶段所需更多的人去工作也有问题，因为那样做的人就没有真正的自主权去做出改变和做他们需要做的事，这就不那么有趣了，然后你就无法吸引最优秀的人去做那些事，因为不够有趣。所以你必须把握好分寸。

Yeah, I mean, I think we're having a lot more fun now. I get to work on all this stuff, it's awesome. What is your advice to all these founders who romanticize the idea of starting a company? Obviously starting a company is not bad, right? I think there are different schools of thought on how to do it. Some people think, okay, I want to go start a company, so I'm going to dive into this idea. I think that's a little bit dangerous because you have to be able to be nimble and pivot around until you figure out what works. Part of the reason why I didn't think Facebook was going to be the company early on was because when I was in school, I built like 12 different things that were just things I wanted to exist. It's like, all right, this is fun, okay, let's build another thing. It's like, okay, this one's fun, people are still using that, I'll help upkeep this one. But I had a bunch of other ideas for stuff I was going to build too. So I didn't know how to think about what a company was going to be. I think there's something about maintaining flexibility that's helpful. Once you hire a bunch of people, it's a lot easier when you can just have meetings in your own head about what direction you want to go in. And there's a lot less pride and people dug in when you're just like, okay, I'm going to change direction. People haven't invested their ego in, no, we were going in this direction and now I must be convinced. So I do think that you want to keep things lean and be able to do that. That's one of the reasons why we tried to get the company back to being the leanest version of a large company that we can be. But I do think that there's something to that where it's obviously not super fun not having the resources to do what you want to do, but I think it also is problematic to have more people working on something than you should have for the stage that it's at, because then the people who are working on it don't have the agency to actually make the changes and do the things that they need to, which is less fun, and then you can't attract the best people to go work on those things because it's less fun. So you just have to dial it right.

你在 Reality Labs 上花了几万亿美金，这是个技术术语，它还没赚那么多钱。所以我要把你说过的话回放给你：让这么多人和资源去做超出当前阶段所需的事情是不合适的。我有点开玩笑，但我很好奇你怎么区分这个情况。

You're spending a gajillion dollars on Reality Labs, and it's a technical term, it's not making that much money. So I'm going to play Mark back to you: it's not appropriate to have all these people and resources working on things for more than the stage warrants. I'm being a little facetious here, but I'm curious how you categorize it differently.

嗯，我觉得有些东西，当你到了我们这样的规模时，也关乎你未来 10 到 20 年想做什么，以及你认为什么会变得重要。我们之前谈到创造运气之类的。我认为我们可以大致感知到一些趋势。我非常确信眼镜、全息呈现和 AR 将会成为一个完全无处不在的产品。就像以前有手机的人都换成了智能手机，然后更多人拥有了智能手机。如果仅仅是让世界上所有已经有眼镜的人升级到内置 AI 的眼镜，这就已经会成为世界历史上最成功的产品之一了。而且我认为它会走得更远。还有一点是掌控我们自己的命运。这具有战略价值。我们做过一个估算，从核心应用家族中，我们因为平台的各种“税收”损失了多少钱——当他们告诉我们不能按照我们认为正确的方式运营广告业务时，当他们告诉我们不能发布某些产品，导致人们使用更少或更喜欢程度降低时。很难精确估算，但我觉得如果我们拥有平台，我们的利润可能会翻倍。所以从纯金钱的角度来看，这价值巨大，虽然我主要不是从这个角度出发的。但即使现在，自从雅虎时代以来我也学到了一些东西，现在我至少能够阐述一个理由，说明为什么我确信长期来看这会很好。但对我来说，这关乎打造我认为对未来重要的东西。

Well, I think some of the stuff, by the time you're at the scale that we're at, is also just about what do you want to do over the next 10 to 20 years and what do you think are going to be important. We were talking about making your own luck and all that. I think there are some broad strokes that we can have a sense of where things are going. I'm pretty sure glasses and holographic presence and AR is going to be a completely ubiquitous product. It's just like everyone who had a phone before replaced it with a smartphone, and then a lot more people got smartphones. If all we get is all the people in the world who already have glasses upgrading to glasses that have AI in them, then this is already going to be one of the most successful products in the history of the world. And I think it's going to go a lot further than that. There is also the thing about controlling our own destiny. It's strategically valuable. We did this calculation at some point where it's like, how much money do we lose from our core family of apps to the various taxes that the platforms have, when they tell us we can't run the ad business the way that we think we should be able to, when they tell us we can't ship certain products so that people use the things less or like them less. It's hard to exactly estimate, but I think we might be like twice as profitable if we own the platform or something. So from that perspective, that's worth a lot from a pure dollars perspective, which is not primarily how I come at this stuff. But even now, I've learned a thing or two since the Yahoo days, and now I at least am able to articulate a case for why I am confident that it's going to be good over time. But for me, it's about building the things that I think are going to be important for the future.

一直以来，我更关注的是产品体验以及你能实现和构建什么。其中一个转变——这有点像价值观随时间的变化——是早期 Oculus 的一些人曾对我说过，构建好的东西和构建令人惊叹的东西是有区别的。“好”就是好，对吧？它有用、有帮助，是人们日常使用的东西，因为它为他们的生活增添了价值。但“令人惊叹”不同，它令人振奋、鼓舞人心，让你对未来更加乐观，是人性中一种升华的东西。所以我认为我们迄今为止在社交媒体上做的很多事情都非常“好”。我们构建了这些产品，超过 30 亿人几乎每天都在使用。每天大约有 33 亿人使用。他们使用是因为它在生活的方方面面都有用。显然人们用它做不同的事，但它有用，能帮助人们保持联系、建立业务、形成社群。这很好。但很少有人每天起床后会想：“耶，社交媒体！”那不是……所以我想，在公司下一个阶段，未来 15 年，除了“好”的东西，我还想构建更多“令人惊叹”的东西。我认为两者都很重要。但对我来说，这有点像我希望公司代表和成为的下一阶段。所以我认为我们在 Reality Lab 做的很多事情都会属于那个范畴。我们做的很多 AI 工作也会属于那个范畴。应用里也有很多东西会属于那个范畴，还有新应用。但我不确定，我觉得这从根本上来说非常好。也许这也只是我目前人生阶段的体现。我喜欢认为自己还年轻，虽然年纪大了一点，但我确实认为，在这一点上，这不仅仅是 Meta 的事。在我的个人生活中，我很多个人价值观就是和那些我觉得鼓舞人心的人一起做鼓舞人心的事。所以也有个人版本。我可以和普莉希拉、我的妻子以及一群很棒的人一起研究有趣的科学问题。我可以和世界上一些最优秀的时装设计师一起设计衬衫。我委托制作了我妻子的雕塑，复兴了为你所爱的人设计雕塑的罗马传统。我完全没有……但我的意思是，我认为 Daniel Arsham 是一个非常有才华的人，我当时想，这是一个我愿意与之合作的人。我们去找个项目吧。我有一个副业：我们在考艾岛有一个养牛场，我想看看能不能养出世界上最高品质的牛肉。有各种各样的事。从……开始，这太棒了。我们有一头公牛叫 Chun，他真是个男子汉。我们很难把他留在牧场，因为每次我们把他放进钢制围栏，他一看到母牛就会撞破围栏。但我觉得这就是你想要用来生产最高品质牛肉的那种公牛。我们就是努力和优秀的人一起做高品质的、令人惊叹的事。如果未来 15 到 20 年我能做这些，那将会是美好的 15 到 20 年。

It's always been way more about the product experience and what you can enable and build. One of the shifts, and this is sort of like a values shift over time, is that one of the things that some of the early Oculus guys used to say to me is the difference between building good things and awesome things. Good is good, right? It's helpful, it's useful, it's things that people use on a day-to-day basis because it adds something to their lives. But awesome is different. Awesome is uplifting and inspiring and just leads you to be way more optimistic about the future, and it's just this uplifting thing about humanity. So I think a lot of what we've done with social media so far is very good. We've built these products that more than three billion people use on a near daily basis. It's like 3.3 billion on a daily basis. They use it because it is useful in their life in all these different ways. Obviously people use it for different things, but it's useful and it helps people stay connected, helps people build businesses, helps people form communities. It's good. There aren't that many people on a day-to-day basis who get out of bed and are like, 'Yeah, social media!' That's not like... So I kind of think for the next stage of the company, the next like 15 years, I want us to build more things that are awesome in addition to things that are good. I think that they both matter. But to me, this is a little bit of the next stage of what I want our company to stand for and be. So I think a lot of the Reality Lab stuff that we're doing is going to be in that bucket. A lot of the AI stuff that we're doing, I think, is going to be in that bucket. There are a bunch of things in the apps that are going to be in that bucket too, and new apps as well. But I don't know, I think that there's something that's fundamentally pretty good about that. And maybe it's also just where I am in my life right now. I like to think I'm young, I'm a little older, but I do think that at this point, it's not just a Meta thing. In my personal life, a lot of what I personally value is doing things that are inspiring with people who I find inspiring. So there's the personal version of this. I get to work on interesting science problems with Priscilla and my wife and a bunch of awesome people. I get to design shirts with some of the best fashion designers in the world. I commissioned a sculpture of my wife, bringing back the Roman tradition of designing sculptures of people you love. I'm not at all being... but I mean, I think Daniel Arsham is a really talented guy, and I was like, that's a person who I'd love to work with on something. Let's go find a project. I have one of my side projects: we have this cattle ranch in Kauai, and I'm trying to see if we can raise the highest quality beef in the world. There's all this stuff. It starts with... it's awesome. We got this steer, Chun. He's just the man. We're having a hard time keeping him on the ranch because every time we put him in a steel enclosure and he sees a female cow, he busts through the steel enclosure. But I feel like that's the kind of bull that you want to make the highest quality beef in the world. We're just working with trying to do really high quality awesome things with awesome people. If that's what I get to do for the next 15 or 20 years, then it's going to be a good 15 or 20 years.

有没有一个时刻？是什么改变了？这什么时候成了你的优先事项，为什么？这感觉如此激进，不可能是渐进的。还是说 Mark 一直都是这样，只是我们没看到真实的 Mark？

Was there a moment? What changed? When did this become your priority and why? It feels so radical that it couldn't have possibly been gradual. Or was this just Mark all the time and we just couldn't see the real Mark?

我认为可能和公司在疫情期间运营方式的转变有关。所有科技公司都暂时远程办公，那是一个有趣的时期，可以多些时间，退后一步。我是一个相当内向的人，我确实需要小心：我从与人相处中获得很多价值、能量和想法，但我也需要独处的时间。疫情期间我得到了那种独处，那是一段反思的时光，让我能够思考这些事情。当时我们国家也经历了一段非常困难的政治时期，我们公司处于很多事件的中心。我认为那引发了很多反思。然后，我们之前启动但规模较小的一些事情——2014 年启动的 Reality Lab 项目，2012、2013 年左右启动的关于基础 AI 研究的 FAIR 项目——这些项目开始发展，并到了这样一个时刻：我们是全力投入去做，还是把它当成一个爱好？我当时想，不，我们应该做。我认为这将成为我们工作中非常重要的一部分。我们不得不做一系列非常重要的决定，我们知道全力投入这些事情、构建所需的 AI 基础设施、扩大 Reality Lab 的规模会非常痛苦。我知道很多投资者会讨厌它，至少在短期内，在它被证明是正确的事情之前。我当时不知道的是，我以为他们不会喜欢，但我觉得会没事，因为我认为不会同时出现经济衰退。所以那真的……我是说，你看，你通过挑战了解自己。我们经历了……和市值蒸发 80% 相比，蒸发一半都算温和了。所以这些都是有意的决定。我们进行了很多对话，比如我们是否应该继续推进？我得到的答案是肯定的。这是我所相信的。我认为这对世界很重要。我认为随着时间的推移它会成功。我们对经历痛苦时期并不陌生。从某些方面来说，这会让公司变得更好。我们干吧。

I think that there might have been something around the way the company shifted in operations around COVID. All these tech companies went remote temporarily, and it was an interesting period to just get some more time, take a step back. I'm a pretty introverted person, and I do think I need to be careful where I get a lot of value and energy and ideas from being around other people, but I also need time with myself. With COVID, I kind of got that, and it was a time of reflection where I was able to think about this stuff. We were also going through this very difficult political time in the country, and our company was at the center of a lot of those things. I think that that was a cause of a bunch of reflection. Then I think that a bunch of the things that we'd spun up earlier but at smaller scale—the Reality Lab stuff that we started in 2014, the FAIR stuff around fundamental AI research that started around 2012, 2013—these things kind of got started and were growing, and it reached this moment: are we going to double down on this and do this, or are we going to kind of do this as a hobby? I was like, no, I think we should do this. I think this is going to be a really important part of what we do. We had to make a really important set of decisions where we knew it was going to be really painful to go double down on those things and build out the AI infrastructure that we needed to and scale up some of the Reality Lab stuff. I knew that a lot of the investors would hate it, at least in the short term, before it's clearly the right thing to do. What I didn't know was that at the time I thought they were going to not like it, but I thought it was going to be okay because I didn't think there was also going to be a recession at the same time. So that really... I mean, look, you learn who you are through challenges. We had a really... losing half of your market cap is quaint compared to losing 80% of your market cap or whatever it was. So these are all intentional decisions. There were a lot of conversations that we had which were like, should we go forward with this? And the answer that I came out with is yes. This is what I believe. I think this is going to be important for the world. I think it's going to work over time. We're no stranger to going through painful periods. In some ways it makes the company better. Let's do it.

好吧，我们开始进入，看看时间，结论闪电轮环节了。我有个问题一直潜伏在……

Well, we're starting to enter, looking at the clock, conclusion lightning round territory. I've had one like lurking in...

我潜意识里觉得，你把公司改名为 Facebook 以外的东西是合理的，毕竟你拥有的应用家族已经如此庞大。假设你今天要重新品牌，你有 AI、AR、VR 在推进，你会选择 Meta 这个名字吗？

The back of my head it makes sense to me that you would rebrand the company something that is not Facebook given how broad the family of apps was that you've got. Let's imagine you were going to rebrand it today, you've got AI going on, you've got AR going on, you've got VR going on. Would you pick the name Meta if you were going to rename the company today?

我喜欢 Meta，这是个好名字。找到简短的好名字……这其实是我们讨论了一段时间的事情，因为很明显，如果 Facebook 在世界上的重要性持续增长——我认为很多人没有意识到这一点，它的规模令人难以置信——但其他应用……我们经历了一个时期，只有 Facebook 和几个小应用，而现在我们有四个应用拥有十亿或更多用户。希望未来几年内，如果 Threads 继续扩张，会有第五个。我们多次讨论：公司名称用其中一个应用的名字是否合理，因为其他应用也在发展，它真的变成了一个应用家族。对我来说很重要——这也恰逢我们面临的许多挑战，政治品牌挑战等等。很多人提议从逃避 Facebook 品牌的角度出发："Facebook 品牌有问题吗？我们需要新品牌吗？"我说，我们不逃避。有一天不让 Facebook 成为公司的主导品牌可能是合理的，因为我们做这么多不同的事情，但我只会在我们想出一个能唤起我们试图构建的未来的品牌时才这样做，因为我们奔向某物，而不是逃避。当我们想到 Meta 时，我说，好吧，我们就在这里。那是在我们加倍投资并充满争议的时候，我说，看，如果我们这样做，我们就要全力以赴，所以让我们做吧。

I like Meta, it's a good name. Finding good short names... this actually was a thing that we talked about for a while because it was pretty clear that if Facebook is continuing to grow in importance in the world — which I think a lot of people don't appreciate, it's kind of mindboggling at the scale that it's at — but the others... we went through a period where we had Facebook and a handful of small apps, and now we have four apps that have a billion people or more using them. Hopefully in the next few years five with Threads if that continues scaling. This was a conversation that we had a bunch: does it make sense for the name of the company to be one of the apps as the other apps as it's really becoming a family of apps? It was important to me — this was also coinciding with a lot of the challenges that we were having, the political brand challenges, different things. A lot of people were proposing that from the perspective of running away from the Facebook brand: "Does the Facebook brand have issues? Do we need a new brand?" I was like, we don't run away from that. It might make sense one day to not have Facebook be the lead brand for the company because we do so many different things, but I'm only going to do this when we come up with a brand that is evocative of the future that we're trying to build, because we run towards something, we don't run away from things. When we got to Meta, I was like, all right, we're here. It was around the time when we were doubling down on the investment and where there was all the controversy, and it's like, look, if we're doing this, we're going to lean into this and we're going to do it, so let's do it.

如果让我来论证，我觉得 Meta 的核心能力是你能发现世界上的产品，你有好主意，你付诸实践，你发现有趣的产品，而你，Mark，不是那种想用任何东西定义自己的人。你想掌控一大堆好牌，最大化你的自由度，看清世界走向，然后拥有最好的飞船去那里航行。似乎我会选择一个几乎不把我限制在特定未来的品牌。我可能会寻找更像这样的东西：看，我想最大化我的机动性。我理解，但我不确定，这只是……

If I were to make the case to you, I feel the core competency of Meta is you are able to discover products in the world, you have great ideas, you work on them, you discover interesting products, and you, Mark, are not someone who wants to define yourself by anything. You want to have your hands on a bunch of great controls and maximize your degrees of freedom, see where the world's going, and then have the best freaking spaceship possible to go maneuver your way over there. It seems like I would pick a brand that almost doesn't pigeonhole me into a specific future. I might be looking for something that's more like, look, I want to maximize my maneuverability. I get it, but I don't know, that's just...

我理解。但我们围绕我们想做的愿景和使命保持一致，我们奔向它。我们一直是这样运作的。在很多方面，做我刚才建议的事情有点像逃跑……就像，好吧，我们没那么相信它，然后你说，不。我的意思是，我们是一家在我们所做的事情上插旗并去做的公司。就像在我们面前放一堵墙，墙上会有一个 Mark 形状的洞。

I get it. But we align around a vision and a mission of what we're trying to do, and we run towards it. That's always been how we've operated. And in many ways, doing what I just suggested would kind of be running... it's like, well, we don't believe in it that much, and you're like, no. I mean, we're a company that puts a flag down around what we're doing and we're going to go do it. It's like put a wall in front of us, there's going to be a Mark-shaped hole in the wall.

说到闪电问答和 Mark 形状的洞，你正在加速你以前的年度挑战。我一直——当我们都是孩子、彼此还不认识时，你每年做年度挑战并发布出来，我深受启发，觉得那太酷了。然后我们都长大了一点，现在我们在台上都有孩子，都有公司，有些大有些小。时间上的需求——尤其对我而言，我想对很多人来说——那个空间被吸走了，而你却扩大了它。怎么说？

Speaking of lightning rounds and Mark-shaped holes, you are accelerating what used to be your annual challenges. I always — when we were all kids and we didn't know each other, I was so inspired you would do your annual challenges, you would post about them, and I was like, wow, that's pretty damn cool. And then we all get a little older and we all have kids on the stage now and we all have companies on the stage now, some large, some small. The demands on your time — for me especially, I think lots of people — that space gets sucked, and you have expanded it. How? What do you mean?

嗯，你以前做年度挑战，我觉得你现在在做每周挑战。你在设计 T 恤，你在做雕塑。我只是想做一些鼓舞人心的事情。我不知道。我也很有竞争心。

Well, you used to do annual challenges and I feel like you're now doing weekly challenges. You're designing t-shirts, you're making sculptures. I'm just trying to do inspiring things. I don't know. I'm also really competitive.

你的竞争对手是谁？什么意思？

Who's your competition for this? What do you mean?

哦，我只是在想我正在做的其他事情。我就像，我开始做什么了？我参与了所有这些更极限的运动和格斗之类的东西。我不知道。我的意思是，我们在所做的很多方面都面临很多竞争。有社交媒体竞争对手，有平台竞争对手。我认为苹果是比人们意识到的更大的竞争对手。他们觉得，嘿，他们在做不同类型的事情，但我不确定。我认为在未来 10 到 15 年，那种战斗——关于下一代平台架构应该是什么样的意识形态之战。它们会是苹果一直做的封闭集成模式吗？再说一次，有多种好的构建方式。如果你看看不同代的计算，PC、移动，它们都有某种封闭集成版本和开放版本。我认为存在大量近因偏差的事情是，因为 iPhone 基本上赢了——我知道外面有更多 Android 手机，但 iPhone 是某种智力领导者，并且远远拥有所有……我们姑且认为这是事实。我认为存在近因偏差，可能这里几乎每个人都有 iPhone。由于近因偏差，有一种观点认为，哦，这只是做事的优越方式。但我实际上不认为这是理所当然的。在 PC 时代，拥有开放生态系统的 Windows 是领导者。我未来 10 到 15 年、下一代平台的部分目标是构建下一代开放平台，并让开放平台获胜。我认为这将带来一个更有活力的科技行业。现在做封闭集成模式有优势。我认为苹果肯定会有位置。我预计他们会成为我们的主要竞争对手，我认为这不仅仅是产品竞争。我认为这在某些方面是深深植根于价值观和意识形态的竞争，关于科技行业的未来应该是什么，以及这些平台——无论是像 Llama 和 AI，还是眼镜或其他东西——应该对开发者有多开放。一个像我一样在宿舍里起步的个人，不必请求许可就能去构建下一波很棒的东西。

Oh, I was just thinking about other things that I'm doing. I'm like, what have I started doing? I got into all these more extreme sports and fighting and stuff. I don't know. I mean, we face a lot of competition in a lot of different aspects of what we do. There's the social media competitors, there's the platform competitors. I think Apple is a bigger competitor than people realize. They kind of think, hey, they're doing a different type of thing, but I don't know. I think over the next 10, 15 years, I think that kind of battle — ideological battle over what should the architecture be of the next set of platforms. Are they going to be the closed integrated Apple model that Apple has always done? Which again, I mean, there are multiple good ways to build things. If you look at the different generations of computing, PCs, mobile, they've all had sort of a closed integrated version and an open version. The thing that I think there's just a ton of recency bias around is because iPhone basically won — I know there are more Android phones out there, but iPhone is sort of the intellectual leader and by far has all the... let's take it as a given. I think there's the recency bias and probably almost everyone here has an iPhone. Because of the recency bias, there's this view that, oh, this is just the superior way to do things. But I don't actually think that's a given. In the PC era, Windows with the open ecosystem was the leader. Part of my goal for the next 10, 15 years, the next generation of platforms, is to build the next generation of open platforms and have the open platforms win. I think that's going to lead to a much more vibrant tech industry. Now there are advantages of doing a closed integrated model. I think Apple will have a place for sure. I expect them to be our primary competitor, and I think it will not be just a product competition. I think it's in some ways very deeply values-driven and ideological competition around what the future of the tech industry should be, and how open these platforms — whether it's things like Llama and AI, or the glasses or different things — should be for developers. An individual someone getting started in their dorm room like me to not have to ask for permission to go build the next set of awesome things.

我有个结束问题。非常感谢。今晚观众中有很多建设者，很多创始人。我们可能处于最……

I've got a closing question here. Please, thank you so much. We have a lot of builders in the audience tonight, a lot of founders. We're in probably the most...

从早期移动时代以来，技术环境在机遇方面一直很有趣。已经过去 20 年了，你可能得往回看一点。但考虑到我们今天生活在一个不同的世界，对于今天的创始人，你有什么建议——不同于试图模仿 2004 年的 Mark Zuckerberg？

Interesting technology environments since the early mobile days in terms of opportunity. It's been 20 years, you might have to go back a little bit. But what advice do you have for founders today on something that's different than trying to pattern match Mark Zuckerberg from 2004, given we live in a different world today?

嗯，我不知道。我的意思是，就做你关心的事情。如果你想执行我们的策略，那就尽可能快地学习。但我想说的是，构建东西有不同的方式，对吧？我们的方式对我以及我们的团队有效，但其他公司显然也有不同的成功之道。我不知道。有一天，我带女儿去看了 Taylor Swift 的演唱会。她说：‘爸爸，我长大后想成为 Taylor Swift 那样的人。’我说：‘你做不到，那不适合你。’但她想了想，然后说：‘好吧，那我长大后要让人们想成为 August Chan Zuckerberg。’我说：‘太棒了，太棒了。’所以我觉得，要学习别人的成功和失败，但要做你自己的事。

Yeah, I don't know. I mean, just do something that you care about. And if you're trying to run our strategy, try to learn as quickly as you can. But I think part of what I'm trying to say is there are different ways to build stuff, right? Our way worked for me and our team, but different things have clearly worked for other companies. I don't know. One day, my daughter and I went to a Taylor Swift concert. She was like, 'Dad, I kind of want to be like Taylor Swift when I grow up.' I was like, 'You can't, that's not available to you.' But she thought about it and said, 'All right, when I grow up, I want people to want to be like August Chan Zuckerberg.' I was like, 'Hell yeah, hell yeah.' So I think it's like, look, learn from other people's successes and failures, but do your own thing.

说得好，说得好。嗯，这正好是结束的完美时机。我们给你做了一件你已经拥有的、非常棒的、设计精良的衬衫。我希望你的生活里还能再容纳一件。

Love that, love that. Well, that is the perfect place to leave things. We made you something that you already have a very amazing, well-designed shirt. I hope you have room in your life for more than one.

我确实有空间。你知道，我以前只穿一种衬衫，现在我已经变了。

I do. You know, I used to only wear one type of shirt, now I've moved on.

所以 David 和我给你做了一件定制的、独一无二的衬衫，代表今晚。谢谢。这是 Zuck 的尺码，所以别人穿不了——再也做不出第二件了。背面有这些坐标。第一组 GPS 坐标代表 Kirkland House，你在那里写了 Facebook 的第一行代码；第二组是 Chase Center。太棒了。所以感谢你今晚来到这里。

So David and I made you a custom one-of-one shirt that represents tonight. Thank you. It is size Zuck, so no one else can—there's no way it can ever be made again. And we've got these coordinates on the back. The first one, GPS coordinates, represents Kirkland House where you wrote the first line of code for Facebook, and the second one is Chase Center. Awesome. So thank you for joining us here tonight.

谢谢你们邀请我。

Thank you for joining us.

哇，今晚太棒了。简直疯狂。我是说，Mark 今年做了很多采访，包括其他播客和传统媒体，但这次感觉不一样。光是在一个体育馆里面对 6000 名现场观众这一点就不同。但我没想到会感觉这么不同。

Wow, what a night. Absolutely crazy. I mean, Mark has done many interviews this year, both with other podcasts and in traditional press, but that felt different. If for no other reason than it happened live in front of a 6,000-person audience in an arena. But I wasn't expecting it to feel that different.

是啊，我是说，站在台上是我人生中最疯狂的体验。我甚至不知道还有什么能比得上。太不可思议了。

Yeah, I mean, it was the wildest experience of my life being up there. I don't even know what else could compare. Pretty insane.

好了，听众朋友们，你们可能已经注意到了，感谢我们的赞助商，这次对话没有中断。我们想稍微回顾一下，分享一些我们的想法以及回顾这次对话的感受。但首先，我们想介绍一下 StatSig 和 Crusoe。

Well, listeners, as you may have noticed, thanks to our sponsors, this conversation was uninterrupted. And we do want to reflect a little bit and share some of our thoughts and how we're feeling looking back on this conversation with you. But first, we do want to share a word on StatSig and Crusoe.

那么 StatSig。Mark 最著名的口头禅大概是‘快速行动，打破常规’。但正如我们和他聊到的，尽管这被灌输到 Facebook 的工程文化中，Facebook 实际上并不经常出问题。当然现在更是如此，而且相对于同行，即使在过去也不常出问题。Facebook 投入了数十万工程小时来开发一套内部工具。这些工具让任何工程师都能设置新指标、发布新功能并实时衡量性能。这意味着任何人都可以发布新功能，但他们总有指标作为护栏，并且如果出现问题，他们总能回滚功能。哦，天哪，多年来，Facebook 和 Meta 有无数传奇故事，关于工程师在入职第一周的新兵训练营就以实习生或新员工身份发布功能。你可能希望你的团队也能这样做，像 Facebook 那样构建产品：快速发布、基于数据做决策、快速迭代。但你需要合适的工具，所以你被困住了，对吧？那么，StatSig 来了。StatSig 构建了世界上第一个产品加速平台，将功能标志、产品分析、实验和可观测性等工具整合在一起，帮助你更快行动并做出更明智的决策。更棒的是，StatSig 正是由前 Meta 团队创立的，他们希望帮助每个人像最优秀的公司一样构建产品，并将这些工具推向市场。如今，许多世界领先的科技公司都依赖 StatSig，包括 OpenAI、Microsoft、Notion、Anthropic、Figma，以及数千家早期初创公司。David，每次我们与 StatSig 合作，这个名单都越来越令人印象深刻。现在完全是顶级公司了。太棒了。所以，如果你准备好加速增长并在公司内普及产品构建，请访问 statsig.com/acquired，联系时告诉他们 Ben 和 David 介绍的。谢谢 StatSig。

So StatSig. Mark's most famous catchphrase is probably 'move fast and break things.' But like we talked about with him, despite instilling this in Facebook's engineering culture, Facebook doesn't actually break very often. Certainly not anymore, and really relative to its peers, not even throughout its past. Facebook invested hundreds of thousands of engineering hours in a set of internal tools. These tools let any engineer set up new metrics, ship new features, and measure performance in real time. That means anyone could just ship a new feature, but they always had metrics to use as guardrails, and they could always roll back a feature if anything broke. Oh man, there are legendary stories of engineers shipping features in their first week at boot camp as interns or new hires at Facebook and Meta over the years. And you might wish that you could do the same on your team and build products like they build products at Facebook: ship fast, make data-driven decisions, iterate rapidly. But you need the right tools, so you're stuck, right? Well, enter StatSig. StatSig has built the world's first product acceleration platform, combining tools like feature flags, product analytics, experimentation, and observability all in one place, helping you move faster and make smarter decisions. Even better, StatSig was literally founded by an ex-Meta team who wanted to help everyone build like the best and bring these same tools to the market. Today, many of the world's leading tech companies rely on StatSig, including OpenAI, Microsoft, Notion, Anthropic, Figma, plus thousands of early-stage startups. David, every time we work with StatSig, this list gets more and more impressive. Like now it is purely A-list companies. It's awesome. So if you're ready to accelerate your growth and democratize product building at your company, go to statsig.com/acquired and when you get in touch, just tell them that Ben and David sent you. Thanks, StatSig.

接下来是 Crusoe。Crusoe 是一个气候友好的云平台，专为 AI 工作负载构建，由清洁能源驱动。他们构建并运营 GPU 数据中心，使用低成本、原本会被浪费或更糟地被排放为温室气体的搁浅能源。这太疯狂了。当 Acquired 刚开始与 Crusoe 合作时，这还是一个很酷的想法。现在他们已成为世界上最重要的公司之一，其 AI 云优于超大规模云服务商，并且许多全球最大的公司都将 AI 基础设施托付给他们。是的，人们很容易认为 AI 就是‘一群 Meta、OpenAI 或 Anthropic 的博士在办公室里摆弄模型权重并运行计算’。但 AI 还有另一个工业层面：模型训练按下‘开始’之后的一切。那就是能源、冷却、建设，所有 AI 背后的物理基础设施。而 Crusoe 通过生产或再利用大量电力来支撑这一切。他们的开发管道中有千兆瓦级的电力，相当于核反应堆的发电量，成本低于其他供应商，并且零排放，在某些情况下甚至是负排放。这非常重要。如果你听 Zuck 和其他人谈论 AI 进步的瓶颈，实际上不是算力，而是能源。而 Crusoe 正在解决这个问题。这是一家非常棒的公司。我们非常自豪能与他们合作，并成为该公司的投资者。你可以通过他们的托管 AI 云与 Crusoe 合作，这对想要完整端到端 AI 平台的初创企业和企业来说非常合适；或者直接作为数据中心客户，全球几家最大的公司已经在这样做了。所以请访问 crusoe.ai/acquired，或点击节目说明中的链接，告诉他们 Ben 和 David 介绍的。

And now for Crusoe. Crusoe is a climate-aligned cloud platform built specifically for AI workloads and powered by clean energy. They build and operate GPU data centers powered by low-cost, stranded energy that otherwise goes to waste or, worse, gets emitted as greenhouse gases. It's crazy. When Acquired first started working with Crusoe, this was a cool idea. Now they're like one of the most important companies in the world, with an AI cloud that's superior to the hyperscalers, and a whole bunch of the largest companies in the world trusting their AI infrastructure to them. Yeah, it's easy to think about AI as like, 'Oh, that's a bunch of PhDs at Meta or OpenAI or Anthropic or whatever, tinkering with model weights in their office and hitting compute.' But there's this whole other industrial side of AI: everything that happens after you press 'go' on the model training. That's energy, cooling, construction, all the physical infrastructure behind AI. And Crusoe is powering that by producing or repurposing huge amounts of power. We are talking gigawatts in their development pipeline, which is nuclear reactor amounts of power, for less cost than other providers and with zero or, in some cases, actually negative emissions. It's super important. If you listen to Zuck and others talk about what the bottleneck to AI progress is, it's actually not compute but energy. And Crusoe is solving that problem. It's just an awesome company. We are super proud to work with them and to be investors in the company. You can work with Crusoe either through their managed AI cloud, which is great for startups and enterprises who want a complete end-to-end platform for AI, or directly as a data center customer, which several of the largest companies in the world are now doing. So just go over to crusoe.ai/acquired, or click the link in the show notes, and tell them that Ben and David sent you.

好了，David，对这次对话的反思。我整晚一直在想的一件事是，当我们和 Mark 以及他的团队交谈时，人们一直说：‘我们一般不这样做。Mark 一般不这样做。’我一直在想：‘嗯，他其实做的，因为他今年做了所有这些播客，而且他做 Facebook Meta Connect，他以前也做过大型活动，当然对吧？’而且他做……

Okay, so David, reflections on this conversation. The biggest thing that I kept thinking going into the night, as we're talking with Mark, as we're talking with his team, you know, people kept saying, 'We don't really do this. Mark doesn't really do this.' And I kept thinking, 'Yeah, he kind of does, because he's done all these podcasts this year, and he does Facebook Meta Connect, like he's done big events before, of course, right?' And he does a...

他还做了不少面对面的媒体采访。他并不是不跟传统媒体交流，尽管这已经成了一种说法，但其实并非如此。不过，马克从未做过这种面对几千人的外部现场活动。这是一种非常不寻常的形式，甚至有点让人不舒服。就算是你和我，我们也习惯了停顿、开始、深思熟虑地回答，而这是一场表演，没有休息，没有重来。

Good number of in-person press interviews too. It's not like he doesn't talk to the traditional press, even though that has kind of become a narrative. It's not really true. However, Mark has not done an external several-thousanders live thing like this. This is a very unusual format and kind of an uncomfortable one. Even for you and I, like we're so used to stopping, starting, being thoughtful in our answers, and like this is a show you're performing. There are no breaks, there are no retakes.

没错。但马克和所有 Meta 高管都非常投入。整个高管团队都来了，他们腾出了一整天，实际上我们前一天晚上也做了一些事情。很多董事会成员都在场，很多对马克重要的人也在场，他的家人也来了。他们把这件事办成了一个活动。

Yeah, right. But Mark and all the Meta execs really embraced it. A bunch of the executive team came, they took off this whole day, and actually some stuff we did the night before too. A bunch of the board members were there, a lot of people important to Mark were there, his family came. They made it an event.

我以为这对我们来说是一件大事。我有点惊讶，马克也觉得这对他是一件大事，这太酷了。

I thought this was a big deal for us. I was kind of shocked to the degree that Mark also thought it was a big deal for him, which is super cool.

完全同意。还有一点，我也很惊讶和高兴他愿意和我们深入探讨历史。是的，我们完全没想到。他通常都狂热地专注于未来。在活动前的准备对话中，他说：“我觉得你们是个历史播客，咱们聊聊未来吧。”我说，好吧好吧，但我们想以历史为基础。结果他到了现场，完全准备好回顾过去。我觉得这让关于现在和未来的讨论更加精彩了。

Totally agree. That's one. I was also surprised and delighted that he was willing to dive into history with us. Yes, we totally did not expect that. He's so usually maniacally focused on the future. And in our conversations to prep with him before the event, he was like, "I think of you guys as a history podcast, you know, let's talk about the future." I'm like, okay, okay, but we want to be grounded in history. And he showed up and was totally ready to go back. And I think that made the talking about the present and the future even better.

完全如此，因为你可以创造出这些贯穿始终的线索。我的意思是，尽管你插话说“让我们回到 IPO 时刻”很有趣，但它打开了这些对比时刻的大门。比如，Meta 今天做的事情是否与你反复做过的事情相似？我们应该留意一种模式，还是你如今与历史上截然不同？他在台上谈论这些事情的方式感觉非常真实，我以前从未听过他那样说话，至少公开场合没有。

Totally, because you could create these through lines. I mean, as funny as your interjection on "let's go back to the IPO moment" was, it opened up the door to have these comparative moments. Like, is what Meta doing today similar to something you've done over and over? Should we be watching for a pattern here, or are you very different today than you were historically? The way that he was talking about that stuff on stage felt very authentic, and I just haven't heard him speak in that way before, at least publicly.

我认为这也是一个很好的方式，让我们都能一窥他的内心世界，这又引出了另一点，那就是他仍然全身心投入。还有哪些公司创始人像这样？我的意思是，有 Jensen。还有谁？你知道，就他们两个。

I think it was also a great way to let us all get a window into his psyche, which kind of brings us to another point, which is like he is still in it. Oh, what other founders of companies like that? I mean, there's Jensen. Who else? You know, it's the two of them.

是的。我认为对 Meta 的普通观察者可能会注意到，马克已经经营了 20 年，而大多数时候这些创始人都会去做别的事情。他们成为执行主席，或者进入董事会，或者持有公司 4% 的股份。存在某种模式。而对于马克，我认为在台上已经一目了然：他比以往任何时候都更投入。我不认为他觉得自己的旅程已经过半。我不认为他是“40 岁干了 20 年，我就结束了。”我也没有那种感觉。

Yeah. I think the casual observer of Meta might observe like, you know, Mark's been running it for 20 years, and most of the time these founders kind of go and do something else. They become executive chairman, or they step into a board role, or they own 4% of the company. There's some pattern there. And for Mark, I think it was plain as day on stage: he is more in it than ever. And I don't think he thinks he's like halfway through his journey. Like, I don't think he's "20 years in at 40, I'll be done." I don't get that sense either.

我认为 Meta 是他度过整个人生的工具，他想和这群人一起创造他想创造的东西，就是这样。这基本上就是产品策略。

I think Meta is his vehicle by which he wants to live his entire life, and he wants to make things with this group of people that he wants to make, period. And that is kind of the product strategy.

当他说到“20 年的错误”时，我起了一身鸡皮疙瘩，然后当他说“但 20 年其实并不长”时，我更是起了一身鸡皮疙瘩。是的，这是一个很有启发性的评论。

I got chills when he said the 20-year mistake, and then I got even more chills when he said "but 20 years actually isn't that long." Yeah, it's a pretty illustrative comment.

完全同意。我很感激他愿意和我们讨论“批评公司”，因为老实说，我问这个问题是为了给我们将来不可避免要做 Meta 那期节目做研究。我觉得他给了我们一个遗憾，而不是批评。但我们在 6000 人面前现场直播，这确实不是适合那种讨论的形式。

Totally. I was appreciative that he engaged with us on "be critical of the company," because honestly I was asking that as research for when we inevitably do our Meta episode. I think he gave us a regret, not a criticism. But we were live on stage in front of 6,000 people, and it's not really the right format for that.

是的，完全同意。话虽如此，这显然是一个非常有趣的回答。我认为这又回到了“他仍然投入”这一点——从某种意义上说，你可以把 Reality Labs 看作他的蓝色起源，100%。只是它在 Meta 内部。我很高兴你也注意到了这一点。其他大型科技公司的 CEO 创始人都有他们经营公司的时刻，然后他们担任董事会职务，去做另一件事，而且通常这件事对世界来说重大、重要且资本密集。而马克正在做这件事，但在 Meta 内部通过 Reality Labs 来做。

Yep, totally. That said, obviously a very interesting answer. I think related though, back to the "he's still in it" — in some sense, Reality Labs you could look at like his Blue Origin, 100%. It's just within Meta. I'm glad you caught this too. Other big tech CEO founders have their moment running the company, they take a board role, they go do another thing, and oftentimes it's big and important for the world and capital intensive. And Mark is doing that but inside Meta with Reality Labs.

我认为 20 到 50 年后回顾起来会非常有趣，看看将多个巨大赌注合并到一个公司旗下，与让一个人同时担任多家公司 CEO 或从一家公司卸任去经营另一家相比，会产生哪些意料之外或意料之中的结果。对于马克，我再次感觉 Meta 是他执行他认为很棒的产品想法的工具。当然，不仅仅是很棒的产品，还有那些能让他对自己的宇宙有更多控制权的东西。他显然是一个重视自由度、不喜欢被束缚的人。

I think it'll be super fascinating 20 to 50 years from now to reflect back and say, what were the unintended or perhaps intended outcomes of co-mingling multiple huge swings under one corporate umbrella, versus having people who are either CEO of multiple companies concurrently or step down from one to run the other? For Mark, I kind of feel like again, Meta is his vehicle for executing the things that he thinks are awesome products. And of course it's not just awesome products, but like things that could let him have more control over his universe. He's clearly a guy who values having a lot of degrees of freedom and doesn't like being boxed in.

我喜欢你那个回合制策略游戏的比喻：“获得更多回合，每回合学到更多。”就像，天哪，星际争霸职业选手入门课。是的。但看看 Reality Labs 放在 Meta 组织内而不是作为一个新创企业会带来什么连锁反应，将会很有趣。

I loved your turn-based strategy game of "get more turns, learn more on each turn." Like, oh man, Starcraft pro player 101 there. Yes. But it'll be interesting to see the knock-on effects of having Reality Labs in the Meta organization versus as a new venture.

完全同意。所有这些让我想到，坦白说，我从整个经历中得到的最大的、压倒性的收获是：Ben，你开发了一个非常好的研究采访问题，你现在用它来问我们所有的消息来源，那就是你问：“关于这家公司、这个组织，最被误解的一件事是什么？”多年来，Meta 的每个人总是说“马克”。直到今晚我才完全理解。

Totally. All of that brings me to, frankly, just my biggest overwhelming takeaway from the whole experience, which is: Ben, you've developed a really great research interview question that you use on all the sources that we talk to now, which is you ask, "What is the one thing that is most misunderstood about this company, this organization, etc." And everybody at Meta for years always would say "Mark." And I never totally got it until this evening.

他本人是一个独特的人，但不仅如此。公司真正的超能力在于，它从上到下——法律上、财务上、组织上、文化上——都被设计成反映和放大他巨大力量的样子。我认为苹果和史蒂夫·乔布斯、比尔·盖茨和微软、英伟达和 Jensen 可能也是如此。是的。但我们非常接近地看到了 Meta 在某种程度上是一个放大器，几乎就像是一种方式，让你把马克的产出增益放大一万倍。

He's both a singular individual himself, but it's not just that. It's that a true superpower of the company is that it is architected from top to bottom — legally, financially, organizationally, culturally — to reflect and amplify his immense strength. Which I think is probably true of Apple, Steve Jobs; Bill Gates, Microsoft; Nvidia, Jensen. Yes. But we are right up close to the ways in which Meta is a sort of amplifier, almost like it's a way for you to take the gain on Mark's output and turn it up 10,000x.

是的。我认为对我来说如此引人注目的是，与你说的完全正确——所有其他公司相比——在公众叙事中，关于史蒂夫·乔布斯领导下的苹果、关于 Jensen 领导下的英伟达，人们普遍接受这一点。但我不认为关于 Meta 和马克也是如此。我认为人们不理解这一点。直到这次经历我才理解。

Yes. And I think what was so striking about it to me, versus — you're absolutely right, all those other companies — it is generally accepted in the public narrative about Apple under Steve Jobs, about Nvidia under Jensen, that that is the case. I don't think it is about Meta and Mark. I don't think people understand that. I didn't understand that until this experience.

你是说 Meta 仍然很大程度上是马克·扎克伯格的产品？我这就走。

Are you saying Meta is still very much on Mark Zuckerberg production? I'll see myself out.

说得好。就这样吧。好了，听众们，非常感谢你们加入我们的这段旅程。来我们的 Slack（acquired.fm 的 Slack）和我们聊聊吧。我们也很想听听你们的想法。加入我们的邮件列表，访问 acquired.fm。这样你就能第一时间知道每一集新节目上线，或者当我们再次做像 Chase Center 这样的活动时，你会第一个知道。天哪，如果我们再搞一次类似活动的话。我们还有周边商店，去 acquired.fm 看看吧。

Well put. There we go. Well, listeners, thank you so much for joining us on this journey. Come talk about it with us in the Slack, acquired.fm's Slack. Would love to hear all of your thoughts as well. Join our email list at acquired.fm. That will let you basically know every single time a new episode drops, or when we are doing something like Chase Center again, to be the first to know about that. God, if we ever do something like that again. We've got a merch store, check it out at acquired.fm.

FM，我们迎来了第二场节目，我们总是采访比 Meta 更早期的公司，但我们认为这些公司与创始人和 CEO 的对话非常有见地。David，我知道你有一些感谢要说。最后一件事，最后的感谢。感谢 Mark，感谢基本上整个 Meta 高管团队，他们协助了今晚的活动。感谢 Hermes 为我们提供服装，这是今晚我最喜欢的复活节彩蛋。是的，太有趣了。感谢 Jamie Diamond、摩根大通和摩根大通支付，让这一切成为可能。这真的是梦想成真，而这都归功于我们不可思议的合作关系。确实如此。好了，听众们，我们下次再见。是的，几周后带来完整节目。我们迫不及待要发布了。下次见。谁得到了真相？是你吗？是你吗？是你得到了真相吗？嗯？

FM, we've got our second show where we are always interviewing earlier stage companies than Meta, but where we think there are great insightful conversations with founders and CEOs. And David, I know you've got some thank yous. One last thing, final thank yous. Thank you to Mark, thank you to basically the entire Meta executive team who helped with the evening. Thank you to Hermes for dressing us, which was my favorite Easter of the night. Yes, so fun. Thank you to Jamie Diamond, JP Morgan Chase, and JP Morgan Payments for making it all possible. It was truly a dream come true, and that is because of our incredible partnership. Indeed it was. Well listeners, we'll see you next time. Yes, in a couple of weeks with the full show. We are pumped to drop it. We'll see you next time. Who got the truth? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you who got the truth now? Huh?