王者归来：特拉维斯·卡兰尼克谈 Uber 2017 年危机及其非常规融资

我们知道 Uber 在 2017 年经历了什么。Travis Kalanick 辞去了首席执行官一职。如果 Ben 或 Mark 在董事会，事情就不会那样发展。你身处地狱，应对诉讼。你担心诉讼，然后你说：“嘿，让我们重新开始。”重要的不是从哪里开始，而是为什么开始。他是极少数赚了那么多钱还想继续玩下去的人。还记得我是秘密行事的。我知道我用的有些手段很激进，但那个名字你不能用。我记得 Google 的 David Drummond 在我们的董事会，他说：“不，Travis，那不是回事，伙计。你得改。”关于 Adam 的食品，有意义的是，你能不能让优质餐食的准备和配送变得如此高效，以至于接近去杂货店购物的成本？如果能，你就对厨房做了 Uber 对汽车做的事。很多关于建立公司、建立伟大公司的想法。它总是关于伟大的创业者。Travis，这里是“我回来了”播客。这是“王者归来”的一集。

We know what Uber's 2017 was like. Travis Kalanick has stepped down from his role as chief executive. That wouldn't have gone that way if Ben or Mark was on the board. You're in this hell. You're dealing with the lawsuits. You worry about the lawsuit and you say, 'Hey, let's build again.' It's not as much about where you start. It's about why you start. He's one of the very rare guys who made as much money as he did and wanted to keep playing. Also remember I did it stealth. I know some of the techniques I use very aggressive but that name you can't use that name. And I remember David Drummond from Google was on our board and he's like no Travis that's not a thing dude. You got to change it. The meaningful thing about Adam's food is can you make the preparation and delivery of a quality meal so efficient that it approaches the cost of going to the grocery store? If it does, you do to the kitchen what Uber did to the car. A lot of that idea to build a company, a great company. It's always a great entrepreneur. Travis, this is the I'm back podcast. This is the return of the king episode.

“机器归来”。我完全赞成我们可以回归。我不知道什么是对的，但我们肯定得想一首出场音乐。“Mac 归来”。归来。

Return of the mech. That's I'm all about we can return. I don't know what the right thing is, but we got to come up with a walk-on song for sure. Return of the Mac. Return.

这不仅是 Travis 的回归，也是这段伙伴关系或本可能的关系的回归，是 Travis 和 Ben 的关系。所以，我想读一段 Travis 在你发布文章中的引言。我认识 Mark 和 Ben 很久了，我们在 2011 年差点就在 Uber 合作了。我 Travis 怪 Mark，Ben 怪自己，但我们就说这都怪我们，是我们所有人的错。而在 2017 年，Uber 因为没有 Mark 在董事会而承受了后果。懂的都懂。Travis，讲讲这个故事。

And it's not just a return of Travis, but it's also a return of this partnership or what could have been and this relationship with Travis and Ben. So, I want to read a quote from Travis from your launch post. I've known Mark and Ben for a long time and we got oh so close to partnering up at Uber in 2011. I Travis blame Mark. Ben blamed himself, but let's just say it was all on us and it was on all of us. And in 2017, Uber suffered the consequences of not having Mark on the board. If you know, you know. Travis, tell the story.

好的。这会很有趣，因为我想 Ben 和我可能只讨论过一两次。是的。很痛苦，而且我想对于发生了什么可能有不同看法，但我会告诉你我认为发生了什么。所以，我当时在融资模式。这是我们的 B 轮。这是 2011 年。Uber 始于 2010 年，2010 年 6 月。我在进行 B 轮融资。那年早些时候，我做了 A 轮，和某家风投，名字就不提了。我很强硬，这很有趣。我在 Uber 之前作为创业者经历了非常艰难的时期，所以一旦我在 Uber 并且事情进展顺利，我仍然表现得好像明天就没饭吃一样。所以我会把每件事都做到极致，做到完美。所以我有一套完整的融资流程，我会做到完美。这意味着我会进行拍卖。所以见了 A16Z 的人，见了很多其他人。这是一场我称之为“赢家通吃”的拍卖，意思是有一个主要领投方。他们会定价格，然后其他人都会跟进。所以我去见那个人，你知道，我告诉他故事，他们说：“哦，你知道，我们感兴趣。他身体前倾。”然后他们会说：“那么，你筹多少钱？价格是多少？”我会做这样的事，我会说：“嗯，我们不知道，这将是今年硅谷最热门的交易之一。我们不知道价格会是多少，会涨到哪里，但至少是空白。”我称之为“无上限锚点”。意思是，我永远不会处于和某人谈判的境地，我在这，他们在那，然后我们在中间会合。我总是说至少是这个，而且可能更高，但我从低开始。

Okay. So, this will be interesting because I think Ben and I have maybe discussed this once or twice. Yeah. Painful and I think that there could be a difference of opinion on what happened, but I'll tell you what I thought happened. So, I'm in fundraising mode. This is our series B. This is 2011. Uber started 2010, June 2010. I'm raising our series B. Earlier that year, I did series A with VC, let's remain nameless. And I'm hardcore like it's interesting. I was such, I went through such tough times as an entrepreneur pre-Uber that once I'm in Uber and things are working, I'm still acting like I'm not going to eat tomorrow. So I would do everything right up to the line, like be perfect. And so I have this whole fundraising process that I would do just to perfection. And that means I'd run an auction. So met with A16Z guys, met with lots of folks. And it was a what I would call winner takes all auction, meaning there's one major lead. They're going to set the price and then everybody else will fall in. So I'd go to the one guy, you know, I'd tell him what the story was and they're like, 'Oh, you know, we're interested. He's leaning forward.' And I would, they're like, 'So, how much you raising? What's the price?' And I would do this thing where I would say, 'Um, we don't know what like this is going to be one of the hottest deals in Silicon Valley this year. We don't know where the price is going to be, where it's going to go to, but it's at least blank.' And I call this the uncapped anchor. Meaning, I'm never in a place where I'm negotiating with somebody where I'm here and they're here and we meet in the middle. I'm always saying it's at least this and it can go up, but I start low.

所以，一切都进行得很顺利，每个人都兴奋不已，身体前倾。他说：“好的，你能看到肢体语言。你能读懂。很好。”

So, it all goes so that everybody's pumped, leaning forward. He's like, 'Okay, you can see body language. You can read. It's good.'

你去见下一个。下一个人真的来到你的办公室。一个小时后，同样的事情发生了。他非常兴奋。我展示所有分析数据。很棒。好的，所以我们感兴趣。你对价格有什么想法？随便。我说，如果上一个至少是上一轮的 2 倍，现在变成了 3 倍。我会说：“我们不知道。硅谷最好的交易之一。这将是今年硅谷的顶级交易之一，但至少是上一轮的 3 倍。”他说：“好的。”然后你打电话给前一个人，你说：“嘿，听着，伙计，刚从 2 倍涨到 3 倍。”你知道，我们看看会怎样。我不知道。他们开始紧张。无论如何，你一路走到最高点，然后你说“一次，两次”。在这个特殊情况下，有点好笑，Yuri 几乎要超过最高价。所以我们达到了 3.75 亿，A16Z 投前估值 3.75 亿。Yuri 几乎出价 4 亿，但他说：“不，我不能。”所以我说：“好的，一次，两次，成交。”

You go to the next. The next guy literally comes to your office. An hour later, same thing happens. He's fired up. I'm showing all the analytics. It's great. Okay, so, we're interested. What are you thinking about price? Whatever. I'm like, if the last one was at least 2x our previous round, it just became 3x. I'll say, 'We don't know. One of the best deals in Silicon Valley. It's going to be one of the top deals in Silicon Valley this year, but it will be at least 3x our last round.' And he's like, 'Okay.' You then go call the guy before and you're like, 'Hey, just, hey, look, dude, just went from 2x to 3x.' You know, we'll see where it goes. I don't know. They start getting nervous. Anyways, you get all the way to the top and then you go going once, going twice. And it's kind of funny in this particular case, Yuri was almost coming over the top. So, we got to 375 with 375 million pre with A16Z. Yuri almost came in at 400, but he was like, 'No, I can't do it.' And so I'm like, 'Okay, going once, going twice, sold.'

是的。

Yeah.

这很有趣，因为那是一笔高势头的交易，这就是你做事的方式。当时，你几乎应该对做那样的事感到有点害羞。这有点粗俗，就这么说吧，但那就是我当年的风格。就像全力以赴，一路到底。就像跑出达阵，即使你知道，这有点过头了。

And it's funny because that's a high momentum deal, and that's how you do it. And at the time, you almost should feel a little shy about doing something like that. And it's a little bit crass, let's just say, but that's how I was wired back in the day. Like just go all the freaking way, all the way. Like run the touchdown, like score the touchdown even when you're gonna, you know, it's a little much.

所以我们开始合作。你会拿到投资意向书，整个过程。然后我收到 Mark 的邮件。邮件说，嘿，让我们，嘿 Travis，我们去吃晚饭吧。我想是明天晚上之类的。我们去吃晚饭。我说把投资意向书发给我，然后我们可以去吃晚饭。他回复说我们去吃晚饭吧。我想，哦，那不行，我不喜欢那样。所以我就南下到了这一带。是的。因为我在旧金山，还有那个小寿司店，我不记得名字了。他说：“听着，我知道我们谈的是 3.75 亿，但去了合伙人那里。他们不同意，或者他们只是认为这不是正确的数字。我们最多能做到 2.1 亿。明白吗？”所以，我只是告诉你对我来说事情是怎么发生的。

So we're starting to work. You're going to get a term sheet going, the whole thing. And I get an email from Mark. And it was like, hey, let's, hey Travis, let's go to dinner. I think it was like tomorrow night or something like that. Let's go to dinner. And I said send me the term sheet and then yeah, we can go to dinner. And he responded he said let's go to dinner. And I'm like oh that didn't, I didn't like that. So came down south this neck of the woods. Yeah. because I was in San Francisco and this little sushi place, I don't remember the name of it. And he said, 'Look, I know we talked about 375, but went to the partnership. They don't agree or they just didn't think it was the right number. We're the best we're going to be able to do is 210. See that?' So that I'm just telling you how it went down for me.

是的。哇。好吧，所以我想，另一边的故事肯定不同，但我想听听会很有趣。

Yeah. Wow. Well, and so then I'm like, story was definitely different on the other side, but so but I want it be interesting to hear it.

如果我们想花时间，我有比预定的一小时更多的时间。但无论如何，我有一笔高势头的交易。它一路走到最高点。我拍卖了它，清算了市场，然后底部塌了。所以我不得不回去找其他人说 2.1 亿是新的数字。是的。就像：“嘿，伙计们，赢家退出了。我现在回到 2.1 亿。我们重新开始拍卖。”那非常尴尬和奇怪，因为那一刻你会失去信誉。

I've got more than the hour we have scheduled here if we want to take time. But anyways, I had a high momentum deal. It went all the way to the top. I auctioned it, cleared the market, and the bottom came out from it. And so I had to go back to everybody else and say 210 is the new number. Yeah. Like, 'Hey guys, the guy who won backed out. I'm now back at 210. We're starting the auction over.' It was super awkward and weird because people you lose credibility in that moment.

然后我把它重建起来。基本上最后就是门洛帕克。这就是谢尔文参与优步的方式。

And I built it back up. And uh basically it ended up being Menlo Park. This is how Shervin got involved in Uber.

在某个时候，我告诉谢尔文别再自己跟自己抬价了，因为他没别人竞争还一个劲往上加。我说：“哥们，你赢了，没事了。”我不想同样的事情再发生一次。你懂我的意思吧？

And at some point I told Shervin to stop negotiating against himself because he just kept driving it up without anybody else. I'm like, "Dude, you won, dude. It's fine." I didn't want the same thing to happen again. You know what I'm saying?

呃，所以我对 375 和 210 以及我的经历非常清楚，但这个故事可能还有另一面。

Uh, so I am very clear about the 375 and the 210 and the experience I had, but there may be another side of that story.

是的。嗯，好吧，让我告诉你我实际记得什么。嗯，然后是我大概记得的。所以，我记得你来做了演示，而且我想只有你一个人。

Yeah. Well, you know, okay, let me just tell you what I actually remember. Um, and then what I kind of remember. So, I remember you came in for the pitch and I think it was just you.

是的，那是那是

Yeah, that's that's

顺便说一句，这很不寻常。通常人们不会，尤其是在那个年代，企业家在这么大的交易上不带团队成员来是非常罕见的。顺便说一句，那是个大交易，那是个高价交易，现在大概是 375。

which is uh by the way unusual. So normally people don't particularly in those days very rare that entrepreneur would come in with no team members on a deal that size. That was a big deal by the way that wasn't that was a high price deal at now it's like a 375.

是的。你会说，哥们，预，预

Yeah. You'd be like dude preede preede

预，预，还有

pre pre and

对

right

是的，那个演示非常令人印象深刻。然后嗯，我我记得比较清楚的另一件事是，呃，特拉维斯显然读过我的一些博客，我觉得哦，我们能赢下这个。这是个交易。嗯，我们进行了讨论，很明显，不，我们想做这笔交易。呃，当时我想我真的应该做这个，但我不是消费领域的专家。然后我，你知道，我有很多董事会席位，很多

yeah the pitch was super impressive. And then um the other thing I I I recall pretty closely was uh like Travis had definitely like read some of my blogs like I felt like oh we can win this. This is a deal. Um and we had the discussion and like it was clear like no we want to do the deal. Uh and at the time I was like I should really do this one but I wasn't the consumer guy. And then I, you know, I had a lot of board seats and a lot of

我想大概有 16 个董事会席位。那真是疯狂。

I think it was like 16 board seats. It was something crazy.

就是，就是太多了，所以我想，呃。然后我把它交给了马克和约翰·奥费雷尔去做，然后我记得的，所以我现在记得有点不同，但我都是从他们那里得到的。所以我不在场。呃，好像有关于员工期权池的事，或者类似的事，我我我不能，但这是那种事情，好吧好吧，但我只是假设我们在做交易，然后接下来我知道谢尔文拿到了交易，我就像，天哪，我后悔了，我无法告诉你多久，因为那是我的折磨的开始。所以我就像，“妈的，我知道我们应该做那笔交易。我们输掉了一笔交易。”

It was, it was just so I was like, uhh. And so I I gave it to Mark and John O'Ferrell um to do and then all I remember so I remember something different at this point, but I I got it all from them. So I wasn't there. Uh there was something about the employee option pool or some like I I I couldn't but it was one of these things where it's like okay okay but like I just assumed we were doing the deal and then the next thing I knew uh Shervin had the deal and I was like geez and and I regret I can't tell you how long because like so that was the beginning of my torture on on this thing. So I was like, "Fuck, I know we should do that deal. We lost a deal."

然后嗯，与此同时，呃，斯科特·韦森为这个领域的另一家公司 Lyft 做了一笔交易。嗯，顺便说一句，那笔交易起步非常非常艰难，你知道，主要是因为优步。嗯，所以，你知道，为了戴夫和卡奇，我最终不得不进入董事会，我接过了那个董事会席位，帮助他们度过难关。

And then um meanwhile uh Scott Weissen did a deal uh for the other company in the space, Lyft. Um and by the way, that kind of got off to a very very difficult start, you know, largely because of Uber. Um, so and you know in order to Dave and catch I ended up having to go on the board like I took over that board seat to kind of help them through that.

而且让你明白我在 Lyft 这件事上的经历，我相信那发生在一年后。

And just so you understand my experience on the lift thing, it happened I believe a year later.

是的。

Yeah.

几乎就在同一天，类似的事情，还有 210 的交易。

Almost to the day something like this and the deal on 210.

真的吗？我不

Was that was it really? I I don't

我知道。我只是说这是企业家会记住的，哥们。你懂我的意思吗？天哪。但不管怎样，所以，你知道，因为如果一家公司陷入很多麻烦，那通常是我被叫去的时候，嗯，你知道，鉴于我在这方面的历史。

I know. I'm just saying this is what the entrepreneur is going to remember, dude. You know what I'm saying? Holy cow. But anyway, so so I you know because if a company is in a lot of trouble that that's generally when I get called um you know given given my history with that.

哦，天哪，我那么努力地工作。

Oh man, I was working so hard on that.

所以

And so

我在那个麻烦上努力工作。

I was working hard on that trouble.

哦，我的天，那是很多麻烦。那是很多麻烦。但不管怎样，所以我一直忍受着。然后顺便说一句，然后我会看到特拉维斯，你知道，时不时地，比如我们，我请他到我家，CEO 烧烤，各种各样的，对吧？就像因为我知道他是谁。

Oh my god, it was a lot of trouble. It was a lot of trouble. But anyway, so so I'm living with that. And then by the way, and then I would see Travis, you know, now and again like we had I had him over to my house, CEO barbecue, like all kinds of right? like just cuz like I knew who he was.

是的。我们算是朋友。我们就像，而且总是有很多，就像有一种

Yeah. And we were kind of friends. We were like and it was always like a lot of like there was a

那里有一种尊重，因为我们知道彼此是谁。

there was a respect there because we knew who each other were.

嗯，但就像他在赢，而且就像他不会让我听不到。那真是太可怕了。你知道，我不得不听。我就像，该死的。

Um but like he was winning and it was just like he wasn't going to let me not hear it. And it was just horrible. You know, I had to listen. I was like god damn it.

还有

There's also

一直如此，就像十年。

all the time like for for a decade.

还有另一件事会发生。所以这就像 2000 年，我想这真正开始于 2014、15 年等。埃米尔和我会在这家超级隐蔽的餐厅与马克和本见面。

There was also this other thing would happen. So this is like 2000 I think this really started 2014 15 etc. is Emil and I would meet up with Mark and Ben at this super undercover restaurant.

啊，是的，是的

Ah yes yes

就在我们办公室旁边，当时和 TW 在同一栋楼，或者抱歉，和 Square 在同一栋楼

right next to our office which was in the same building at the time as TW or sorry same building as square

对

right

顺便说一句，我也觉得他非常了不起，目前是战争部的首席技术官，嗯，超级有才华。

by the way me also like a remarkably amazing and currently the CTO of the department of war but um super talented.

是的，最好的。是的，

Yeah the best. Yeah,

我们会做这些会议。我们就是吃晚饭，吃点面包，聊工作，

we would do these sess. We just we'd have dinner, break some bread, talk shop,

然后我们就像，

and we're like,

是的，

yeah,

埃米尔和我总是走出去说，该死的，有这些家伙参与会太好了。

Emil and I would always walk out going, damn, it would have it would be so great to have these guys involved.

当然，我没有，因为他们在

Of course, I didn't because they were at

Lyft。是的。

lift. Yeah.

有时甚至我们可能会谈论，嘿，有没有什么能凑到一起？但就像我就是那样。有

And sometimes even we might even talk about, hey, is there a thing that comes together? But like I was just so the way I was. There's

是的。除了他把公司给他，否则没有办法和他达成交易。

Yeah. There was no way to cross a deal with him other than if he gave him the company.

是的。而且他可以立即解雇所有人。

Yeah. and he could just fire everybody instantly.

所以那是，你知道，但就像那是，那是

So it was, you know, but it was like that is it was it was

有一种相互尊重，同时又有一种很酷的紧张感。

there was m there was mutual respect with this really kind of cool tension at the same time.

是的。是的。

Yeah. Yeah.

呃，这让优步的经历有了额外的质感。至少对我来说是这样。

Uh that made it that kind of just was the extra texture on the Uber experience. At least for me.

是的。有点像，呃，感觉就像，嗯，你是打篮球的。感觉就像老拉里·伯德和魔术师约翰逊。我们就像

Yeah. It was kind of like uh it felt like well you're a basketball guy. It was felt like the old Larry Bird like Magic Johnson. We're like

好吧，我们会见面的。

okay we'll meet each other.

我们恨你，但就像希望你在我们队里。

We hate you but like wish you were on our team.

这太糟糕了。

This sucks.

所以这是失去的那个。

So it's the one that got away.

嗯，但快进到现在，有一个新的机会在

Um but fast forward and now there's a there's a new chance at

嗯，我想说的是这中间还有一块。

Well, what I would say is there's one middle piece to this.

当然。

Sure.

那就是那些显然在科技行业的人，我们知道优步 2017 年是什么样子。

which is those who are obviously in the tech industry, like we know what Uber's 2017 was like.

呃，如果本或马克在董事会，那不会变成那样。

Uh that wouldn't have gone that way if Ben or Mark was on the board.

不会。

Nope.

所以，所以当本和我谈论这个时，我们就像，这是我们的错。

So, so when Ben and I talk about this, we're like, it was our fault.

是的。

Yeah.

我们搞砸了。

We we screwed it up.

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，它本来会是，顺便说一句，优步今天会是一家大得多、更重要、更核心的公司。毫无疑问。我的意思是，首先它会赢得外卖。毫无疑问，优步当时主导着外卖。

I mean, it would have been By the way, Uber would be I'll just say considerably larger and more important and more central company today. There's no question. I mean first of all it would have won food. No qu Uber was dominating food.

是的。

Yeah.

当时主导着外卖，而且它肯定也会成为 DoorDash，在自动驾驶方面领先。

Dominating food at the time and it would have also been Door Dash for sure a lead a leader in autonomous.

我离开时 DoorDash 只有 5% 的市场份额。是的。

Door Dash was 5% market share when I left. Yeah.

而且嗯而且

And um and

如果我们失去十分之一

if we lost a tenth of a percent

在一个星期内，

in a week,

是的，

yeah,

我们这个周末就不回家了。

we're not going home this weekend.

顺便说一句，托尼，上帝保佑他，

And by the way, Tony, God bless him,

当时他完成融资非常困难。就像在那个时期，他在 DoorDash 进行一轮融资。

had a hell of a time getting his round done at the time. Like like right at that period, he was doing a round at Door Dash.

嗯，他必须非常努力才能完成。

Um and he had to really struggle to get it done.

而且你知道，祝贺他打造了他所打造的东西。

And you know, congratulations to him for building, you know, what he built.

而且他做到了。

And he's done it.

他成功了。你知道吗？做“如果当初”之类的假设很容易。最重要的是最终结果。

He got it. You know what? It's really easy to do the whatifs and the this and the that. The thing that matters most is tail of the tape.

是的。

Yeah.

而且他做成了一些事。

And he got some stuff done.

他确实做到了。

He did. He did. He did.

你知道，令人尊敬。

You know, respect.

不，太了不起了。他挺过来了。顺便说一句，在创业中，生存是很大的一部分。

No. Amazing. He survived it. Which is, by the way, you know, in entrepreneurship, surviving is a big part of it.

是的。

Yeah.

是的，好事。

Yeah. Good stuff.

那并不容易。

Not that easy.

我们的 Tommy 项目当时仅次于 Waymo，但正在追赶。

Our Tommy program was like second to Waymo, but catching up at the time.

而且你有网络。

And you had the network.

我们也有网络。我们只是有那种追赶所需的凶猛劲儿。

We had the network, too. And we just had the ferocity, sort of the fierceness that it takes to catch up.

是的。

Yeah.

在某个技术领域，同时还在做我们正在做的所有这些其他事情。我的意思是，那很多。那是好时光，非常有趣。

In a certain technology space while building all these other things that we were doing. I mean it was a lot. It was good times. It was a lot of fun.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。我的意思是，尽管 17 年对我来说非常艰难，甚至可以说对整个公司也是如此。当然对公司整体来说，你知道，我热爱每一分钟，老实说，即使当你走出来时，你会觉得，是的，最后有点奇怪。那很艰难。我仍然，仍然，仍然，那仍然很棒。

Yeah. I mean even though 17 was super tough for me, and maybe you could say even for the company at large. Certainly for the company at large, you know, I loved every minute and honestly even when you come out of it and you're like yeah got a little weird at the end. It was tough. I still, I still, I still, it was still great.

有些东西你回想起来会喜欢。

Some of that you love in retrospect.

是的。不，我懂你。相信我。你不用提醒我。我只是说，当时那种感觉太糟糕了，你知道吗？

Yeah. No, I get you. Trust me. You don't have to remind me of that. I'm just saying like there's that feeling that's so horrible at the time, you know?

是的。那是一种热恋，我几乎会这么说。

Yeah. It was there was a love affair there and that's almost the way I would put it.

很多人会说，你知道，你对这个或那个生气吗？你对那件事发生感到不安吗？我就说，当你再次恋爱时，你不会太想前任。

And a lot of people talk about well you know are you mad about this or that? You upset that that happened and I'm like when you fall in love again you don't think about the ex very much.

是的。

Yeah.

就是这样。所以你可以说那是一段好时光。

That's it. So then you can just be like it was a good time.

是的。

Yeah.

她最后有点疯狂。

She got a little crazy at the end.

那倒是真的。就像那个疯狂的前任。是的。所以就这样。

That's true. That's true. Like the crazy ex. Yeah. So there we go.

是的。

Yeah.

那么，你是怎么再次坠入爱河的，或者，你花了多久，你是怎么处理这段过渡期的……

And um how did you fall in love again or or did it take you how did you handle this the interim period between sort of the...

嗯，是的。我的意思是，你遇到了一个非常有趣的情况。我认为那个时期的头条新闻和其中的负面情绪，以及你可以说是那种极端的“觉醒”文化开始进入 Uber 并试图约束它，如果这说得通的话。有一段过渡期。我离开到创办现在叫 Adams 的公司之间大约有七八个月。我不得不为我的生命而战，因为有很多诉讼、很多调查，所有这些事情，我只是继续坚持我在 Uber 做出的每一个决定。但是你知道，很多时候你可以争辩说我只是太接近底线了，然后是的，我可以证明鞋上没有粉笔灰。我可以证明，但你需要一台电磁扫描显微镜才能看到鞋上没有粉笔灰。你倒放慢动作，就会发现，问题就在于，从一个苦苦挣扎的小创业公司孩子，变成一个正在运作且变得超大规模的东西的边缘。

Well, yeah. I mean you had a really interesting situation. And I think headlines and the negativity in the headlines from that period of time and and you could really say the extreme wokeness that was sort of coming in on on Uber and trying to constrain it if that makes sense. There's this interim period. It was like seven, eight months between when I left and when I started what's now called Adams. And I had to sort of fight for my life because there are just a number of lawsuits, a number of investigations, all these things where it was just like I continue to stand by every decision I made at Uber. But you know there are a lot of times where you could just make the argument I just got way too close to the line and then yeah I could show that there's no chalk on on the shoe. I could show but you would need a electromagnetic scanning microscope to see that there was no chalk on the shoe. You reverse angle slow-mo and it's just like that's the problem is is the edge of being a what's the word? a hard scrabble small startup kid brought to something that's working and going super big.

是的。

Yeah.

你没有意识到，当你变大时，实际上有不同的规则。

You don't realize that when you get big there actually are different rules.

是的。你，而且不仅仅是规则，还有氛围，当海盗变成海军时。我们在农场经常谈论这个。当你是一个新贵，与大佬抗争时，你可以采取强硬手段，但如果你在成为大人物时这样做，那就不行了。

Yeah. You and they're not just the rules, there's the vibes when the pirate becomes the navy. We talk about this at the farm a lot. When you're the upstart and you're battling the man, you can go hard in ways that if you do it when you're the big dog, it's not okay.

是的，你被完全不同的看待。

Yeah. It's very that you're viewed entirely differently.

是的。而且我没有，我没有吸收那个信息。这实际上帮助了我，因为你知道，当我们创办公司时，我们是新贵，我疯狂地谈论其他风投等等，你知道，给他们打电话，但就像在某个时刻，我能感觉到它在转变。是的。

Yeah. And I didn't I hadn't consumed that information. It actually helped me because, you know, when we started the firm, we were the upstart and I talked just crazy about the other VCs and this and that and you know, call them and but like at some point like I could feel it turning. Yeah.

我记得发生在他身上的事，我就想，我们实际上有整个事情，比如我们不再是海盗了。不要说那种话。要冷静。

And I remembered what happened to him and I was like and we actually had a whole thing like we're not the pirates anymore. Don't say that type of stuff. Like be chill.

我们有，是的。我们有这么一件事，我们会针对 Lyft，我们会招募 Lyft 上的司机，把他们带到 Uber 来，这样 Lyft 就很难建立供给，我们会积极这样做，我们内部有一个项目，我们称之为“入店行窃”。

We had Yeah. We had this thing where um we would against Lyft we would uh we would recruit the drivers on Lyft um to bring them over to Uber so that uh it was hard for Lyft to build supply um and we would aggressively do it and we had a program for it internally which we called shoplifting.

好吧。顺便说一句，就那个名字而言，忘掉所有那些，我知道他们使用的一些非常激进的技术，但那个名字，你不能用那个名字。

Okay. Just that name by the way, like forget about all the, I know some of the techniques they used very aggressively, but that name you can't use that name.

那根本不行，我记得，你知道，谷歌的 David Drummond 在我们的董事会，他说，你知道，Travis，那不行，老兄，你得改掉它。然后我当然有反垄断培训，当时我又像个小创业公司的孩子。我说，“反垄断？那是什么鬼？”法律人员告诉我什么。他们说，“听着，”我说，“我等不及要有那个问题了，”你知道吗？然后他们说，“听着，事情是这样的。你给项目命名的方式，必须适合一个 10 岁的篮球队。”所以，它从“入店行窃”变成了“全国，抱歉，北美冠军系列赛”。我们称之为 NACS。

It's just not a thing and I remember um you know David Drummond from Google was on our board and he's like you know Travis that's not a thing dude you got to change it and then I had of course like antitrust training which are like at the time again I'm like this small startup kid. I'm like, "Any trust? What the hell is that?" Legal people telling me whatever. They're like, "Look," I'm like, "I can't wait to have that problem," you know? And uh they're like they're like, "Look, here's the thing. The way you call projects, it has to be appropriate for like a a a 10-year-old basketball team." So, it went from Shoplift to the National, sorry, the North American Championship Series. We call it the NACS.

我们有一个非常重大的计划，叫做 NACS，以确保我们赢得北美冠军系列赛。

And we had a whole very heavy duty initiative called the NACS to like make sure that the North American Championship Series was won by us.

那太搞笑了。

That is hilarious.

我不知道北美冠军系列赛。那……

I didn't know about the North American Championship series. That's...

是的。

Yeah.

好吧。所以，你经历了这八个月。你身处地狱。你在处理诉讼。你在反思。你在想下一步。然后你说，“嘿，让我们再建一次吧。”

Okay. So, you go through this eight-month period. You're in this hell. You're dealing with the lawsuits. You're sort of reflecting back. You're thinking about what's next. and you say, "Hey, let's let's build again."

所以，发生的事情非常有趣。嗯，我有一个朋友，在我 Uber 任期快结束时创办了一个东西。嗯，它叫 Cloud Kitchens。事情是这样的，他是一个房地产天才。

So, what happened was it's super interesting. Um, so I had a buddy who started a thing right near the end of my Uber tenure. Um, and it was called Cloud Kitchens. And what happened was is he he's a real estate savant.

是的。

Yeah.

就是这样。他在看房地产，就像科技和房地产之间一定有角度。我们怎么做？他搞到了一处房产。实际上，也许你知道吗？让我从更早开始。我们有 Uber，我们在 2015 年推出了 Uber Eats。我们看到了第一批“暗厨房”。我不知道，大概是 15 年底，16 年初。我们看到了墨尔本商业厨房的照片，那些不是餐厅，却在 Uber Eats 上。

That's just thing. And he was looking like real estate like there's got to be an angle in tech and real estate. How do we do this? and he got a property up. Actually, maybe you know what? Let me start even before this. We got Uber, we got Uber Eats up in 2015. We saw the first dark kitchens. I don't know, it was like late 15, early 16. We saw pictures of commercial kitchens in Melbourne that were not restaurants that were on Uber Eats.

哦，哇。哇。哇。

Oh, wow. Wow. Wow.

所以，第一批“暗厨房”出现了。我们觉得，这太疯狂了。那太有趣了。

So, the first dark kitchens were emerging. We're like, this is crazy. That's so interesting.

然后我一个朋友，他是个房地产天才，他听说了这个事，然后他有个想法：我们为什么不搞一个多租户的模式呢？就是在同一块地上建 30 个厨房，然后把每个 200 平方英尺的厨房租出去，作为纯外卖点。反正，我当时不太清楚——我是说，我大概知道怎么回事，但也不是很清楚。然后到了秋天，大概我离开 Uber 三个月后，我们见面了，他跟我说：‘是啊，你知道，我们已经有几个租户了，还挺管用的。’他说：‘我打算再多做几个。我想试试看能不能再多做几个。’我说：‘你是说几千个吧？’

And a buddy of mine, who is this real estate savant, sort of caught wind of what's going on, and he had this idea: why don't we have a multi-tenant approach to this? So 30 kitchens on a single property, and basically lease these kitchens, which are 200 square feet, as delivery-only locations. Anyways, I didn't really—I mean, I sort of knew what was going on but not really. Then in the fall, about three months after I had left Uber, we meet up, and he's telling me, 'Yeah, you know, we got a few tenants. It's kind of working.' He's like, 'I'm going to do like a few more of these. I think I'm going to try to figure out how to do a few more.' I'm like, 'You mean like a few thousand, right?'

然后你们就合伙了。

And so then we partnered up.

嗯，我收购了它。我想他们刚完成 A 轮融资，然后我就收购了它，接着我们就大干了一场，对吧？所以这真的很有趣，因为有时候你开创一件事，有时候你参与一件事，然后你加入进来——我觉得这是一个有趣的故事——

Um, I acquired it. I think they had just done their Series A, and so I acquired it, and then we just went to town, right? And so it's really interesting because sometimes you start a thing, and sometimes you're involved in a thing, and then you come in—I think this is an interesting story about—

埃隆也参与其中，显然他从一开始就参与了特斯拉——起初是投资者，但后来全身心投入。这些想法是怎么来的，很有趣。

Elon was involved, like obviously involved in Tesla from the beginning—was an investor at first but then went all the way in. And it's interesting how these ideas come.

所以我想说，有时候是你有想法，有时候是想法来找你。

So I like to say that sometimes you have ideas, sometimes ideas come to you.

对。但如果这个想法是命中注定的，如果它是你的灵魂伴侣，你一眼就能认出来，对吧？

Yeah. But if it's an idea that's meant to be, if it's your soulmate, you know it when you see it, right?

然后你就——有时候你就直接去做了。就像一段恋情。有些人有长长的清单。

And you just—sometimes you just go for it. It's like a love affair. Some people have these long lists.

重要的区别，因为那和所谓的职业 CEO 之间真的有差别，对吧？没有人会认为——除了少数奇怪的政治人物，没有聪明人会认为埃隆是职业 CEO。

Important distinction, because there's a real difference between that and what's known as the professional CEO, right? Where nobody would ever consider—nobody smart, other than a few weird political people—would ever consider Elon a professional CEO.

是的，就像，‘哦，那是个想法——’我没有创办这家公司，但它是我的。那是我的，就像它是我的一部分，我知道怎么做。这些家伙在创办它方面做得很好，但他们不可能做到。那是一种完全不同的动物。

Yeah, it's like, 'Oh, that's an idea that's—' I didn't start the company, but it's mine. That's mine, like it is me, and I know how to do it. And these guys did a great job in starting it, but there's no way they can do it. And that's a very different animal.

对。所以，你知道，你爱上某样东西，它在那个时刻就是为你准备的，然后你就去追求它。

Yeah. So, you know, you fall in love with something and it's meant to be for you at that time, and you just go for it.

对我来说，就像，‘啊，伙计，复杂性对我来说很有趣。那些表面上不性感的东西也奇怪地有趣。’然后，尤其是如果你能看到它很性感但人们还不理解，那就是你眼中闪光的地方——你会想，‘啊，你看不到我所看到的，而且我很确定我是对的，’这就是有趣的部分。

And for me, it was like, 'Ah, man, complexity is interesting to me. Things that are naturally not sexy on the surface are also weirdly interesting.' And then, especially if you can see that it's sexy but people don't understand yet, that's where the sparkle in your eye—you kind of go, 'Ah, you don't see what I see, and I'm pretty sure I'm right,' and that's the fun part.

对。但这是一件非常复杂的事情，因为我们买地产，我们搞建设，我们有一个销售团队向餐厅推销纯外卖地点。所以他们是在扩张餐厅连锁。这不是说我仅仅进入一个供应商流程。我实际上——我们是在做一个战略销售，那就是你应该扩张你的业务，而且你应该用一种新的方式扩张，这是同时进行的两个战略动作。

Yeah. But this was a very complex thing because we're buying property, we're doing construction, we have a sales team that's selling to restaurants a delivery-only location. So they're expanding the restaurant chain. This isn't like I'm just getting into a vendor flow. I'm actually—we are making a strategic sell, which is you should expand your business, and you should expand it in a new way, which is two strategic moves at the same time.

对。顺便说一句，你喜欢复杂性。

Yeah. And by the way, you like complexity.

对。对。这让它——

Yeah. Yeah. Which makes it—

没错。对。所以然后他们说，‘你还要——好吧，我们已经把技术编织进整个房地产项目里了。我们有一个软件栈，当然会在这个设施里用，但我们也会把它卖给你所有的实体店。而且我们同时搞点机器人，因为劳动力是餐厅老板最大的问题。’如果你解决了这个问题，那就非常了不起了。我可以深入讲为什么这是整个事情的关键，但就项目复杂性的实质而言，我觉得很有趣。

Exactly. Yeah. So then they're like, 'You're also—okay, so we've woven technology through this whole real estate thing. We have a software stack that of course will work in this facility, but we'll also sell it to all your brick-and-mortars everywhere. And let's just get some robotics going at the same time, because labor is your biggest problem if you're a restaurant tour.' If you solve that, it's really big. I can get into the strategy of why that is the whole thing, but just the brass tacks of the complexity of the project was interesting to me.

所以这更像是涌现或迭代的，而不是‘嘿，我对它会变成什么样有一个总体的愿景。’

So it was more kind of emergent or iterative than, 'Hey, I've got this master vision for what it's all going to turn into.'

不，我觉得在那个时候，如果我看不到它有多大、多有意义，那么为了复杂而复杂就不是一回事。必须有——也许有人会说是彩虹尽头的金子——它必须是有意义的。关于 Adam's Food，或者人们所说的云厨房，有意义的事情是：你能不能让一顿饭的准备和配送，一顿高质量的饭，变得如此高效，以至于接近去杂货店购物的成本？如果能，你就对厨房做了 Uber 对汽车做的事，然后你会说，‘好吧，这还挺了不起的。’但接着你会说，‘你需要做什么才能达到那个目标？’好吧，你需要做在线外卖的电子商务，这意味着我需要像亚马逊那样的仓库。

No, I think at that time, if I don't see how it's big and meaningful, then complexity for complexity's sake is not a thing. There has to be—maybe somebody would say a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow—it has to be something meaningful. The meaningful thing about Adam's Food, or what folks know as cloud kitchens, is: can you make the preparation and delivery of a meal, a quality meal, so efficient that it approaches the cost of going to the grocery store? If it does, you do to the kitchen what Uber did to the car, and you go, 'Okay, that's kind of a big deal.' But then you say, 'What do you need to do to get there?' Okay, well, you need to do e-commerce for online food delivery, which means I need warehouses like Amazon style.

对。

Yeah.

但它们不只是用于物流。不只是拣选、包装、分拣，然后放进车里。你还必须有制造在那里。制造，也就是餐厅。人们不会想到这一点，但你去劳工统计局，劳工统计局的数据显示，餐厅是制造商。好吗？所以你必须在同一个地方有制造和物流基础设施。那是房地产。然后你实际上必须有自动化生产。那是制造。所以是机器人食品机器人，本质上是食品机器人技术。然后你还需要机器人快递员。你做到这三件事，然后突然间你就能得到超高质量的餐食。你能想象到的一切。我们称之为互联网美食广场。它以去杂货店的价格送到你手上。所以你会说，‘好吧，不错。这是个好故事。’你会说，‘好吧，20 年后，机器人技术会——’我先从一个非常简单的问题开始。20 年后，人们还会经常做饭吗？会有一整套机器人技术，基本上能做出更高质量的餐食。就像，它们会比我们任何人都做得更好。我想大多数人，尤其是机器人领域的人，都会说，‘当然，这显然会发生。’然后你会说，‘20 年后，我们会有——我称之为自主卷饼——就是带轮子的盒子，保持食物温度，来到你家门口吗？’是的。每个人都会说，是的，绝对会。我们已经看到 Waymo 在到处跑了。我们只需要一个便宜得多的版本。所以 20 年是容易的。然后你会说，‘那 10 年呢？7 年呢？5 年呢？’那就是你在弯曲现实的时候。你把它弯向现在。所以每个人都同意这会发生，现在的问题是何时、由谁来做，然后你说，‘冲吧。’

Except they're not just for logistics. It's not just picking, packing, sorting, and then putting in a car. You also have to have manufacturing there, too. Manufacturing, also known as a restaurant. People don't think of that, but you go to the labor statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, restaurants are manufacturers. Okay? So you have to have manufacturing and logistics infrastructure in the same place. That's real estate. Then you actually have to have automated production. That's the manufacturing. So robotic food robots, essentially food robotics. And then you need to have robotic couriers. And you do those three things, and then all of a sudden you are getting super high quality meals. Everything you could ever imagine. We call it the internet food court. And it gets to you at the price of going to the grocery store. So you go, 'Okay, nice. That's a nice story.' You go, 'Well, in 20 years, will robotics—' I start with a really easy question. In 20 years, will people be cooking food regularly? And there will be a suite of robotics that basically will make higher quality meals. Like, they will be doing a better job than any of us could do. And I think most people, especially those in the robotics space, would be like, 'Of course, that's obvious that that's going to happen.' And you're like, 'In 20 years, are we going to have—I call them autonomous burritos—like boxes on wheels that hold food at temperature that come to your house?' Yes. Everybody will say yes, absolutely. We see Waymos cruising around already. We just need a much cheaper version of that. So 20 years is like the easy one. Then you go, 'Well, what about 10? What about seven? What about five?' And so that's when you're bending reality. You're bending it towards now. So everybody would agree that this is going to happen, and now it's about when and who, and then you say, 'LFG.'

有时候你会稍微早一点，我会说在云厨房上我们有点早，但你建了那些砖块，所有我提到的那些东西，我们在 30 个国家有数百个设施，很多数百个设施，因为在线外卖市场持续增长，餐厅做得越来越好，所以成功正在发生。

Now sometimes you're a little bit early and I would say on the we were a bit early on cloud kitchens but you build those bricks all those things I talked about we have hundreds of facilities in 30 countries many hundreds of facilities in 30 countries restaurants because the online delivery market keeps growing the restaurants are doing better and better so success is happening.

是的，没错。餐饮行业流失率很高。但你的流失率开始下降，因为量在上升。我们有应用能保证这些餐厅的量，这样我们就能有成功的租户，这意味着从商业模式角度看，我是个成功的房地产商。机器人开始发挥作用。你知道，我们第四季度要上机器人的生产线。所以，各个部分开始拼凑起来。你会想，生产现在便宜了 50%。一旦我们有了外卖员，机器人外卖员，每餐配送成本就从 12 美元降到 50 美分或 1 美元。现在你省下了 6 美元的劳动力。你省下了，姑且说，10 或 11 美元的外卖员费用。在房地产上，因为你会获得更高价值的量，因为你把价格压低了，你每餐可能省几美元，也许我们叫它每餐 2 到 3 美元的占用成本。突然之间，你就有了一份 8 到 10 美元全包送达的餐。

Yeah, right. Well, restaurant world has high churn. Your churn starts coming down because volume's going up. We have applications that guarantee volume into these restaurants so that we can have successful tenants, which means I'm a successful real estate guy from a business model perspective. The robotics start to work. You know, we're getting a manufacturing line for our robots up in Q4. So, like the pieces start to come together. You're like, production is now 50% cheaper. Once we get the couriers, the robotic couriers, you go from $12 a drop for each meal to 50 cents, a dollar of distribution cost per meal. And now you're taking $6 out in labor. You're taking, let's call it, $10 or $11 out on the courier. On the real estate, because you're going to get higher value volume because you're driving the prices down, you probably save a few bucks, maybe let's call it two or three bucks on occupancy per meal. And all of a sudden you've got like an $8 or $10 meal that's delivered to you all in.

另外，你不需要招募司机，你知道，也不会被偷东西。

Plus, you don't have to recruit drivers, you know, and get shoplifted.

没错。所以这是对的。你不能偷机器人外卖员。

That's true. So that's right. You can't shoplift a robotic courier.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yes.

所以我们需要停止使用这个术语。

So we need to stop using this term.

太不对了。好吧。

So wrong. Okay.

30 个国家 100 个设施，8 年多时间数千名员工，而且你还在隐身模式。

100 facilities in 30 countries, thousands of employees in over 8-year period and you're in stealth.

是的，老兄。

Yeah, dude.

是的。那简直是超级困难模式。

Yeah. That's just super hard mode.

是的。问题是，你看，从 17 年的事情出来后，每天有 150 篇负面文章。所以我想能够建设而不把那种负面情绪带进系统。我想让团队能够建设而不担心《纽约时报》明天写什么。

Yeah. And the thing is, look, coming out of 17 things, it was 150 articles a day of negative negativity. And so I wanted to be able to build without bringing that negativity into the system. And I wanted the team to be able to build without worrying about what the New York Times was writing tomorrow.

是的。就这么简单。而且这是正确的做法。现在我们不得不做困难模式，我们必须冷启动招聘。而且总是来自一个在 LinkedIn 和签名里有隐身字样的招聘人员。

Yeah. Simple as that. And it was the right thing to do. Now we had to do hard mode is we had to recruit cold. And it was always from a recruiter who has a stealth thing in LinkedIn and on their signature.

是的。

Yeah.

好吧。嗯，而且你必须去获取客户，就像 LinkedIn 里有隐身字样一样，而且你有几千人规模。这是困难模式。

Okay. Um, and you had to go get customers with like stealth in LinkedIn like and you're thousands of people big. This is hard mode.

是的。而且这很有趣。我们不知道会持续多久。你必须相信没人会泄露。嗯，你知道会发生什么，这是隐身模式酷的地方。如果你持续那么久，我不推荐任何人这样做，这不是一个很特殊的案例。

Yeah. And it was interesting. We didn't know how long it was going to go. And you have to trust that no one's going to leak. Um, you know what happens is here's the cool part about stealth. If you go that long and I don't recommend this for anybody like it's not a very special case.

是的。你不会真的，我不知道，但最终你的叙事会有这个断裂，就像有一个故事弧，它一直在进行，然后它不连续了。它停止了，然后有这个“哎呀，抱歉各位”。现在有很长一段时间没有东西填补。然后发生的是媒体不想报道一个故事，因为讨论一个几年前有空白的东西太难了。所以做故事太难了，报道也太难了。所以你到了这个自我实现的地方。

Yeah. You don't really I don't you know but eventually there's this break in your narrative like there was this story arc and it was going going and then it's discontinuous. It stops and there's this Whoops. Sorry about that guys. There's this long period of time now where nothing is filling in. And what happens then is the media doesn't want to cover a story because it's so hard to discuss a thing that has a gap a few years before it. So it's too hard to do the story and it's too hard to cover it. So you get to this place where it becomes self-fulfilling.

是的。

Yeah.

随着时间的推移，隐身更容易，因为即使有人试图泄露，也没人知道该怎么处理。

Where it's easier to be stealth over time because even if somebody tries to leak, nobody even knows what to do with it.

他们就像，我甚至不明白。而且顺便说一句，我们做了疯狂的事情。所以人们知道它是美国的云厨房。但在拉丁美洲它是赌场。而且我们有不同的名字。那基本上意味着魔法厨房。嗯，我们在韩国有厨房谷。我们在中国有闪厨和其他三个名字。我们有，我是说，伦敦的食品之星，你知道，就这样。我认为中东是厨房公园。我们本来打算用亚拉厨房，你知道，就像一堆这样的东西。所以很难把点连起来。

They're just like, I don't even understand. And by the way, we did crazy stuff. So people know it as cloud kitchens in the US. But it's casinos in Latin America. And we have different names. That means like magical kitchens essentially. Uh we have like kitchen valley in Korea. We have Flash Kitchen and three other names in China. We have I mean food stars in London like go it goes you know. I think it's Kitchen Park in Middle East. We were going to go with Yala kitchens like you know it's like a bunch of things like this. So it was very hard to connect the dots.

是的，你更隐蔽了。

Yeah, you're extra still.

是的。

Yeah.

不管怎样，它成功了。所以在某个时刻，这家公司出现了一个更大的愿景，数字化物理世界。我们在创造品类，你在创造一个新品类，工业 AI 这个术语。

Anyways, it worked. And so at some point an even bigger vision for this company emerges to digitize the physical world. We're category creating, you're creating a new category, the term industrial AI.

是的。

Yeah.

谈谈这个更大的愿景什么时候开始达到顶峰。

Talk about when this bigger vision starts to culminate.

所以你看，对我来说，数字化物理世界的愿景始于 Uber。好吧。把原子当作比特来对待始于 Uber。你曾经，它一度是科幻。我保证你碰一下玻璃，一辆车就会来到你面前。

So look, the vision for digitizing the physical world for me started at Uber. Okay. And treating atoms like bits started at Uber. You were, it was sci-fi at one point. I promise you would touch glass and a car would come to you.

是的。

Yeah.

而且你有卫星视图。你看着这辆车向你驶来。那太疯狂了。

And you had satellite view. You're watching this car come to you. That was crazy.

现在就像无所谓了。好吧。但当时很疯狂。每个人的第一次 Uber 体验都是一个神奇的时刻。

Now it's just like whatever. Okay. But it was crazy at the time. Everybody's first Uber experience was a magical moment.

所以我们，我，你知道，数字化物理世界就是那件事。而这个我称之为基于原子的计算机的想法，是我在 Uber 末期在框架方面一直在研究的，即 CPU 操纵比特，存储存储比特，网络从 A 点移动比特到 B 点。好吧。那么，CPU 操纵比特。什么操纵原子？那是制造业。存储存储比特。什么存储原子？那是房地产。网络从 A 点移动比特到 B 点。什么移动原子？嗯，那是运输、物流。那些现在是你基于原子的计算机中的三个核心计算资源。而且你知道吗？你在计算机科学课程中学到的一切，你在工程学中学到的一切，在原子世界里都适用。相同的框架，所有的数据结构，所有的算法，它完全一样地工作。

So we, I, you know, digitizing the physical world was the thing. And this idea of what I would call an atoms-based computer was something I was sort of working on in terms of her framework at the end of Uber, which is CPU manipulates bits, storage stores bits, network moves bits from point A to point B. Okay. Well, CPU manipulates bits. What manipulates atoms? That's manufacturing. Storage stores bits. What stores atoms? That's real estate. Network moves bits from point A to point B. What moves atoms? Well, that's transport, logistics. And those now are your three core computing resources in an atoms-based computer. And you know what? Everything you learn in your computer science curriculum, everything you learn in engineering, it plays in the atoms world. Same frameworks, all the data structures, all the algorithms, it works exactly the same.

路由算法。

Routing algorithms.

哦，完全，完全。事实上，我们用 TCP。我们用 TCP saw 来基本上管理根据容量和可靠性向某些厨房发送多少需求，作为一个例子。

Oh, totally, totally. In fact, we use TCP. We use TCP saw to basically manage how much demand to send to certain kitchens based on capacity and reliability as an example.

但就像我们看，当我去，我在摆弄，就像当我向一个想理解那个 1 万英尺设施的技术人员推销时，我称之为 1 万英尺半导体。

But like we look at when I go and I'm messing around like when I'm pitching this to a tech person who wants to understand that 10,000 foot facility I call a 10,000 foot semiconductor.

而且它是一个 30 核处理器，30 个厨房。它们在计算原子，而不是比特。食物移动的走廊，那是网络总线。处理中心就像 L1 缓存或类似的东西。

And it's a 30 core processor, 30 kitchens. They're computing atoms, not bits. The corridors where the food moves, that's a network bus. The processing center is like an L1 cache or something similar.

他把这个类比推得很远。

He's taking this analogy very far.

冷库，那里有冰淇淋和果汁。好吧，那是预先计算好的项目，放在边缘。那些是你的 Okami 服务器。

The cold storage where you have ice cream and juice. Okay, that's precomputed items that sit on the edge. Those are your Okami servers.

外卖员来取食物，上路，把餐送到你那里，他是一个 TCP 包。这个可以一直延伸下去。

The courier who comes and picks up the food and goes on the road and brings the meal to you, he's a TCP packet. This goes forever.

太棒了。

It's excellent.

好的。所以，这个愿景始于 Uber。

Okay. So, the vision started at Uber.

所以，关键在于，基于原子的计算是真实存在的，而且说实话，它一直存在。那种想法，比如，Uber 是物理世界的网络，将交通数字化。而且，顺便说一句，这几乎完成了。为什么几乎完成？因为它几乎完全是软件了。

So, the point is that atoms-based computation is a thing, and honestly, it's always been a thing. The idea that, oh, okay, Uber was a network for the physical world, digitized transportation. And by the way, almost done. Why almost done? Because it's almost fully software.

是的，对吧？Waymo 已经在路上跑了。它几乎完全是软件。但是，物理世界的 CPU 和物理世界的存储呢？基本上就是数字化的制造和数字化的房地产。那里有太多事情要做，太疯狂了。所以那里有大量的创新。不仅仅是 Adams 在做的事情，还会有很多超出我们正在做的事情。如果你在投资，这真的是一个组合策略。

Yeah. Right? Waymos are cruising. It's almost fully software. But what about CPU for the physical world and storage for the physical world? Basically digitized manufacturing and digitized real estate. There's just so much to do there. It's crazy. And so there's a huge amount of innovation there. Not just with what Adams is doing, but there's going to be lots of stuff even beyond what we're doing. It's a portfolio strategy really if you're investing.

这很有趣，因为你某种程度上得出了我们现在都从 AI 中学到的结论，那就是你可以用计算来模拟几乎任何东西，而你基本上在模拟这个物理世界方面走在了前面，甚至隐喻性地将其视为计算，现在又在你的计算框架之上用 AI 来实现这一点。

It's very interesting because you kind of got to the conclusion that we've now all learned from AI, which is you can model just about anything with computation, and you basically were ahead of that in modeling this physical world even metaphorically as computation, and now kind of manifesting that with AI on top of your computational framework.

有趣的是，这个框架是在我在 Uber 的末期开始的，当时我们正深入深度学习和重型机器学习。而且，你知道，我们会去争取一些最优秀的 AI 人才。我们有一个 AI 实验室，可能也是世界上最好的之一。我一直主张，对于这些东西来说，物理世界比数字世界更有趣。

Funny because the framework started near the end of my Uber time, really when we were getting deep into deep learning and heavy-duty ML. And I was, you know, we would go after some of the best AI talent. We had an AI lab that was probably one of the best in the world as well. And I was always pitching that the physical world is more interesting for this stuff than the digital one.

而且你看，我在推销我的书，我们就是干这个的，对吧？但是你有更多更多的变量和随机分布的维度。

And you look, I'm selling my book, like that's what we do, right? But you have way, way more variables and axes of stochastic distribution.

是的。

Yeah.

这意味着你不会用算法来解决它。你会通过经验性地理解它的运作方式来解决它。

Which then means you're not going to solve it with an algorithm. You're going to solve it by empirically understanding how it works.

是的，没错。

Yeah. Right.

那么，让我们快进到，关于公司的组合，更大的原子愿景是如何整合在一起的。然后我还想谈谈合作关系，因为这也联系在一起。

So let's fast forward to how the bigger vision for atoms comes together in terms of the combination of the companies. And then I also want to get to the partnership because it also ties together.

是的，一切都很好。

Yeah, it's all good.

所以，好的。你必须要有你的制造物流中心。那是房地产。你必须要有你的自动化生产。而且你还要有你的自主卷饼。

So, okay. You've got to have your manufacturing logistics hub. That's the real estate. You've got to have your automated production. And you've got to have your autonomous burritos.

大约一年前，我开始研究自主卷饼，我去了中国，考察了所有的自动驾驶公司。在美国这里，也和很多自动驾驶的人聊了。消息传开了。他们说，‘Travis 又在看自动驾驶了。’人们开始问，‘怎么回事？’

The minute about a year ago, I started looking into autonomous burritos, and I went to China and checked out all of the autonomy guys. Was here in the US talking to a lot of the autonomy guys. Word got out. They're like, 'Travis is looking at autonomy again.' People started going, 'What's going on?'

是的。

Yeah.

是的。而且你知道，像 Uber 这样的公司，以及其他不同类别的合作伙伴，都因为这样或那样的原因表示‘我们感兴趣’。因为，你甚至可以是食品供应链的人。你也会说，‘为了业务连续性和安心，我需要有另一种选择，关于这些货运、这些卡车、重型运输将如何移动。我需要一个替代方案，而且我很乐意有一个合作伙伴作为这类事情的例子。’

Yeah. And you know, folks like Uber, other partners across different categories were like, 'We're interested,' for one reason or another. Because it's like, you could even be a supply chain guy on food. You're also saying, 'I need to have, for business continuity and just like peace of mind, I need to have another alternative for how these freight, how these trucks, heavy transport are going to move. And I need an alternative, and I'd love to have a partner as an example of this kind of stuff.'

所以，好的，和几个人合作，实际上创建了一家新公司来做这件事，因为通过一个核心食品公司来资助自动驾驶一开始是行不通的。原因在于，这些是不同的类型。房地产公司。这就像重型软件。大笔大笔的钱投进去。

And so, okay, so partnered with a couple folks, actually created a new company to do it, because funding autonomy through a sort of core food company just wasn't going to work at first. And the reason why is because these are just different profiles. A real estate company. This is like heavy-duty software. Big, big money going after it.

这就像一家计算机公司试图在旁边建立一个网络公司。你必须买一家网络公司。

It's like a computer company trying to build a network company off of the side. You got to buy a networking company.

所以我们刚刚，而且这些合作伙伴想要一个纯粹的投资标的，所以我们在去年年底左右创建了那家公司。但发生的事情是，好吧，现在我需要把我的团队召集起来。我需要找回 2016、2017 年那些在自动驾驶上全力以赴的老伙计们。我们需要重新启动，因为如果你要进入专业机器人领域，你必须拥有自己的自动驾驶能力。你的机器人在物理世界中移动和行动，你不能只依赖一家有存在证明的公司。当然，特斯拉会达到那个目标，你知道，很快或者也许需要一些时间。我们不确定。你不能那样依赖。

So we just got, and these partners wanted a pure play, and so we created that sort of near the end of last year. But what happened is, it's like, okay, well now I need to get my team together. I need to get my guys from way back when, 2016, 2017, when we were running hardcore at autonomy. We need to get that going, because if you're going to be in the specialized robotics game, you have to have autonomy for yourself. Your robots are moving and acting in the physical world, and you cannot depend on only one company that has an existence proof. Now, of course, Tesla's going to get there, you know, sometime soon or maybe some amount of time. We don't know exactly. You can't be dependent in that way.

所以，好的，把团队召集起来。Eric Myhoffer，他曾负责 ATG，现在已经在管理我的食品机器人部门。那是 Uber 的先进技术集团，为我们工作。然后 Anthony Lewendowski，他在 Uber 时是我自动驾驶方面的顶级负责人之一，当时在经营 Pronto，一家自动驾驶采矿公司。我们称之为越野自动驾驶，但在一个工作流程或类别中，它不仅仅是‘这个东西需要移动’。而是，它如何移动？它移动的背景是什么？这是一个非常专业的事情。

And so, okay, get your team together. Eric Myhoffer, who ran ATG, is already running my food robotics division. That's Uber's advanced technology group, working for us. And then Anthony Lewendowski, who was one of my top leads on autonomy back at Uber, was running Pronto, which was an autonomous mining company. Let's call it off-road autonomy, but in a workflow or category where it's much more than just like this thing needs to move. It's like, how does it move? What is the context for which it's moving? It's a very specialized thing.

是的。我是 Pronto 最大的投资者。我说，我们走吧。所以，收购了 Pronto，现在我在采矿行业。但我并不是不知道这件事。我一开始就是它最大的投资者，这是有充分理由的。

Yeah. I was the biggest investor in Pronto. I'm like, let's go. So, acquired Pronto, and now I'm in the mining business. But it's not like I didn't know about it. I was the biggest investor in it to begin with, for a good reason.

这是最漂亮、最有趣的自动驾驶类别或用例之一。

It's one of the most beautiful and interesting autonomy categories or use cases.

在我们的采矿业务中，我们的使命宣言是：更高效的矿山，为地球的工业提供动力。我们现在就可以去对金矿 CEO 说，‘你想每年多获得 20% 的黄金吗？’我们现在不会得到拒绝。他会说，‘证明给我看。’然后我们说，‘我们走吧。’

And on our mining business, we have our mission statement: more productive mines to power Earth's industries. We can go to a gold mine CEO right now and say, 'Would you like to get 20% more gold per year?' We don't get no right now. He says, 'Prove it.' And we're like, 'Let's go.'

但这就是发生的事情。所以，Pronto 已经独立从事采矿工作八年了。七八年，独立经营。

But that's what's happened. So separately, Pronto is working on mining for eight years on their own. Seven, eight years on their own.

继续说。

Go ahead.

这也是自动驾驶的一个很好的目标，因为你知道，对人类来说，最糟糕的工作可能就是采矿工作，对吧？

Also a great target for autonomy, because you know, maybe the worst job for humans there is the mining jobs, right?

而且我们有，所以我们的采矿客户，因为我们在世界各地运营着许多矿山，我们的采矿客户存在生存安全问题，或者我们称之为安全问题、安全担忧。比如，任何一天都可能发生不好的事情，而且有真实的人在矿山时冒着生命危险。所以当你自动化采矿的某些部分时，你会显著提高安全性，而且我是说真正地提高。就像当你看到正在做的工作以及它是如何完成的，当你接触到它并看到矿山如何运作时，这有点令人心碎。这不是矿山的错。这只是工作的性质。而且，伴随着生产力的提升，还有巨大的安全提升，这真的很特别。

And we have, so our mining customers, because we're operating in a bunch of mines around the world, our mining customers have existential safety problems, or let's call it safety issues, safety concerns. Like where bad things can happen on any given day, and you've got real people that are putting their lives on the line when they're at these mines. And so when you automate certain parts of mining, you dramatically improve safety, and I mean in a real way. That's like when you look at the work that's being done and how it's being done, it's a little bit heart-wrenching when you are exposed to it and you see how mines work. It's not the mine's fault. It's just the nature of the work. And there's a massive safety upside that goes along with the productivity upside, which is really special.

是的。所以，现在发生的是 Pronto 刚刚超越了人类生产力。所以，就像任何企业软件公司一样。你和大公司做一些很酷的试点，你有了东西，你会说，‘老兄，我在这个一万人的公司里只有八个席位，’然后你会说，‘好吧，也许吧。’然后突然之间，它变得更好了。在自动驾驶领域，关键是它比人类生产力更好。这意味着你的矿场和查询，就像，正是行动的时候。那就是你踩油门的时候。所以我们会看到超指数增长。我们正在看到。我们现在正处于其中。在采矿方面，超指数增长，这非常特别。这些人长期经营一家非常精益的初创公司。现在我去见他们的客户，他们恳求我们加快速度，把更多东西推出去。我们必须制造套件。抱歉。我们必须做供应链和制造套件。我们必须把这些套件安装在这些机器上，这些机器在亚马逊雨林中间，或者在沙特和伊拉克边境，或者在这些疯狂偏远的地方。而且要快，然后在每个矿场做变革管理。所以，他们说，‘是时候了。我们走吧。’他们在推我们。所以，我们，你知道，我们怎么跟他们说，就像，‘听着，我们曾经是一家精益初创公司，我们要变得强壮。’

Yeah. So, what happened is that Pronto just now is coming past human productivity. So, it's like any enterprise software company. You do some cool pilots with big companies, you got stuff and you're like, 'Dude, I've got like eight seats at this 10,000 person company,' and you're like, 'Okay, maybe.' And then all of a sudden it's better. And in the autonomy world, it's about it's better than human productivity. That means your minds and the queries and it's like exactly go time. That's when you hit the gas. So we're gonna see super exponential. We're seeing it. We're in the middle of it right now. Super exponential growth on the mining side, which is super special. These guys ran a very lean startup for a long time. And now I'm going to their customers who are begging us to move faster and get more out there. We have to manufacture kits. Sorry. We have to do supply chain and manufacture kits. We have to install these kits on these machines that are in the middle of the Amazon or on the border of Saudi and Iraq or like in these crazy wild places. And do it fast and then do the change management at every one of these mines. So, they're like, 'It's time to go. Let's go.' And they're pushing us. And so, our, you know, how we talk to them is like, 'Look, we were a lean startup and we're going to muscular.'

是的。我也是这样跟团队说的，因为你不希望他们变臃肿。

Yeah. And that's how I talk to the team, too, because you don't want them to get fat.

是的。就像精瘦的肌肉，你知道。

Yeah. It's like lean muscle, you know.

是的。

Yes.

但我们需要一些蛋白奶昔，你知道，还有肌酸之类的。这关乎流程，把很多事情专业化。但在某些方面，那里的增长几乎是确定性的，只要你做那些专业的事情，把所有这些东西都放在心上。但这意味着现有的矿场将生产更多，它们将能够走得更远，获得更多，新的矿场将出现，那些以前不可行的，这对 AI 意味着什么，这对这里和任何地方的进步意味着什么，超级大事。

But we need some protein shakes, you know, and creatine and things like that. And it's about process, professionalizing a lot of this stuff. But it's in some ways the growth there is almost deterministic as long as you do the professional things to get all that stuff in mind. But what it means is that existing mines are going to be producing more and they're going to be able to go much further and getting more and new mines are going to emerge that couldn't that were not viable before and what that means for AI what that means for progress here and everywhere super big deal.

是的。所以继续，我们会谈到合作伙伴关系。在什么时刻这变成了某种——你从一开始就认为这是一个企业集团，还是在什么时刻这全部被包裹在 Atoms 里？

Yeah. And so to continue, we'll get to the partnership conversation. At what point does this become sort of a—are you thinking from the beginning this is a conglomerate or at what point does this become all wrapped up in the atoms?

嗯，所以这——我的意思是融资是其中的一部分。所以发生的是我们开始了融资，你知道 Ben 记得这个，因为我第一次在拉斯维加斯给他预览，我就像——我就像那个穿着风衣、戴着 20 块手表的人。我说，‘你想要哪块表？’我有各种各样的表。他说，‘老兄，我只想要整个风衣，老兄。就像我，你知道，这个想法是我不想投资采矿或运输或食品。我想要你在做的事情，让我们成为你所有事情的合作伙伴。’所以那是把公司聚集在一起的动力，创建 Atoms，以及融资本身。是的。创建 Atoms 和融资本身是在我们所谓的顶层公司层面。

Well, so this—I mean the fund raise was part of it. So what happened is we started the fund raise and you know Ben remembers this because I gave him a preview at first at in Vegas actually and I'm like—I was like the guy with a trench coat that's got like 20 watches. I'm like, 'Which watch do you want?' I got all kinds of watches. And he's like, 'Dude, I just want the whole freaking trench coat, dude. Like I, you know, the idea being I don't want to invest in mining or transport or food. I want the things that you're doing and let's be partners for all the things you do.' And so that was the impetus for bringing the companies together, creation of Atoms, and the funding itself. Yeah. The creation of Atoms and the funding itself being at what we would call topco level.

是的。

Yeah.

对。所以现在它只是一个实体。我的意思是到处都有子实体，但它是一个股权结构，这对员工和我都有好处，因为管理——老实说我不知道 Elon 是怎么做到的，或者曾经怎么做，或者现在怎么做。这很疯狂，老实说我很高兴我没有那个头疼的问题。

Right. And so now it's just one entity. I mean there's sub entities all over the place but it's one equity structure which is great for the employees and great for me because managing—I honestly I don't know how Elon does it or did it slash does it. It's pretty wild and I'm really glad I don't have that headache to be honest.

是的。是的。这是非常复杂的对齐。但你知道，这是一个有趣的点，因为很明显，你知道，当我们在这里讨论时，它应该怎么运作，我认为这些事物如何被构建的叙事被行业和媒体不断错误讲述，你知道，如果你听说 Facebook 是怎么来的，Google 是怎么来的，你知道 Tesla 是怎么来的——哦，他们有了这个想法。是的。这个想法就是做这个。但那不是真正发生的。很多人都有那个想法。你知道，外面有很多这样的想法。就像如果你看 Tesla，有一部非常著名的纪录片叫《谁杀死了电动车》，在 Tesla 之前就出来了。如果你是一个企业家看那个，你会看到的是大石油、大汽车、大政府。我们永远不会让那发生。他们会杀了你。但现实是，哦，Elon Musk，那是很难杀的，对吧？就像他一个人基本上让美国汽车工业脱碳了，你知道，回想起来真的难以置信，但然后它被讲述，对吧？就像如果你现在听政客们说，他们说，‘哦，他没有建造 Tesla。他只是像发现了一个金矿，然后就把金子拉出来。’就像所有那些人建造了它。是的。但为什么所有那些人没有建造另一个 Tesla？就像只有一个，因为在那等式里只有一个不可替代的、非常罕见的人能做到。同样，这就是为什么只有一个 SpaceX。这就是为什么你知道，这就是为什么 Meta 是 Meta，Fster 是 Fster，以及所有那些东西。

Yeah. Yeah. It's very complicated alignment. But you know it's a kind of an interesting point because it's very obvious to you know when we talked about it here the way it should work and I think the narrative of how these things get built is mistold constantly by the industry by the press which is you know if you hear about how did Facebook come about how did Google come about how did you know Tesla come—oh they had this idea. Yeah. And the idea was to do this. But that's not really what happened. A lot of had that idea. You know, there's a lot of those ideas out there. And like if you look at Tesla, there was a very famous documentary called Who Killed the Electric Car that came out before Tesla. And if you were an entrepreneur watching that, what you would see is big oil, big auto, big government. We're never going to let that happen. They would kill you. But then the reality is, oh, Elon Musk, that is hard to kill, right? Like so he by himself kind of decarbonized American auto industry, which is, you know, really unbelievable in retrospect, but then it gets told, right? Like if you listen to the politicians now, they're like, 'Oh, he didn't build Tesla. He just like struck a gold mine and is just pulling the gold out.' Like all those people built it. Yeah. But why didn't all those people build another Tesla? Like there's only one because there's only one non-fungible very rare person in that equation who could do that. And same and that's why there's only one SpaceX. And that's why you know that's why Meta is Meta and Fster Fster and all that kind of thing.

那是个好例子。我很久没听到那个了。

That's a good one. I haven't heard that one for a long time.

是的，很好。所以为了建立，你知道，建立一家公司，你知道，一家伟大的公司，总是有一个伟大的企业家。所以当我们看它时，我们觉得，你知道，在硅谷的历史上，很少有企业家建立了像 Uber 这样的东西。而 Uber 基本上在没有他的情况下幸存下来，并且仍然是一家非常有价值的公司，这几乎，你知道，就像没有创始人的情况下永远不会发生。我的意思是，它通常很快变成垃圾。所以那就是我们喜欢的，是的，这个想法很棒，雄心壮志令人惊叹，如果他成功了，对世界来说将是惊人的，但我们想投资于那个能成功的人。这就是驱动整个事情的原因。

Yeah, it's good. And so to build, you know, to build a company, you know, a great company, it's always a great entrepreneur. And so when we looked at it, we're like there's a very few entrepreneurs, you know, in the history of the valley that built something like Uber. And that Uber basically it survived and is still a very valuable company without him, which almost, you know, like that never happens without the founder. I mean, it usually turns to crap very fast. And so that was what we like, yes, the idea is great, the ambition is amazing, it's going to be amazing for the world if he pulls it off, but like we want to invest in the guy who could pull it off. And that's kind of what drove the whole thing.

还有一件有趣的事。我在 Uber 也意识到这一点，我认为在很多方面，也许也许 Bezos 是那种真正去那里的人，那就是你想象力的唯一约束是管理能力，因为看看 Amazon 开始做的所有事情。他们比其他人更早开始做很多事情，对吧？

And there's a fun thing. I realized this at Uber too is that I think I in many ways maybe maybe Bezos was the guy to sort of really go there which is the only constraint to your imagination is management capacity because like look at all the things that Amazon started doing. They were earlier than everybody else starting to do lots of things, right?

所以我想——哦顺便说一句，另一个好例子。有多少人有过网上书店、网上零售商、网上任何那些的想法？

And so I'm like—oh by the way another good one. How many had the idea for an online bookstore, online retailer, online any of that?

就是这样。

There we go.

又有多少个 Amazon？

And how many Amazons?

是的，完全正确。

Yeah, totally.

你知道，而且顺便说一句，Jeff，就像每个认识 Jeff 的人，每个人都听过他说话，你会说，‘哦，他非常特别。’

You know, and by the way, Jeff, like everybody who knows Jeff, everybody's heard him talk, you're like, 'Oh, he's very special.'

那真是一位特别的 CEO。

That's a special CEO right there.

而且那种眼光，我们的业务就是投资那种非常非常特别的个体。他们极其罕见。

And that look, and that's our business is to invest in that kind of very, very special individual. And they're super rare.

所以我觉得在很多方面，贝索斯可能是——我总想说他是某件事的 OG，但后来你发现一百年前有人已经做过了。但就我们这个时代而言，AWS 是怎么发生的？它真的和书店毫无关系。

And so I think in many ways Bezos may have been—I always want to say the OG on something, but then you find out a hundred years earlier somebody else did that. But of our time, where it's like, how did AWS happen? It literally had nothing to do with a bookstore really.

毫无关系。

Nothing.

我是说，他们讲了一些有趣的故事，但这完全是一个全新的事物。

I mean, there's some fun stories they tell, but it's like this is just a whole new thing.

是的。但顺便说一句，那并不是在经营亚马逊。

Yeah. But by the way, it wasn't like that was running Amazon.

是的。不，完全同意。这就是我的观点。所以，一旦你站稳脚跟，有了滩头阵地，而且它运转良好，你就可以开始扩展——你做 Uber 出行，然后是 Uber Eats，然后是 Uber 自动驾驶，然后是 Uber Freight，然后是 Uber AI 实验室。就像，你可以开始让有约束的想象力去做真正有趣的事情。所以起点很重要。

Yeah. No, totally. That's my point. Yeah. Yeah. So, once you get the foothold, the beachhead, whatever, and it's working, you can start going—you Uber rides, then it's Uber Eats, then it's Uber autonomy, then it was Uber Freight, then it's like Uber AI labs. Like, you can start letting your imagination with constraints start to do really interesting things. And so where you start matters.

是的。你说得对。而且你必须要有知识。

Yeah. You're right. And it has to be like you need knowledge.

对。就像亚马逊在 AWS 上的优势是，他们知道大规模运行这些东西意味着什么，因为他们是第一个或前五个达到那种规模的公司。所以他们拥有那种知识。

Right. Like the thing that Amazon did have on AWS is they had knowledge of what it meant to run these things at scale, because they were the first to get to, or one of the first like five to get to that kind of scale. And so they had that knowledge.

完全不同的业务，但他们知道产品应该是什么样。

Totally different business, totally, but they had the knowledge about what the product should be.

是的。而且因为他是这些产品的客户，对吧，在 Uber，他突然知道网络是什么。他知道怎么做。

Yeah. And because he's a customer of these things, right, at Uber, he all of a sudden he knows what the network is. He knows how to do that.

而且尽管是完全不同的业务，如果你能规模化、执行并扩展管理，那些知识是可以转移的，而且有时候那些看起来相邻的类别比全新的、偏离轨道的类别要容易得多。

And although it's a totally different business, that knowledge is transferable if you can scale and execute and expand management, and sometimes you go to sometimes those C look adjacent categories are way easier than whole new off the rails categories.

哦，是的。而且还有——我是说，AWS 的惊人之处在于，它是少数几个扩张中，没有人会想“我想从亚马逊买的是算力云”这样的。当时没有人这么想。

Oh, yeah. Yes. And there's also—I mean, the amazing thing about AWS is it's one of the few expansions where like nobody would think, well, what I want to buy from Amazon is like a compute cloud. Like nobody was thinking that at the time.

是的。没有。

Yeah. No.

你知道，总是有“哦，我应该卖给他们更多他们想从我这里买的东西”。但那是另一回事。但是，你知道，如果你有那种杰夫级别的技能，比如在组织设计、文化连续性方面，那家伙是巅峰贝索斯，难以超越。

You know, like there's always, oh, I should sell them more stuff they want to buy from me. But that's a whole another thing. But, you know, if you have that level of Jeff skill, which like in terms of organizational design, cultural continuity, that guy is Peak Bezos, hard to beat.

非常好。

Very good.

是的。所以起点很重要。

Yeah. So, where you start matters.

是的。别让他过他的最好生活。他为此得到了很多负面报道。

Yeah. Don't let him living his best life. He gets a lot of bad PR for that.

嗯，我在想，特拉维斯，你本可以有一个“过最好生活”的版本，就像“嘿，这就是我做的”，或者“我要永远做下去”，或者“嘿，我追寻了应许之地，我走得很远，但我本可以走得更远。我下次要达到那里”。你直接回到竞技场的动力是什么？

Well, I was wondering you, Travis, you could have had a version of living your best life where you just like, hey, this is what I do, you know, or was it like, I'm going to keep doing it forever, or was it like, hey, I chased the promised land. I got really far, but I could have got so much further. I'm going to get there next. What was the sort of motivation to just get right back in the arena?

只是我喜欢在竞技场里战斗。

It's just I love being in the arena fighting it.

而且，你知道，顺便说一句，他是极少数赚了那么多钱还想继续玩的人之一。我是说，基本上重新开始。不是完全，但几乎完全，对吧？

And it's not, you know, by the way, he's one of the very rare guys who made as much money as he did and wanted to keep playing. I mean, and start over basically. Not totally, but almost completely, right?

所以——是的，你必须真的想要，因为还记得我是秘密做的。是的。所以这意味着——关于秘密的事情是，秘密和从底层开始，对吧？就像亲手做，对吧？就像不是——我走进去，收购了这家公司，执行主席——我收购了 Cloud Kitchens，和我的哥们迭戈合作，对吧，我收购的公司里只有六个人。所以这很有趣，因为你想，我上次的全员大会有 2 万人，我下次的全员大会——那是我唯一参加的公司——只有六个人，我站在前面，就像一样，我说：“伙计们，走吧。我们干吧。图表，你知道，这是正在发生的事情。我们，你知道，开始吧。我们干吧。”而这些我刚刚走进来的人，他们就像：“刚才发生了什么？”

So the—yeah, you got to really want because also remember I did it stealth. Yeah. So what it means—here's the thing about stealth is that stealth and starting at the bottom, right? Like doing it by hand, right? Like not—like I walked in, I acquired this company, executive chairman—I acquired Cloud Kitchens, partnered with a buddy of mine Diego, right, and there were like six people in the company that I acquired. Okay, so it was so funny because you got to think the last all hands I did had 20,000 people, the next all hands I did—and it's the only company I was in—had six, and I stood in front just like the same, and I'm like, "Let's go, guys. Let's do this. Charts, you know, like here what's happening. We're, you know, let's roll. Let's do it." And these guys who like I just walked in, they're like, "What the just happened?"

他们那天早上去上班时还是一家六人初创公司，一小时后，Uber 的创始人成了 CEO。

They went to work that morning at a six-person startup and an hour later, the founder of Uber is now the CEO.

是的。是的。是的。那太疯狂了。而且顺便说一句，我们——我见过很多次，有人到了顶层，然后他们说：“哦，我想做点新东西。”但他们不想一路下到一楼，从底层开始把建筑搭起来。好吧，现在你在一个简陋的房子里。他们想直接跳到——那永远行不通。你不能从顶层开始。

Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That is wild. And then by the way, like we—I've seen it so many times where somebody gets to the penthouse and they're like, "Oh, I want to do a new thing." But they don't want to go all the way down to the ground floor and start at the bottom putting the building together. Okay, now you're in a shotgun house. They want to jump all the way to the—which never works. You can't start at the top.

是的。而且从底层开始也关乎谦逊。

Yeah. Well, and the bottom thing also is about there's a humility thing to it.

是的。而且有一种反名声的东西。我的意思是，想象一下——你从底层开始，你也秘密地做。这意味着你和公司里的每个人都从每天的工作中获得满足感。不是因为他们会出名，而是因为他们喜欢一起工作的人和日复一日所做的事情。顺便说一句，如果你能实现这一点，那是一个非常显著的文化优势，因为一旦公司觉得它在为外部地位做事，那就是一个危险的——不稳定的局面。

Yeah. And there's like—there's an anti-fame thing to it. And what I mean by that is imagine—do you start from the bottom, you also do it stealth. It means you plus everybody in your company gets fulfillment from the work they do every day. Not because they're going to get famous. But because they enjoy the people they're working with and what they're doing day in day out. By the way, if you can pull it off, that's a very significant cultural advantage because as soon as the company feels like it's doing something for the outside status, it's a dangerous—it's a volatile situation.

是的。没错。你开始基于外部验证而非内部正确性做决策。

Yeah. That's right. You start making decisions based on external validation versus internal correctness.

是的。你失去了真正的方向。

Yeah. You lose true north.

是的。这是秘密模式的好处之一，也是我当初做的一部分原因，因为记得我想在不用担心《纽约时报》说什么的情况下建设。

Yeah. And that's part of the upside of stealth and part of what I was doing because remember I wanted to build without worrying about what the New York Times was saying.

是的。所以它始于内部正确性而非外部验证。是的。

Yeah. So it starts with internal correctness versus external validation. Yeah.

一旦公司开始这样做，就很难——就像你已经在大实验室看到的那样。人们一直说：“哦，为什么大实验室要打自己的脸？”嗯，那是因为他们需要为员工提供外部验证，因为他们的员工对此上瘾。我想当个好人。我想当个好的 AI 研究员。所以，去告诉他们我们要抢走所有工作。这就像，真的吗？你想这么说？你甚至不知道这是不是真的，但你想这么说。嗯，你为什么这么做？嗯，外部验证对他们来说太重要了，不仅对经营的人重要，对公司里所有的人都重要。所以，他们几乎不得不这么做。

Which once the company starts doing that, it's hard to—like you already see this with the big labs. People keep going, "Oh, why do the big labs smack themselves in the face?" Well, it's because they need that external validation for their employees because their employees are addicted to it. I want to be a good guy. I want to be a good AI researcher. So, go ahead and tell them that we're going to take all the jobs. It's like, really? You want to say that? You don't even know if it's true, but you want to say that. Well, why are you doing that? Well, it's that external validation is so important to them, and it's so important not just to the people running it, but to all the people in the company. And so, they almost have to do it.

即使他们，如果你愿意，如果你真这么想，那就去解决那些问题。比如，‘你不想让它奖励黑客行为。’那你为什么不去解决这个问题，而不是到处放嘴炮，因为你更在乎外界的认可，而不是事情本身？

Even though they, if you wanted, if that's what you think, then work on those problems. Like, 'Oh, you don't want it to reward hack.' Well, why don't you try and solve that, as opposed to go running your mouth, because you care about the external validation more than the actual thing?

这就是——

And that's the—

是啊，很容易陷入那种状态。很多公司都这样。

Yeah, it's very easy to slip into that. Many companies slip into that.

问题是——

And here's the thing—

一旦说漏嘴，就很难收场。人性中就有一种对自己做的事感到自豪的倾向，希望妈妈为你骄傲，希望整个社区为你骄傲。

It's hard to, once it gets out of the bag, it's very—there's a human nature aspect to being proud of what you do, wanting your mom to be proud of what you do and your community at large.

嗯。

Yeah.

所以，人性中有这么一部分，而我通过保持低调压抑了它。但这迫使我培养了一种情商，现在当我们走出低调时，这种情商非常强大。

So there is a human nature piece which I was malnourishing by being stealth. But it forced an emotional intelligence that's very powerful now that we're moving out of stealth.

是的。未来几年会很有趣，这将是一个非常有趣的文化案例研究，看看公司随着时间会变成什么样。

Yeah. And it will be interesting to see how the coming years go. That's going to be a very interesting cultural case study, see what the company is like over time.

嗯。

Yeah.

我们谈过书对亚马逊的意义，你知道，食物对亚当斯的意义，就是起点很重要。那么，从可推广性的角度来看，为什么从食物开始很重要？就像——

So, we've talked about what books were to Amazon, you know, food is to Adams in the sense of it's where you start and where you start matters. So, why was it important that you started at food in terms of what's generalizable? What's like—

是的，同样道理。所以，事情是这样的，对吧？云厨房的意义，在我看来——这也是我带来的东西——就是数字化的制造和数字化的房地产。它被称为——我进来时这么叫它——人们知道它是云厨房，因为这是我们向餐厅客户推销的，但公司名称是城市存储系统。

Yeah, same way. So, here's the thing, right? So what cloud kitchens was all about, the way I saw it—and this was what I brought to the party—but it was like this is digitized manufacturing and digitized real estate. It was called—I called it when I came—people know as cloud kitchens because that's what we'd sell restaurant customers on, but the name of the company was City Storage Systems.

啊，好的。物理世界的存储。这是数字化的房地产。

Ah, okay. Storage for the physical world. This is digitized real estate.

是的，这是一个基于房地产存储的食物计算机。

Yeah, this is a food computer with a basis in real estate storage.

好的，这意味着一个网络。

Okay, that means a network.

是的。所以，这是公司从一开始的名字，或者是我进来后的名字。它故意很无聊，因为我要保持低调。你想象一下推销一个叫城市存储系统的东西。人们会想，‘那是什么？’他们会在你跟他们说完 20 分钟后彻底忘记。他们会说，‘城市 CSS。’他们想到的是 HTML。他们很困惑，不知道发生了什么。

Yeah. So, this was the name of the company from the beginning, or once I came in. It was purposely boring because I was going stealth. You imagine selling something called City Storage Systems. Like people are like, 'What is that?' They'll forget literally 20 minutes after you talk to them. They're like, 'City CSS.' They're thinking HTML. They're confused. They don't know what's going on.

所以，对我来说，框架已经存在了。我已经把它看作是数字化的制造和房地产，是一个基于原子的计算机，是一个食物计算机，这就是我兴奋的原因。这个想法因为这一点吸引了我。所以，并不是‘你为什么从食物开始？’而是我看到了不同的东西，甚至可能比最初团队看到的更多，但我看到了它的发展方向。就像我刚才描述的，这就是浪漫之处。是的，外面有很多数字化的制造问题。

So, um, so for me the framework was already there. I already thought about this as digitized manufacturing and real estate, about an atoms-based computer, about a food computer, and that's why I was excited. The idea captured me because of that. And so it wasn't like why'd you start with food? It was like I saw something different than even maybe the original team that was working on it saw it, but I saw where it was going. And in the way that I just described, and that's what the romance was about. And yes, there are lots of digitized manufacturing problems out there.

比如采矿，

Like mining,

比如采矿，还有很多其他事情。嗯，但这件事在合适的时间抓住了我。你知道，我坐在酒吧里，有人走过来，我们聊得很开心。然后下个周末去了卡波，然后就定下来了，说‘走吧’。

Like mining, like a whole bunch of other things. Um, but this just captured me at the right time. You know, I was sitting at the bar and somebody came up and we had a great conversation. You know, went to Cabo the next weekend and then just put a ring on it, like let's go.

机缘巧合，老兄。

Serendipity, man.

是的，这是真实存在的。所以，这没关系，因为关键在于，如果你相信你能找到某件事，让它成功，只要努力去做，让它成功，用意志力让它成功。你的想象力可以继续前进。所以，对我来说，起点并不那么重要。重要的是确保你对起点充满热情。然后你会走向哪里，你完全不知道。这很像，我回到贝索斯的风格，就像你的想象力会不断涌现出新的酷点子。

Yeah, that's a real thing. So, and that's okay because the thing is if you believe that you can find something, make it work, just grind it out, make it work, will it into working. Your imagination can keep going. So, for me, it's not as much about where you start. It's about making sure you're passionate about where you start. And then where you go, you have no idea. And this is very much, I go back to the Bezos style, which is like your imagination will just keep coming up with new cool ideas.

所以，重要的不是起点，而是你为什么开始，以及你如何建立一种文化，让你随着时间不断进入新的领域，让你的想象力在合适的时候蓬勃发展。

And so it's not about where you start. It's about why you start and how you build a culture that allows you to keep going into new places over time and lets your imagination, when it's right, flourish.

是的，这就是我的意思。这不是一个想法，而是一个想法迷宫。你越了解这个想法和所有的事情——而且你什么都不知道——就像从外部很难理解的是，你开始时知道的很少。就像他——我的意思是他甚至没告诉我——他开始时，他不知道他会遇到云厨房问题的 1%。

Yeah, that's what I was. It's not an idea, it's an idea maze. And the more you learn about the idea and all the things—and you don't know any—like the thing that is so hard to understand coming from the outside is you know so little when you start. Like when he—I mean he didn't even tell me—he started, he didn't know 1% of the problems he was going to run into with cloud kitchens.

是的，当然。

Yeah, for sure.

因为你必须真正——

Because you've got to really—

进入什么科技人士懂房地产的领域？

Get into what tech guy knows anything about real estate?

0.0。

0.0.

是的。所以，整个过程都是一个学习过程，然后最好的创业者能够吸收这些经验，然后应用、扩展应用。这就是，你知道，非常非常罕见的事情。比如，看，埃隆把 SpaceX 带到了星链，再到太空数据中心，就是没有人会从那里开始。

Yeah. So you—it's all the whole thing is a learning process, and then it's the best entrepreneurs can take those learnings and then apply, multiply the applications. And that's, you know, it's just a very, very rare thing. Like, look, the fact that Elon has taken SpaceX to Starlink to data centers in space, it's just like nobody would start there.

或者想想这个。第一辆 Roadster 现在是 Optimus。

Or think about this. The first Roadster is now Optimus.

是的。谈谈——

Yeah. Talk about—

是的。是的。

Yes. Yes.

让想象力蓬勃发展是一件美好的事情。

Letting the imagination flourish is a beautiful thing.

是的。理解核心的核心原则是什么。

Yeah. Understanding what the core core principles are.

是的。并应用它们。那么说到这里，给我们描绘一下原子的未来，或者更多关于——或者也许说一些指导原则，这些原则将决定，你知道，你接下来进入哪些行业，或者你如何考虑从这里走向何方。

Yeah. And applying them. So with that said, paint us more—paint us a picture about the future of atoms, or more about the—or maybe say some of the guiding principles that will dictate, you know, which industries you enter next or how you think about where you go from here.

是的，看，我告诉人们我现在非常专注，因为只有食物、采矿和运输。我还有很多事情没做。比如，我现在非常受限。嗯，但这又回到了我之前说的，你必须找到一个滩头阵地，让它蓬勃发展，建立管理能力来解决 98% 正在发生的问题，然后你才有空间去做新的事情。实际上，你知道，我被指责用了太多马拉松的比喻。

Yeah, look, I tell people I'm very focused right now because it's only food, mining, and transport. There's so many things I haven't done yet. Like, I'm so constrained right now. Um, but it goes back to that thing I was saying before, is you've got to find that beachhead, make it flourish, build management capacity to solve 98% of the problems that are going on, and then you have the room to go do a new thing. And really what it is, it's, you know, I've been accused of using the marathon analogy too much.

嗯。

Yeah.

我会不辜负这个比喻，那就是，你知道，在某个时候，你可能在做一项业务，它开始运转了。我在优步的乘车服务中开始看到这一点，就像我在不同地区有负责人，我会给他们打电话，因为我们会讨论难题并努力解决。我们没什么好谈的。

And I'm gonna live up to that, which is, you know, at some point you might be doing a business and it just starts working. I started seeing that on rides at Uber, where it was like I had my leads in different geos and I'd call them up because we would jam on hard ideas and crank and all this. We didn't have much to talk about.

是的，因为它在运转。

Yeah, 'cause it was working.

它就是运转了，你知道，他们会说，‘特拉维斯，我们搞定了。我不知道你现在为什么给我打电话。’

It just worked, you know, and they're like, 'Travis, we got this. I don't know why you're calling me right now.'

所以，这实际上引出了他在 Uber 做得最好的一件事，就是不得不与这些人打交道。你看大多数公司，大多数真正在 2000 年代和 2010 年代崛起的大型科技公司，管理团队都是职业中层经理之类的。但他手下有很多人，你会觉得“不，那是个创始人”，你知道，那边是个创始人，那边是个创始人，那是个真正的创业者，而且令人惊讶的是，他没有在创建自己的公司，因为他好像在为 Travis 工作。但这让他们能够产生大量的想法；你需要这样的团队。

So, actually this brings up one of the things that he did best at Uber, having had to deal with these guys, was like if you look at most companies, most of the really big tech companies that emerged in the 2000s and 2010s, the management team were kind of professional middle managers etc. He had so many guys who you would have gone no that's a founder, you know that's a founder over there, that's a founder over there, that's an actual entrepreneur, and it's amazing that he's not building his own company because he's like working for Travis. But that enabled them to get to a multitude of ideas; you need like a team like that.

而且能建立这种团队的人并不多，吸引并维持这种水平的能力非常困难，因为那些人，除非你在打造绝对非凡的东西，否则他们不会留下，即使你在打造，你也得能管理好他们。

And there's just not that many people who can build that kind of it's just a very hard to attract and maintain that level of capability because those guys, unless you're building something absolutely spectacular, you know, they're not going to be, and even if you are, you're dealing with you got to be able to manage that.

嗯，管理它变成了一个赋权难题。

Well, what happens is the management of it becomes an empowerment puzzle.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，是的。好的。顺便说一句，这里也不例外。

So, yes. Okay. By the way, not unlike here, by the way.

我正要这么说，所以你有，我有，你知道，是的。我在运营 Uber。假设我同时有五个大洲在推进。你有一个工程团队，跨多个项目，财务团队，跨多个项目，产品团队。事情很多，唯一能运作的方式是，你有一个创业者在那里，但他们基本上必须从对齐开始赋权，也就是“好的，战略是什么，我们是否对齐了”。

I was about to say, so you've got you've got I've got, you know, Yeah. I'm running Uber. Let's say I have, I don't know, five continents going at any given time. You have an engineering team that's multiplexed across a finance team that's multiplexed across a product. Like there's a lot going on and the only way it works is okay you have that entrepreneur there but they have to basically empowerment starts with alignment which is okay what's the strategy, do are we aligned on it.

这就是挑战，对吧？赋权加对齐。

That's the challenge, right? Empowerment plus alignment.

所以前端对齐，后端问责。

So alignment on the front end, accountability on the back end.

我们会称之为“让建设者去建设”。

And we would call this 'let builders build'.

所以，但还有一点，你有对齐，但对齐是多维的，因为它是对齐“好的，目标是什么，目的什么，还有文化是什么？”

And so, but way there's is also so you've got alignment but alignment is multi-dimensional because it's alignment on okay what are the goals, what are the objectives, also what is the culture?

比如，是的，行为是什么？

Like yeah, what is the behavior?

你们在那边做的事情，因为那会影响我们这边和我们那边，等等，所以我们不能稀释文化，因为我们给了你自主权，我们必须保持这一点，而这种结合是一种非常高水平的管理技能。

You guys are doing over there because that's going to affect us over here and us over there and so forth, so like we can't dilute the culture because we gave you autonomy, we've got to have that, and that combination is uh it's like a very high level of management skill.

而且那个领导者必须足够优秀才能做到。

And that leader has to be good enough to do it.

是的。

Yeah.

然后那个领导者必须与 CFO 及其团队、产品负责人及其团队、工程及其团队合作，确保一切运作，因为如果我是单点故障，那在 24 个时区上就无法扩展。

And that leader then has to work with the CFO and the CFO's people, the product, the head of product and the product guys, engineering and engineering people to make sure that it works, because if I'm a single point of failure, it ain't scaling on 24 time zones.

绝对不可能。我认为这就是我们在 Uber 所做的与其他很多公司国际扩张方式的不同。他们收购东西。

There's no freaking way. And I think that's the difference between what we did at Uber versus we're seeing how a lot of other companies are expanding internationally. They're buying things.

就像我说，好吧，我买。我们完全可以自己干。城市就是城市。走吧。

Like I was like, well, I buy. We could just freaking do this. A city's a city. Let's go.

然后如果你收购了它，猜怎么着？你带来了另一种文化。

And then if you buy it, guess what? You brought another culture.

是的。

Yeah.

好的。现在你又有了另一个声誉。然后那个声誉会渗透回来。然后，好吧，现在你没有文化了。而且，顺便说一句，因为那些在韩国怎么能逃脱，而我们在美国不能？就像所有这些事情。

Okay. And now you got another reputation. And then that reputation is going to seep back. And then, okay, now you don't have a culture. And by the way, because how are those getting away with that in Korea when we can't get away with that in the US? Like all those things.

而且，顺便说一句，你的产品、你的技术是你文化的反映。所以接下来发生的是，文化反映在技术中，甚至反映在技术如何构建上。做出的产品决策，现在你必须将这些产品和技术融合在一起，这非常困难。也许两年后。

And by the way, your product, your technology is a reflection of your culture. So then what happens is you just have the culture is reflected in the technology and in how even that tech is built. The product decisions that are made and now you got to fuse these products and technologies together, which is very hard. Two years later, maybe.

是的。完全正确。这就是为什么我没有收购 Lyft。

Yeah. Exactly. That's why I didn't buy Lyft.

顺便说一句，那是一个非常不同的文化。

By the way, that was a very different culture.

是的，我可以作证。

Yeah, I can attest.

我，所以这就是我无法做到的原因。

I this so this was the reason I I couldn't do it.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。非常有趣。

Yeah. Super interesting.

那么，你现在受到三个不同行业的约束。什么标准将决定你是否以及何时进入另一个行业？

The and so you're constrained now by three different industries. What is the criteria that's going to determine if and when you go into another?

是的，这是滩头阵地的事情，而且我会回到马拉松的类比，那就是如果事情变得容易了，你必须让它再次变难。

Yeah, it's the beach head thing and it's the I'll go back to the marathon analogy is that if it's getting easy, you must make it hard again.

因为。

Because.

但你必须让它变得容易。你必须开始。这是一种感觉，就像一种感觉，基本上我一直在制造问题。

But you got to get it to easy. You got to you've got to start. It's a and it's a vibe. It's like a feeling where you basically I'm constantly creating problems.

是的。

Yeah.

我是一个问题制造者。制造一个问题可能就像，“嘿，让我们在中国做 Uber。”

I'm a problem creator. A problem creator might be like creating a problem might be like, 'Hey, let's do Uber in China.'

好的，那是在制造一个真正该死的问题。

Okay, that's creating a real freaking problem.

而且，顺便说一句，当你制造它时，你并不完全理解那个问题。为什么那很难？因为，好吧，如果你制造一个问题，你必须解决它。

And by the way, you don't have a full understanding of that problem when you create it. And why is that hard? Because, well, if you create a problem, you have to solve it.

是的。

Yeah.

所以我有一个框架，我称之为“元问题”，即你的问题制造对时间的导数必须小于或等于你的问题解决对时间的导数。

So I have this like framework I call the meta problem, which is the derivative of your problem creation dt must be less than the derivative, less than or equal to the derivative of your problem solving dt.

如果不是，你就有真正的问题了。

And if it's not, you have a real problem.

是的。那么，那么你就被淹没了。

Yeah. Well then then then you're underwater.

是的。然后你被淹没，然后你可能会淹死，如果你有多个这样的问题，你真的被淹没了。

Yeah. Then you're underwater and then you can drown, and if you have multiples of those, you're really underwater.

没错。所以当你制造一个问题时，你在猜测你解决问题的能力，而且你在猜测 6 个月、12、18 个月后的情况，只对问题的本质有一定的理解。当你真的搞错了，你被淹没了，然后你必须停止所有问题制造，以便回到水面上。然后当你从脖子处，然后到腰部，就你被淹没的程度而言。当你在腰部时，你会想，“哦，我能到这里。”

That's right. So when you create a problem, you're guessing at what your capacity is to solve problems, and you're guessing 6 months, 12, 18 months ahead with only a certain understanding of what the nature of the problem is. And when you get it really wrong, you're underwater, and then you must stop all problem creation so that you can get back above water. And then when you go from your neck and then you're like at your waist in terms of how underwater you are with your problem solving. When you're at your waist, you're like, 'Oh, I could get to here.'

你制造更多问题。你让问题制造的位置开放。而且，顺便说一句，当你谈到能力时，在这种情况下，很多是他个人能力，因为他必须能够，如果他在制造一个新的重大问题，他必须能够不再以几乎同样的细节关注他业务的其他部分。

You create more problems. You let the problem creation spot open. And by the way, when you talk about capacity, a lot of it in this case is he's talking about his personal capacity because he's got to be able, if he's creating a new large problem, he's got to be able to not pay attention in nearly the level of detail to the other parts of his business.

这必须得行得通，因为如果他在那边解决问题却制造了一个大新问题，那那个问题就会陷入麻烦。所以这不仅仅是团队的能力，也是个人的能力。

It does have to be working because if he's solving problems over there and created a big new problem, then that one gets in trouble. So it's not just like capacity of the team, it's also personal capacity.

两者都有一点，两者都有一点。

It's a little bit of both, it's a little bit of both.

所以这是真正的……我从来没觉得……我从来没觉得共享出行已经解决了，因为后来发生了……哦，该做自动驾驶了。好吧，我们开始吧。

So it's a real... I never felt like... I never felt like rid share was solved because what happened... Oh, it's time for autonomy. Okay, all right, let's go.

顺便说一句，你当时是对的。是的。

By the way, you were right about that. Yeah.

是的。尽管……是的。

Yeah. Just despite... Yeah.

我甚至不会提名字。

I'm not going to even mention names.

那么，如果你还在运营 Uber，你知道，在另一个宇宙里，或者你在这里对 Adams 的一些愿景，那会不会……你知道，你能带着 Uber 去搞矿业吗？比如……

And so if you had still been running Uber, you know, in this other universe, or some of the vision that you have here with Adams, would that have been... you know, could you have gone to mining with Uber? Like...

这是同一个愿景的延续。是的。

It's a continuation of the same vision. Yeah.

对。所以数字化物理世界，基于原子的计算，那已经确定了。

Right. So the digitizing the physical world, the atoms-based computation, that was already set.

是的。所以如果食品的未来是关于基础设施、自动化生产、自动化物流，那也是 Uber Eats 的未来。现在，这并不意味着当你是一个原始设备制造商，你制造一台食品计算机，你就必须制造所有部件，对吧？但未来是一样的。

Yeah. And so if the future of food is about infrastructure, automated production, automated logistics, that's the future of Uber Eats, too. Now, it doesn't mean when you're an OEM and you make a food computer, it doesn't mean you have to make all the parts, right? But the future is the same.

是的。

Yeah.

所以这就是我的观点，一旦你有了那个框架，为什么框架很重要？因为它告诉你未来会是什么样子。

And so that's my point, is that once you have that framework, why is the framework important? It's because it tells you what the future's going to be.

是的。这是正确的，而且也很引人注目。就像一旦你开始看到这些东西，比如，顺便说一句，我和我的团队在全球建造了大约 500 个云厨房设施。你可以把它看作，为什么你在建厨房，当然我总会到处跟人说我只是你们当地谦逊的厨房建造者，你知道，就是随便搞搞。

Yeah. It's correct and it also is compelling. Like it's interesting once you start seeing things like, by the way, I built with my team like 500 cloud kitchens facilities around the world. Like you could just look at it as like why are you building kitchens, which of course I would sort of go around all the time and tell people I'm just your local humble kitchen builder, you know, just sort of messing around.

但当你招聘的时候，就会问这为什么重要？

But like when you're hiring, it's like why does this matter?

是的。哦，没错。这是一台食品计算机。是的。但一旦……所以它既告诉你未来走向何方，又指引你有趣的事物在哪里，还帮助你以某种方式向真正顶尖的人才描述这一切，他们现在能看到你所看到的，并为此感到兴奋。

Yeah. Oh, that's right. It's a food computer. Yeah. But once... So it's a mix of it's telling you where the future's going and it's pointing the way towards where the interesting things are, and it's helping you describe this in a way to really top-quality talent who now can see what you see and can get excited about it.

是的。还有另一件有趣的事情，我们在理解业务时经历过，那就是不像计算机里你有存储，存储会随着时间变得过时，在物理存储世界，在房地产中，如果你有计算机优化存储，存储会变得更有价值。所以你建造食品计算机，存储对于提供最终服务至关重要，你知道，特别是在有原始设备制造商之前，每个人都知道有食品计算机可用，但那个食品计算机使房地产的价值成倍增加。所以这很奇怪。想象一台计算机使其存储的价值成倍增加。我想这有点像在 AI 中，如果你有数据，突然间数据变得有价值了。

Yeah. And there's another kind of interesting thing which we went through when we were understanding the business, which is unlike in a computer where you have storage and that storage kind of becomes obsolete over time, in the physical storage world, in real estate, if you have the computer optimizing the storage, the storage becomes more valuable. So you build the food computer and the storage is essential to deliver the end service, you know, particularly before there's OEMs and everybody knows there's a food computer available, but that food computer multiplies the value of the real estate. So it's weird. Imagine a computer that multiplied the value of its storage. I guess it's a little like in AI, like if you've got data, all of a sudden data has become valuable.

是的。以某种方式，以前并不是这样。

Yeah. In a way that it wasn't really before.

嗯，或者你这样想。我们可以去一个数据中心。那是房地产。是的，对。今天数据中心发生的运算次数与 20 年前相比是多少？

Well, or you think of it this way. We could go to a data center. That's real estate. Yeah, right. How many tops are now happening at a data center today versus 20 years ago?

是的。完全正确。是的。

Yeah. Exactly. Yeah.

所以，那些运算产生了多少价值，对吧？所以数据中心在为社会提供什么方面的价值随着时间的推移急剧上升。

So, and how much value is coming out of those tops, right? So the value of a data center in terms of what it provides society is going up over time dramatically.

而且现在有很多开心的数据中心所有者。毫无疑问。是的。毫无疑问。我的朋友 Rob Roy。

And there's a lot of happy data center owners right now because of it. No doubt. Yeah. No doubt. My friend Rob Roy.

是的，向 Rob 致敬。

Yeah, shout out to Rob.

是的，我们很快会请他上节目。所以，说到向人才描绘这个愿景，以及谈论未来走向，多谈谈 Adams 所处的这个新兴类别，你称之为工业 AI。

Yeah, we'll get him on soon. So, speaking of painting this vision to talent and just talking about where the future is going, talk more about the emerging category that Adams sits within, you're calling industrial AI.

是的。所以，你看，我们在推出 Adams 时写了一封愿景信，概述了类似物理 AI 的愿景，我们身处其中。甚至深入探讨了物理 AI 堆栈是什么，这真的在某种程度上……我当时觉得这就像关于技术世界、物理世界中的科技行业将走向何方的哲学。但我没有做到的是触及实质，当你看到好吧，有软件，有比特在影响原子……原子会发生什么，比如它们如何组装，去哪里，在物理世界中起什么作用。我们基本上……我现在有点语无伦次，剪辑一下。但我们想创造一种简单的方式来理解它的含义。我说好吧，Adams 的使命：物理自动化以变革行业。你会说好吧，好吧，这让我有点明白了，但那到底是什么意思？嗯，这意味着我们接管整个适合自动化和 AI 的行业，这样做，这些是物理行业，这样做就彻底改变了它们。

Yeah. So, look, I did a vision letter when we launched Adams that outlined sort of vision for like physical AI, where we sit in it. And even went into like what a physical AI stack is, and it's really in some ways... I was like it was like philosophy about where the technology world, the tech industry in the physical world, where it's going to go. But what I didn't do was get to the brass tacks and sort of when you look at okay well there's software, there's bits that are affecting how atoms... what happens to atoms, like how they're assembled, where they go, what function do they do in the physical world. We basically... I'm all over the place right now, cut edit. But we wanted to create an easy way to understand what it means. And I said okay, Adams' mission: physical automation to transform industries. You're like okay, okay, kind of gets me there, but what does that mean exactly? Well, it means we take entire industries that are ripe for automation and AI, and in doing so, these are physical industries, and in doing so just completely transforms them.

从某种意义上说，你有一个想法，比如 Uber 和 Adams，Adams 在某种意义上是 Uber 的演变，因为你有点说好吧，我们是物理世界的思科。嗯，然后你想，嗯，物理世界的其他部分呢？你建立了……你把那个愿景扩展到了计算机，现在你在添加部件。嗯，但计算机是围绕一个行业的。

In a sense, you've had one idea like the Uber and Adams, Adams is the evolution of Uber in a sense, in that you kind of said okay, we're the Cisco of the physical world. Um, and then you're like, well, what about the other parts of the physical world? And you built... that you extended that vision into the computer and now you're adding the parts. Um, but the computer is around an industry.

是的。所以我们为行业制造计算机。

Yes. So we make computers for industries.

是的。那些计算机是……对。这是一个重要的区别。它们是特定行业的计算机，但在某种意义上是通用网络。是的。所以你继续，好吧，我们为什么做运输？嗯，因为你必须为机器人提供移动底座。好吧，酷。但实际上这意味着每个行业都在移动东西。最终会有一些东西的移动，如果你想自动化那个行业的全栈，你必须将移动底座作为他们工作的一部分，作为一个例子。但运输本身也是一个行业。

Yeah. Those computers are... right. That's an important kind of distinction. They're industry-specific computers, but generalized networks in some sense. Yes. So you go, okay, why are we doing transport? Well, because you've got to have wheelbases for robots. Okay, cool. But like actually what it means is every industry is moving things. There's some movement of things eventually, and you must have wheelbases as part of what they do if you want to automate full stack that industry, as an example. But transport itself is an industry too.

是的。但也许是一个横向的而不是纵向的，对吧？

Yeah. But maybe a horizontal one versus a vertical, right?

是的。彼得·蒂尔十年前，你知道，著名地谈到我们在比特方面取得了如此多的进步，但在原子方面却没有，由于监管或无论什么原因，在比特方面更容易。是的，现在我们终于真正地进入这个领域了。

Yeah. Peter Thiel a decade ago, you know, famously talked about how we've had so much progress in bits, but not in atoms, and because of regulation or for whatever reason, it was just easier in bits. And yeah, here we are and we're finally getting into it in a real way.

嗯，而且我觉得自从 Uber 时代以来涌现的企业家并不像比特行业那样害怕监管……

Well, and it's like I think the entrepreneurs that are coming up since the Uber time are not scared of regulation the way the bits...

是的。嗯，从很大程度上说，那是你取得的一个突破。

Yeah. Well, that was a breakthrough in a large sense that you made.

是的。那么这意味着……

Yeah. And so what it means...

嗯，最近他们一直在试图监管比特（数字领域）。

Well, then they've been trying to regulate bits lately.

是的，完全同意。

Yeah. Totally.

但这两者是相辅相成的，因为一旦比特开始控制物理世界中的原子，监管者就会大举介入。

But these go together because it's like once the bits start controlling atoms in the physical world, then the regulators are in the game big time.

是的。

Yeah.

因为监管通常就是这样运作的，它关乎我们的物理世界。几千年来一直如此，至少也有几百年了。所以一旦进入物理世界，你就会意识到监管是个现实问题，然后你会想，过去什么时候见过类似的情况？如果你研究第二次工业革命，会发现卡内基、洛克菲勒、弗里克这些人，你随便列举，都有很多相似之处。

And because that's generally how regulation works. It's about our physical world. And that's how it's been for thousands of years. Really, certainly hundreds. And so um yeah once you get in the physical world you're like okay regulatory is a thing and you say okay when in the past have we seen something like this and it's like if you start studying the second industrial revolution there is so many parallels between what the Carnegies, the Rockefellers, the Fricks, like you just go through the list...

福特们。

Fords

福特们，那些人在当时巨大的快速变革中不得不面对的事情。

The Fords, what those guys had to deal with in that massive rapid change at that moment.

非常相似的政治气候。

Same very similar political climate.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。新政派和现在的人在彻底憎恨实业家这一点上并没有太大不同。

That's right. The New Dealers were not that different than the current in terms of their complete hatred of the industrialists.

好吧。比如有个叫弗里克的人，我想他是卡内基的合伙人，这关乎钢铁以及如何大规模加工钢铁。我相信这个故事是准确的。嗯，就算说是传说吧，可能真实，但我相信是真的。一个无政府主义者在他工作时闯进他的办公室，那是在 1900 年代初或 1800 年代末。一个无政府主义者。

Okay. So like there's a guy Frick who I think was Carnegie's partner and this is about steel and how to process steel and do it at scale. I believe this story is accurate. Uh let's just say mythology possibly true but I believe it's true. An anarchist broke into his office while he was working. This is in like the early 1900s or late 1800s. An anarchist.

嗯。

Yeah.

闯进他的办公室，朝他脖子开了一枪。

Broke into his office, shot him in the neck.

哇。

Wow.

他缝合了伤口，当天就回去工作了。

He got it stitched up, went back to work that day.

而且会有人去查证的。我相信这是真的。

And like somebody's going to look it up. I believe it's true.

是的。

Yeah.

但应该有人去核实一下。不过你能感受到当时的情况以及那些人是怎么行事的。想想今天有些企业家也是那样行事的，但不是所有人都这样。

But somebody should fact check. But you get the vibe of what's going on and how those guys rolled. And think about some of the entrepreneurs today that roll that way. Not all of them do.

比特领域的人不一定这样行事。埃隆·马斯克，但原子领域的人是这样行事的。

The Bits guys don't necessarily roll this way. Elon R, but the Adams guys rolled this way.

绝对是，对吧？所以第二次工业革命，你看看那些人物，他们不得不面对的事情，以及他们必须经历的逆境。

Definitely, right? And so the second industrial revolution and you look at the characters and what they had to deal with and the adversity they had to go through.

嗯，顺便说一句，这些人也都不是圣人。所以他们也有自己的缺点。

Um, by the way, they're also none of these guys is Jesus. So they had their flaws too.

嗯，他们很了不起。

Um, they were amazing.

但有一个国家。是的。这与现在正在发生或即将发生的工业时代有非常有趣的相似之处。如果我们推销自己的书，我们会称之为“原子时代”。

But there's a country. Yeah. There's a very interesting parallel to what's happening slash about to happen now with like the coming industrial age. If we're selling our own book, we would call it the Adams Age.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。实际上有一本书非常有趣，讲的是实业家们打造战争机器，这让我们赢得了二战，毫无疑问。以及他们遭遇的阻力。这本书叫《自由的熔炉》。嗯，你知道，就是比尔·努森这个人，他是个十足的硬汉，在福特搞定了大规模生产，然后和亨利·福特吵了一架，去了雪佛兰或通用汽车，嗯，是的，打造了雪佛兰之类的。然后以 1 美元的工资为政府工作，推动国家工业化。他遭到媒体和所有人的反对，在最基本的事情上，比如他说，如果我们让他们停止生产汽车——顺便说，当时汽车业雇用了 20% 的美国人——如果我们让他们停止生产汽车去造坦克和其他东西，那我们就得给他们一些钱。所以能不能给他们成本加成 7%？这看起来非常合理，但读起来就像他们在战争中获利，连埃莉诺·罗斯福之类的每个人都想干掉这个人。但那种阻力与今天我们在数据中心看到的情况非常相似，我认为纽约州州长刚刚禁止在该州建设数据中心。

Yeah. There's a book actually that's very interesting on the kind of building of the war machine by the industrialists which won us World War II. No question. Um and the resistance that they got. It's called Freedoms Forge. Um, and you know, it was this guy Bill Nudson who was like the complete badass who figured out like the mass production at Ford and then got in an argument with Henry Ford and went to Chevy or went to GM and like yeah built Chevy and like all that kind of thing. Then went to work for the government for a dollar and to industrialize the nation. And the way he got fought by the press and everybody like on the most basic thing like he's like well if we tell them to shut down making cars and cars by the way employ 20% of America at the time, if we tell them to shut down making cars to make tanks and other things then we're going to have to give them some money. So like can we give them cost plus 7%? And which you know like seemed very reasonable like reading about it they're going to profit on the war like in every Eleanor Roosevelt like everybody was just out to kill this guy and uh you know somehow but that kind of resistance is like very similar to what we're seeing in data centers today and that kind of thing where I think the governor of New York just banned data centers in the state.

政治上有许多相似之处，实际上我会称之为对变革的阻力。

There's a lot of parallels politically which actually I would just call that resistance to change.

是的。

Yeah.

而自然，非常快速的变化。是的，没错。

And nature very fast change. Yeah, that's correct.

所以，你知道，我喜欢，嗯，我有点把它看作最重要的求真，就是寻求有价值但未知的真理。但如果你擅长发现有价值但未知的真理，你就在创造变革。

So I, you know, I like, you know, I sort of think of it as like the most important truth seeking is the seeking of valuable unknown truths. But if you're good at finding valuable unknown truths, you're creating change.

那么你就知道别人不知道的事情，这意味着你能做别人做不到的事情。你越擅长，变革来得越快。而关键在于……

Then you know things other people don't know, which means you can do things that other people can't do. And the better you are at it, the faster the change comes. And the matter that...

而变革来得越快，自然就越会做它该做的事。这叫对变革的阻力。

And the faster the change comes, the more nature will do what it does. It's called resistance to change.

是的。

Yes.

所以你必须想办法带来巨大的进步来压倒对变革的阻力。你还必须尽可能建立信任，这样你就有更多的支持者而不是反对者。

And so you have to figure out how to bring big time progress to overwhelm resistance to change. And you also have to build trust as best as you can so that you have more advocates versus adversaries.

这就是动态。我想说的关于工业的一件事是……

And this is the dynamic. And one of the things I want to say just on the industrial...

顺便说，这很难做到。

Very hard to do by the way.

非常难。

Very hard.

每个人都喜欢进步，但他们受不了的是变革。

Everybody loves progress. It's change they can't stand.

是的，这两者恰好是相伴的。

Yeah. Those two happen to go together.

所以是的。但在工业 AI 这件事上，我整个愿景笔记都是物理 AI，是个理论性的东西，非常学术和理论化，我想说我想得到一些实际的东西。工业 AI 基本上就是软件、传感器、机器人、机械这一整套，用来自动化一个行业，我们一次只做一个行业，这样就变得非常真实和清晰了。你说物理 AI，人们会问：“哦，那你在做人形机器人吗？”我说：“不，不，我们是非人形的那类。我对他们没有意见，但那不是我们做的。”你会说：“哦，那你做军事相关的东西吗？”我说：“不，那也不是我的事。”你知道，所以这就非常清晰地定义了我们在做什么以及我们如何去做。

So yeah. So like but on the industrial AI thing it was like my whole vision note was physical AI and like this theoretical thing and it was very academic and theoretical and I want to say I want to get something that's practical brass tax. Industrial AI is basically this stack of software, sensors, robotics, machinery that automates an industry and we take it one industry at a time and it just became much more real and clear about what it is. You go physical AI, you're like, "Oh, so you're doing a humanoid." I'm like, "No, no, we're like the non-humanoid guys. I don't have a problem with them, but that's not what we do." You're like, "Oh, do you do like some military thing?" You're like, "No, that's not my thing either." You know, it's like so this felt very clean about what it is we're about and how we're going after it.

顺便说，你知道，关于这一切一个非常有趣的点是，我们完全忘记了如何做的一件事。我们曾经是世界上最棒的，我们教会了世界如何制造。而现在作为一个国家，我们基本上已经忘记了如何制造，除了像埃隆这样的人。如果你需要懂制造的人，你真的得从埃隆那里找。

By the way, you know, a really interesting point on this whole thing is one of the things that we completely forgot how to do. We were the best in the world by far. We taught the world how to do was manufacture. And now we've basically forgotten how to do it as a country other than like Elon. Like if you need somebody who knows how to manufacture, you literally have to get them from Elon.

是的。

Yeah.

我们将不得不重新学习这一点。实际上，它的开端就是数据中心。这在很大程度上是一个制造问题，你知道，涉及冷却、电力，你还得自己发电等等。

And we're going to have to relearn that. And actually the beginnings of that are literally data centers. That is a manufacturing problem to a large extent, you know, with the cooling and the power and you know, you've got to build your own power and all that kind of thing.

而恰恰是那些多年来一直抱怨制造业工作流失的人，对此却极力抵制。

And there's so much resistance to that from the exact people who were just harping and harping for years about all the manufacturing jobs are going away.

好吧，工作回来了，但我们却不想要了。所以，这就是这个故事的艰难之处，也是这种叙事的困境。

Well, they're back, but we don't want them. And so like that's how tough this story is and this kind of narrative.

是啊，谢天谢地，还有足够多的地方仍然欢迎数据中心。

Yeah. Thank God there's still enough places that are still welcoming data centers.

嗯。

Yeah.

这不像……联邦体制是件好事，因为你有某种竞争。

That it's not like I the federal system is a wonderful thing because it's like you have this competition of some kind.

各州之间。

States.

是啊，结果真的很有趣。

Yeah. It's really interesting how that works out.

嗯，否则我们就会像欧洲那样。

Yeah. Otherwise we'd be Europe.

嗯，好吧。

Yeah. Okay.

我们之前私下聊过，你说在创办 Uber 时，你与那些选择与你共事的人合作。现在你的处境不同了，你有了更多选择。你一直在秘密建设。现在这是你的公开亮相。跟我们谈谈你在这里组建什么样的团队，人们如何能帮上忙。

So, we were talking offline you were saying when you started Uber you worked with people who would choose to work with you. Now you're in a different position. You have a bit more choice. You've been building in stealth. Now you're this your coming out story. Talk to us about what kind of team you're building here. How folks can help.

你看，我们刚刚把要进入的行业数量乘以三。这算是件事。而且每个行业都是数万亿美元的机会。

Well, look, we just multiplied the number of industries we're going after by three. So that's a kind of a thing. And each of them is a multi-trillion dollar opportunity.

嗯。

Yeah.

你知道，我有一些很棒的伙伴。这说起来有点好笑，但当你让别人赚了数亿美元，就很难再把他们招回来。所以，我雇佣富人从来都不太成功。

And you know, look, I had some awesome guys. Like, you know, this is kind of a funny thing to say, but when you make somebody hundreds of millions of dollars, it's hard to hire them again. So I've never had great success hiring rich people.

嗯，所以说嘛。

Yeah. So, there you go.

所以，你知道，但像 Emil Michael 那样的人，他现在是国防部副部长，但他曾是我的得力助手，负责史诗级的交易和战略行动。我需要下一个 Emil Michael，如果这说得通的话。比如一个企业发展和商业发展负责人，能建立一个有灵感的团队，一个鼓舞人心的团队，举个例子。

So, you know, but there's the crew like Emil Michael's now under secretary of defense, but he was my right hand on doing just epic deal making and strategic moves. I need the next Emil Michael if that makes sense. Like a head of corp dev bisdev that can build an inspired team, an inspiring team as an example.

嗯，我们正在招聘一位总法律顾问。我们想找一个人能坐在副驾驶位置，确保我……你知道，我喜欢踩线。我们应该离线几英寸。这是好事。嗯，然后当然，我还需要一位矿业业务的 CEO。

Um, we're in the market for a general counsel. So, we're looking for somebody who can ride shotgun and make sure that I'm, you know, so I like to go to the line. We should be like a few inches off the line. That's a good thing to do. Um, and then of course it's just like I need a CEO of my mining business.

是的。我需要建立全面的技术领导力，从自动驾驶到重型机器人，我们一直有很多人加入，但需要那些史诗级的领导者，能激励团队超越自我，真正创造奇迹。嗯，所以，无论你作为企业家身处何地，人才游戏就是一切。而且，当我们把行业数量乘以三，我们又回到了潮流中。因为我们秘密行动了这么久，我们不在潮流中。我们一直在冷呼叫每个人。我认为我们重新公开亮相的美好之处在于，我们现在可以有一个地方让人们了解我们是谁，我们做什么，我可以开始组建团队，以非常公开的方式出现，让人们知道我们在做的伟大工作。

Yeah. Like I need to build technical leadership across the board from autonomy, heavy duty robotics and it's really like we have lots of folks coming in like all the time but it's like those epic leaders that can inspire their team to just go above and beyond and do really like make magic. Um, so we're all, no matter where you are as an entrepreneur, the talent game is the game. And, uh, again, when you multiply the industries by three, you're back in the flow. And because we were stealth for so long, we weren't in the flow. We were cold calling everybody. And I think it's one of the beautiful things about us being back out there is okay, like we can now have a place for people to understand who we are, what we're about, and I can start putting teams together that can be out there in a very public way and let people know the great work we're doing.

如果你现在加入，你既受益于你从云厨房和之前的 Uber 中学到的所有经验和验证过的东西，所以，差不多二十年，但又足够早，以至于未来有巨大的上升空间。

And if you're joining now, you're joining both with the benefit of having all the lessons you've learned and things you've proven out with cloud kitchens and of course Uber before that. So, almost two decades, but early enough such that there's the upside of enormous opportunity going forward.

是的。而且有能力做非常有意义的事情，我的意思是，拯救孩子们免于在矿井工作。你知道，基本上让每个人都能吃到好食物，而不是吃超级健康的食物，这能节省人们的时间。

Yeah. And the ability to do something super meaningful, I mean, save kids from working in the mines. You know basically making it so that everybody can have great food like instead of eating super healthy food that gives people their time back.

嗯，嗯，同时还省钱。

Yeah. Yeah. Um, while also saving money.

嗯，还省钱。

Yeah. And saving money.

嗯，这真是个了不起的使命。

Yeah. It's a hell of a mission.

嗯，所以我们玩得很开心。这是好时光。

Yeah. So we're having a lot of fun. It's good times.

嗯，这是个很好的结束点。好了，谢谢。太棒了。谢谢大家。

Yeah. It's a great place to wrap. All right. Thank you. Awesome. Thanks, guys.