马克·平卡斯谈 AI、投资与《以游戏速度生活》

欢迎收听 Motley Fool 对话节目，我是主持人、Motley Fool 撰稿人 Rich Lamello。今天请到的嘉宾几乎戴过科技界所有的帽子——企业家、风险投资人，如今又是作家——Mark Pincus。Mark 是 Zynga 的创始人，这家公司打造了《Farmville》《Cityville》等社交游戏爆款。他的履历远不止创办公司：他是 Facebook 等变革性企业的早期投资人，也通过 Reinvest Capital 投资了当今许多领先的 AI 公司，同时布局交通、金融服务和企业软件的未来。他的新书《Life at the Speed of Play》浓缩了几十年来在创新、产品开发和驾驭重大技术变革方面的经验，在 AI 重塑几乎所有行业的当下尤其及时。今天我们将聊聊塑造他职业生涯的决策、他如何识别杰出的创始人和突破性技术、什么改变了他对 AI 的看法，以及一直指引他的投资框架。Mark，欢迎来到 Motley Fool。

Welcome to Motley Fool Conversations, I'm your host Motley Fool contributor Rich Lamello. Today I'm joined by someone who's warned just about every hat in the tech world entrepreneur, venture investor and now author Mark Pincus. Mark's well known as the founder of Zynga, the company behind social gaming hits like Farmville and Cityville. This track record extends well beyond building companies. He's been an early investor in transformative businesses including Facebook and is back many of today's leading AI companies. companies while also investing in the future of transportation, financial services, and enterprise software through reinvest capital. His new book, Life at the Speed of Play, distills decades of lessons on innovation, product development, and navigating major technology shifts, making it especially timely as AI reshapes nearly every industry. Today we'll talk about the decisions that shaped his career, how he thinks about identifying exceptional founders and breakthrough technologies, what changed its mind on AI and the investing frameworks that continue to guide them. Mark, welcome to the Motley Fool.

谢谢邀请。我一直很喜欢你们付费墙之外的内容，不过你们老是在诱惑我。

Thanks for having me. A long time fan of the content that isn't behind the paywall, but you keep tempting me.

那很好，总有一天会让你入坑的。嘿，Mark，我看了你的背景，你在很多层面都很有成就。跟我讲讲你的经历吧——我知道你来自芝加哥，本科读的沃顿，在拉扎德工作过，后来去了哈佛商学院，最后在哥伦比亚资本做风险投资。讲讲你的背景，是什么让你成为投资人的？

That's good. We'll get you one of these days. Well, hey Mark, so as I read through your background, you're obviously accomplished on, you know, many different levels. Why don't you tell me a little bit about, I know you're from Chicago, you went to Worton undergrad, you worked at Lazard and then went to Harvard Business School and then ultimately found your way to venture capital at Columbia Capital. Tell me a little bit about your background and, you know, kind of what led you to being, you know, an investor.

当然。说是什么让我成为投资人，其实挺有意思的。我想从小时候说起，大概 13 岁时我父亲让我对投资产生了兴趣，他鼓励我去研究并买了两只股票，结果都不怎么样。但尽管如此，我很早就迷上了投资。这游戏太好玩了，你判断对了就有回报。这几乎是人生中唯一一个只要长期判断正确就能获得直接回报的游戏。所以投资一直是我的副业。但我一直以为自己的主线会是像我父亲那样做创始人和企业家。我原本以为自己会住在芝加哥，我很爱芝加哥，但在那里找工作太难了，而且我完全不清楚自己能创办什么样的公司。于是我去了世界各地的不同城市，从波士顿、纽约到香港，在银行业打拼。但一路走来，真正改变我世界观的一件事，是在沃顿时读了 George Gilder 的一本书。我现在仍然推荐大家读他的任何作品，他是非常有远见的未来学家。1988 年我读了他的《Microcosm》。他预言了这样一个未来——说来奇怪，现在我们又回到了原点——他说我们将从基于建造原子、建造周围物理世界的未来，转向那个看不见的内在世界。他让我深深相信了比特流动和网络的想法，我隐约觉得那就是我想从事的事业，当时它叫新媒体。这个念头在我脑子里扎了根。所以即使在纽约做银行业务时，我也专注于媒体、手机和通信领域，在香港做的也是这类交易。后来进了哈佛商学院，毕业时我就知道那是我要做的。幸运的是，我非常不擅长面试，所以没有任何好工作机会来干扰我。我在高盛、麦肯锡或迪士尼都过不了第一轮，所以没有好职业机会的诱惑。我是我们那一届唯一一个从哈佛商学院毕业时没有工作的学生。幸运的是，我在 TCI 得到了一次 15 分钟的面试，那是全国最大的有线电视公司。他们给了我一个初级职位，薪水只有我读商学院前的一半。那是 1993 年，我甚至不知道股票期权是什么。哈佛变化很快，但他们给我 6 万美元年薪和 10 天假期，即使在今天就业市场艰难的情况下也不算有吸引力，而且我还是 MBA。但那是世界上最好的工作，因为我能看到一切。当时没人关心新媒体，因为互联网还没出现。总之，快进一下，简单说说我的职业生涯。我到了哥伦比亚资本，那是一家很好的初创风险投资公司，但我并不真正融入，我有点格格不入。他们说我该找别的机会，但当时真的没有。所以我没什么可失去的。那是 1995 年左右，网络刚刚开始兴起。我在华盛顿特区，但位置不对，我完全是个局外人，却对我兴奋的一切发起进攻。我和一个在 AOL 工作的家伙合作，他是 AOL 唯一的互联网员工，幸好 AOL 就在附近。我们创办了一家不太可能的公司叫 Free Loader，名字来源于住在我沙发上的朋友，他也借钱给我创业。这太老套了，简直痛苦。那是最早的消费互联网公司之一，是一个免费下载互联网的屏保程序。7 个月后它以 3800 万美元被收购。这让我走上了一条路，我知道自己可以追求创业生涯。我的职业生涯就从那里展开，我真正开始进攻。几年后，我又创办了一家公司，算是误打误撞，是一家叫 support.com 的企业软件公司。那是互联网泡沫中最无聊的软件公司，但因为是企业级且有真实收入，它在那个窗口期上市了。这两次早期成功让我能够长期从事消费产品创始人的职业。关于投资方面，我想说的是，我什么都做，我是全栈的。我孵化产品和想法，像 Y Combinator 的孩子一样钻木取火。这让我在种子轮和 A 轮投资中有一些 alpha，因为我对这些市场早期有一些想法。这又给我带来成长阶段的 alpha，进而带来公开市场的 alpha。我也管理自己的家族办公室，所以我在所有战线都很活跃。

Sure. Well, it's funny to say what led me to being an investor. I think from a young age maybe I think my dad got me interested in investing when I was 13 and encouraged me to like research and buy two stocks and neither did well. But despite that I got hooked on investing from early on. It's just was it's so fun. It's It's such a good game where you get rewarded for being right. And that's kind of one of the only games in life where you can have such a direct reward if you're right over time. And so that was always on the side, a side hustle for me. But the main thing I always thought was that I would be a founder and entrepreneur like my dad. I actually thought I would live in Chicago. I love Chicago, but it was too hard to get a job there. And it wasn't clear really at all what kind of business I could found. So I went to all these different cities and around the world from Boston, the New York to Hong Kong, pursuing this career and banking. But along the way, I'd say one of the most formative things that really changed my worldview was when I was at Wharton, I read a book by George Gilder. I still recommend reading anything by him. He's such a visionary futurist. And in 1988, I read his book, Microcosm. And he foretold this future where we went. It's odd that now we're coming full circle, but he said we're going to move from a future based on building out the atoms. And the physical world around us to the world, you can't see that's inside. and he sold me so much on this idea of bits moving around and networks that I knew somehow that's what I wanted my career to be and it used to be called new media. And I just had the real bug that got in my head. So even when I went to banking in New York, I focused on media and mobile phone and communications. So I worked on those kinds of deals, worked on those in Hong Kong, then when I got at Harvard Business School and coming out, I knew that's what I wanted to do. Luckily I'm really bad at interviewing, so I didn't get any good job offers to distract me. You know, I'd never made it past the first round at Goldman or McKinsey or Disney, so I didn't have that distraction of a good career opportunity. I was the only kid in my section to graduate from Harvard Business School to graduate without a job. Luckily, I got a 15-minute interview at TCI, which was the biggest cable company in the country. They gave me this kind of entry-level job where I took half the pay I got before I went to business school. I still, this is 1993. I still didn't even know what stock options were. Things changed quickly at Harvard, But they gave me 60K and 10 days of your vacation, not what someone is looking for even today in a tougher job market. And that was with my MBA, but it was the best job in the world because I got to see everything. And no one cared about this new media thing because before the internet. And anyway, roll the camera forward, give you kind of condensed my career. I found myself at Columbia Capital, very good, but it was a fledgling beginning, state, venture firm. I didn't really fit in. I was kind of the odd duck. They said I should look for another opportunity, but there really wasn't one. And so I didn't have anything to lose. And this is 1995-ish. And the web was just really starting to kick off. And so I didn't have much to lose. I was in DC. But I was out of position. And I could not be more of an outsider to attack. And everything I was excited about. But I partnered with this guy who was the one internet employee at AOL. Luckily AOL was nearby. And we started this unlikely company called Free Loader, which was named after my friend who was living on my couch, who also loaned me the money to start it. This is so cliche, it's painful. It was one of the first consumer internet companies. It was this free screen saver that downloaded the internet. It got acquired after seven months for 38 million. And that kind of put me on a path that I could go be. I knew I could pursue a career as an entrepreneur. And so my career unfolded from there. I got to really play offense and go for it. A couple of years after that, found it another company, which kind of by mistake, I found it at enterprise software company called support.com. It was the most boring software company in the middle of the dot com bubble. But because it was enterprise and had real revenues, it went public, at the end of that window. And that those two early wins really set me up to have this long-term career as a consumer product founder. What I would say on the investing side is just to jump into that is I think about, I do everything, I'm full stack. I incubate products and ideas, I'm rubbing sticks together just like a kid at Y Combinator. That gives me some alpha into seed investing and Series A investing, because I have some idea early on these markets. And then that gives me alpha into growth, which gives me alpha into public market. And so I manage my family office as well, and so I'm active on all fronts all the time.

是啊。说到这些早期投资，你在早期阶段，我记得很出名的是 2005 年向 Facebook 投了 3.8 万美元。

Yeah. Well, and speaking of those in early investments, at the early stage you invested, I think famously $38,000 in Facebook in I believe 2005.

是公司、想法还是马克·扎克伯格本人吸引了你的注意？无论最初的动因是什么，你认为马克·扎克伯格身上有什么特质让他在过去 20 年里如此成功？

What was it about either the company, the idea, Mark Zuckerberg that caught your attention? And regardless of what the impetus was, what is it about Mark Zuckerberg that you think has made it so successful in the last 20 years?

让我想想，这里面有很多可以展开的。首先，我对那些做出标志性投资的标志性投资者有不同的看法。我不是要假装谦虚，我真心这么认为。你，或者你的任何听众，都会做出和我一样的投资。我不是在草堆里找针，也没用什么天才。当扎克伯格和肖恩·帕克走进我的办公室，穿着篮球短裤，把脚翘在桌子上，递给我一张写着“我是 CEO，混蛋”的名片，看起来像 15 岁。你也会抢着投资的，因为 Facebook 当时在四五所学校里。他们的数据是我从未见过的。我当时在努力做 tribe.net，但失败了，那是一个在 Facebook 之前推出的社交网络。社交网络的一切都在起作用，但我还是失败了。那个创造了 1.6 万亿美元答案的人走进我的办公室，给我看了答案。即便如此，我还是失败了。幸运的是，肖恩对扎克说，嘿，你应该让 Pink Ass、彼得·蒂尔和里德投钱，他们聪明、友好，不会像 E.C. 那样搞你。所以我们一起做了 50 万美元的种子轮，里德和我各投了 3.8 万。我想说，当你看到那样的数据，当他说，我们有等待我们进入的学校名单，我们一周就能覆盖 80% 的学校，下一周覆盖其余所有。你也会盲目投资的。而且这是在 500 万美元的投前估值，当时听起来其实很高。我想，天哪，这公司有一天可能值 1 亿美元。我当时想，我稳赚 20 倍。你也会这么想的。你也会做出这笔投资，幸运的是你和我都足够聪明看到了这一点。所以，你知道，我能处在那个位置很神奇，因为我很早。我也支持过肖恩的 Napster，我投了第一张 10 万美元的支票。因为我在同一领域孵化，我是早期的领域专家，那个位置让我投资了 Facebook 和 Twitter。所以这是好消息。如果你选对了水域，像我一样，即使你选错了船，像我一样，即使你固执地和船一起沉没，不尝试其他，像我一样。我写这本书的原因，我要推销我的书《游戏人生》，是因为我试图给你作弊码，让你处在那个位置，做出比我更好的决定，改变你的成功几率，因为 Tribe 本应成为一家非常大的公司，但它没有。但即使处在正确的水域，也让我做出了一些惊人的投资，也让我最终在 Facebook 和 MySpace 之上创立了 Zynga。所以，你知道，选择正确的水域是我首先想要的。你的任何听众，如果想成为创始人或早期投资者，选择正确的水域比选择正确的船更重要。这就是你从我早期职业生涯中应该学到的教训。

Let's see, there's a lot to unpack there. First of all, I have this different point of view on some of these iconic investors who've made these iconic investments. Not to, I don't mean to sound like falsely humble about this. I really believe this. You rich, any of your listeners would have made the same investment I made. I didn't find a needle on a haystack. And I didn't take any brilliance. When Zuckerberg walked into my office with Sean Parker, put his in basketball shorts through his feet up on the table, handed me a car that said I'm CEO, bitch. Looked like it was 15 years old. You would have jumped to invest as well, because he was the Facebook was in four or five schools. Their metrics were nothing I'd ever seen. and I was trying to build tribe.net, which was failing, and it was a social network that launched before the Facebook. And everything was working in social networking. And I still managed to fail. The guy who created the $1.6 trillion answer walked in my office, showed me the answer. I still, even after that managed to fail. Luckily, Sean said to Zuck, hey, you should have pink ass and Peter Thiel and Reed put money in, they're smart, they're friendly, they're not gonna mess with you the way of E.C. will. And so we all did this 500K seed round, Reed and I were 38K. And while I'd say, when you see metrics like that, when you see him say, you know, we have a weight list of schools that want us to come next. It takes us one week to get to 80% of the school. The next week we get everybody else. you would just blindly invest too. And this was at $5 million pre, which actually sounded high then. I thought, oh my God, this could be $100 million company one day. That's, I was like, I have a guaranteed 20X on my money. That was, you would have thought that too. And you would have made the investment, luckily for you and me. We're smart enough to see that. So, you know, it was amazing that I was in a position and it was because I was so early. I'd also back Shawn with Napster. I'd put the first 100K check in in Napster. So because I was incubating in that same area, I was one of the early domain experts, that position made invest in Facebook and Twitter. So that's the good news. If you pick the right body of water as I did, even if you pick the wrong boat as I did, even if you stubbornly sink with that boat and don't try anything else as I did, And the reason to read my book, I'll plug my book, life at the speed of play is that I try to give you the cheat codes to be in that position and make better decisions than I made and to change your odds of success because I tried should have been a very large company and it wasn't. But even being in that right body of water led me to making some amazing investments also led me to eventually founding Zynga on top of Facebook and MySpace. And so, you know, picking that right body of water is the first thing that I want. Any of your listeners who are thinking about being founders or even early stage investors, it's actually more important that you pick the right body of water than the right boat. And that's the lesson you should take from my early career.

是的。说到这个，你是最早完全理解 Facebook 平台的创始人之一。无论你把 Zynga 看作是一家游戏公司，还是一家消费者行为公司，总之你意识到 Facebook 是一个绝佳的平台。你看到了什么？只是你刚才说的那些数字，还是有其他东西让你觉得，天哪，这对我来说是完美的平台？

Yeah. And speaking of that, so you were one of the first founders to, you know, I would say fully appreciate Facebook's platform. And whether you look at Zynga as fundamentally a gaming company or if it's a consumer behavior company, one way or another, you realized Facebook was a great platform for it. What did you see that was it just those numbers that you just rattled off or was there something else where you thought, oh my god, this is the perfect platform for my idea?

不，这是个很好的问题，我很喜欢思考和谈论这个。这又回到了宏观的水域，你必须思考，这是什么数据游戏，尤其是在消费者领域？你不能忽视分发。分发必须是产品和战略的基础。认为你只要造出最好的捕鼠器，人们就会上门，这是一种希望策略。我喜欢说，在希望杀死你之前杀死希望。这是个好引用。你要的是信念，不是希望。信念基于确信，确信基于确凿的证据。我想说的是，在 Tribe 之后我陷入了深渊，我被 CEO 取代了。我有很多时间思考成功的条件，我鼓励你的听众也花时间这样做。我注意到分发是一个必须解决的根本问题。我想花时间想出大量新想法并测试它们。但如果没有地方测试，这样做就没有意义。即使它们获得了一些吸引力，如果它们有效，也没有地方推广。所以我花了大量时间试图收购 CNET。他们是一家上市公司。我给 CFO 发了邮件，他没有回复。我花了很多时间和银行家、私募股权公司谈。我不推荐任何人这样做，真的不好玩。但想法是，如果我拥有 3000 万北美月活跃用户的忠实受众，我会怎么做？我会做很多事情。我会有一个实验室来测试想法，当它们有效时迅速推出。我会比其他人有优势。我可以寻找其他已被证明、先进入市场的想法，然后我可以凭借忠实的分发网络成为最佳进入者。幸运的是，CNET 的事没有成功。在那期间，我有一个团队在为 Facebook 开发一个扑克游戏，因为我和其他人一样，他们公开宣布要开放 API。我说，好的，这里有 7000 万月活跃用户，我可以免费访问他们。我怎么能忽视这个？对我来说，这就像天上掉下来的甘露，这就是我一直在寻找的。对其他人来说，这是一个尴尬的笑话。如果你回到 2007 年，那些超级病毒式传播的应用是向朋友扔饮料、戳一戳之类的。它们是人们尝试的愚蠢小东西，超级病毒式，但零关注。我说，在我经历 Tribe 之后，导致 Zynga 的 Tribe 之后，我说，我认为这是一个鸡尾酒会。人们想在这里闲逛，但他们在这里无事可做。我想给这个鸡尾酒会增加另一个维度，我认为游戏就是那个维度。所以我事先很仔细地考虑了游戏。有趣的是，当时负责 Facebook 开发者关系的戴夫·莫兰带我出去喝咖啡。他为我感到难过，他说，马克，你可以做很多病毒式传播的事情，别做游戏，游戏不具病毒性。

No, it's a great question that I really love thinking about here and talking about, which is, again, coming back to that macro body of water and thinking about where you have to think, what is this data play, especially in consumer? You can't ignore distribution. Distribution has to be fundamental to your product and your strategy. The idea that you're going to just build the best mouse trap and they will come is that's a hope strategy. And I like to say, you know, kill hope before hope kills you. It's a great quote. If you want belief, not hope. Belief is based on conviction. Conviction is based on hard evidence. And what I would say is that I was in this abyss after tribe. I got replaced with CEO. And I had a lot of time to think about the conditions for success, which I encourage your listeners to spend time doing. I noticed that distribution was a fundamental problem had to be solved, I wanted to spend my time coming up with tons of new ideas and testing them. But there's no point in doing that if there's no where to test them. And even if they get some traction, there's no where to take them if they work. So I spent all this time trying to buy a CNET. They were a public company. I emailed the CFO. He wouldn't return my email. I spent all this time talking to bankers and PE firms. I don't recommend that to anybody. It's really not fun. But the idea was, what if I had a captive audience of 30 million North American MOUs, what would I do with that? I would do a lot. I would have a lab to test ideas and when they work to bring them out quickly. I would have an advantage over everybody else. I could look for other ideas that are proven, that are first to market, and then I could be best to market with a captive distribution network. Luckily, the CNET thing didn't work out for me. And in the middle of that, I had a team building this poker game for Facebook, because I, like everybody else, they publicly announced they were gonna open up their APIs. And I said, okay, here's 70 million MAUs. And for nothing, I can access them. How can I possibly ignore that? Okay, to me, it was, you know, manna from heaven. It was like, this is what I've been looking for. To everybody else, it was an embarrassing joke. And so if you go back to 2007, the apps that were launched that were super viral were throwing a drink at your friend. They were poke apps. They were silly little things that people were experimenting with that were hyperviral, but zero attention. I said, after my experience with Zynga, I said, I'm sorry, after my experience with Tribe, leading to Zynga, I said, I think this is a cocktail party. People want to hang out here, but they've got nothing to do while they're here. I want to add another dimension to that cocktail party, and I think games is the one. And so I was very thoughtful beforehand that I thought about games. What's funny is Dave Moran, who was in charge of developer relations at the time, For Facebook, took me out to coffee. He felt sorry for me, and he said, Mark, there's so many viral things you can do. Don't do games, games aren't viral.

我希望看到你在我们的平台上成功，我说，我听到了，戴夫，但这是我认为最酷的、我能为你的东西增添的最酷的新维度，而且我不在乎它是否病毒式传播。事实上，游戏本身并不具有病毒性。所以我们推出了 Zynga Poker。我在书里喜欢讲这个框架：已验证、更好、创新。你必须非常擅长产品制作这门手艺，才能抵制在产品中每个方面都去创新和改变的欲望。要有纪律说：你知道吗？我不打算测试是否有人喜欢扑克。我只是要找到我能找到的最好的扑克游戏，然后合法地复制它。所以我要把那个变量排除掉。我不会因为错误的原因而失败。我不会因为改变了扑克规则或牌桌的样子而失败。我要努力让它变得更好。在我们的案例中，我们说无需下载。其他扑克游戏都是玩钱的，所以它们必须有大量安全措施、下载和头像，而我们的没有，我们是一键进入。然后我要把真人放在牌桌上，通常是你朋友。那是个新颖的想法。我准备好让它失败了。事实上，它没有失败。但我当时以为它会失败。不像 tribe，我当时以为那个想法会成功。对于 Zynga，我说，好吧，我假设我的第一个想法很可能会失败。然后，当然，生活的悖论是它没有失败。当我完全以为它会失败时，它成功了。然后它成功得超乎我的想象。我们很快发现 25% 的游戏会话是加入朋友在牌桌上。所以我们得到了这些网络效应，朋友们互相招呼，这是 Facebook 上唯一一个你可以和真人实时闲逛的地方。我们就像安静图书馆中间的一个现场酒吧。那成了一个梗。所以对于任何听着的创始人来说，听到这个有点糟糕，听到它像瓶中的闪电，一开始就成功了。听到这个很糟糕，因为那几乎从不发生。所以人们觉得那遥不可及。但事实就是这样。

I want to see you succeed on our platform, and I said, I hear you, Dave, but it's what I think is the coolest, the coolest new dimension I can add to your thing, and I don't care if it's not viral. And in fact, games are not inherently viral. So we launched Zynga Poker. And I like to say in my book, I talk about this framework of proven better new. And you have to really be good at this craft of product making to resist the desire to innovate and change on every single front when you make a product. And to have the discipline to say, you know what? I'm not going to test whether or not anyone likes poker. Or I'm just going to take the best poker game I can find and legally copy it. And so I'm going to take that off the table. I'm not going to fail for the wrong reason. I'm not going to fail because I changed the rules of poker or what the table looks like. And I'm going to try to make it better. And in our case, we said no download. And the other poker games were all for money. And so they had to have lots of security and download and avatars, ours didn't have, that's ours was one click you're in. And then I'm going to put real people at the table, often your friends. And that was this new novel idea. And I was ready for that to fail. And in fact, it didn't fail. But I was assuming it would fail. Unlike tribe, where I was assuming this one idea would work, was Zynga, I said, OK, I'm going to assume my first idea is likely to fail. And then, of course, the paradox of life is it didn't fail. When I was completely assuming it was going to fail, it worked. Then it worked beyond what I could have imagined. And we quickly found that 25% of player sessions were joining a friend at the table. So we were getting these network effects of friends going, this being the only place on Facebook that you could hang out with people live. We were like a live bar in the middle of a quiet library. And that was a meme. And so it kind of sucks for any founders listening to hear this, to hear like it was lightning in a bottle, it worked right out of the gates. It sucks to hear that because that pretty much never happens. And so it feels unattainable to people. But that was it.

嗯，既然我们在聊这本书，我觉得有些概念很迷人。比如你说的“已验证、更好、创新”。已验证基本上就是复制那些已经被证明有效的东西。更好就是，你知道，改进它，让 10 个人里有 10 个说，靠，对，我想做这个。我想要这个。然后创新，我喜欢这个，你知道，加一点新东西。但不要加六个新东西，因为如果它不奏效，你不知道是那六个中的哪一个。没错。这几乎就像安慰剂。你不知道是哪个。你要一个单一变量。所以你加那一个东西。如果不行，就把它拿掉。再放下一个。显然在这里得到了回报。但我很好奇，有没有过这样的时刻，我也喜欢你说的，95% 的时候你的直觉是对的。但 75% 的想法是错的，这又回到了那个概念。显然，你的职业生涯充满了成功。有没有一两个例子是它不奏效的？你没搞对？我的意思是，你已经提到了一两个，但有没有那种你想，回到绘图板。这个不行。

Well, and since we're talking about the book, I mean, some fascinating kind of concept. Like you've said, proven better new. Proven is basically copy that, which is proven already. Better is, you know, improve it so that 10 out of 10 say, you know, F, yeah, you know, I wanna do this. I want this. And then new, and I love this, you know, add something new. But don't add six new things, because then if it doesn't work, you don't know which of those six. Exactly. It's almost like a, you know, placebo. You don't know which it is. You want like a straight variable. So you add the one thing. If it doesn't work, take that out. Put the next thing in. Obviously paid off here. But I am curious, have there been times where, I also like that you said, 95% of the time, your gut is right. But 75% of the ideas are wrong, which again plays into that whole concept. And obviously, your career's littered with the successes. What's an example or two where it didn't work? You didn't get it, right? I mean, you've touched on one or two already, but where you kind of thought, back to the drawing board. This one isn't working like that.

好吧，我给你两个例子。第一个是，我不能不提 tribe.net，因为它应该成为一个案例研究。人们应该研究它。它真的是最早的三家社交网络之一，最终是十家之一。我敢打赌十家里有八家在某种真实层面上是成功的，而 tribe 是没成的两家之一。所以我的意思是，我是在周围那么多人成功的情况下，靠意志力让自己失败的，这需要一种极端的自我。我想我当时已经取得了太多成功，那是危险的。成功会让我们脱离现实。我们失去了好奇心和谦逊。当一个 19 岁的孩子走进你的办公室，给你看答案时，你可能没有谦逊去倾听。而我没有，我投资了，但我没有去理解他做对的地方，那就是信任。所以我真的想鼓励任何听着的、在追求某件事的人，像穿白大褂的科学家一样去追求它。虽然你对创业充满热情，但你必须对你追求的想法保持冷静，这在智力上可能很难理解。但第二次我得到了一个 B+，我要说 B+ 真的很危险。我的意思是 tribe 是 B+，因为有很多正面信号。你知道，它非常有病毒性，但没有留存。我还有另一个叫 TagSense 的项目，是在 tribe 和 Zynga 之间创立的，那是一个面向发布商和用户导向的广告网络，当时博客很火，比如像 Miley Fool 这样的人，除了直接嵌入 AdSense，你可以用 TagSense，放上标签，控制显示什么样的广告，我们的表现比 AdSense 稍微好一点。发布商真的很喜欢。所以我们签了发布商，我们签了 AdSense，彼得·蒂尔和我吃了一顿早餐，说，马克，太好了，我怎么能不投资你呢？我给你 500 万美元。我有一个很棒的 CTO 团队，对吧？一切就绪，我拔掉了插头。谁会这么做？我拔掉插头是因为，一方面，我已经在这个深渊里好几年了。我迫切想出来。那是危险的。约会也一样。当你单身一段时间后，你可能会急于进入下一段关系，太快分手。同样，当我们真的在寻找下一个救命稻草时，有时候我们的过滤器或镜头不够严格。所以你真的要小心，不要抓住下一个出现的东西。我的情况就是这样。所以真的是因为我停下来，我说，你知道，我看到 TagSense 可以成为一个不错的生意。它永远不会很大。我对它没有热情。我不做。我拔掉插头。我有一个很棒的 CTO 和团队。他们都离开了。他们后来都成功了。但那为我创造了做 Zynga 的空间，那是一个好得多的举动。所以有像这样的例子。这可能是我最常想到的两个。

Well, I'll give you two. Okay. So one is, I can't pass up tribe.net because it should be a case study. People should study it. Literally, it was one of the first three, and ultimately 10 social networks. I would bet that eight of the 10 were successful on some real level, and tribe was one of the two that didn't work. So I mean, I took an act of will to fail when so many people were succeeding around me and it took an act of kind of extreme ego. And I think I had had so much success and that's dangerous. Success can make us out of touch. We lose the curiosity and humility. When a 19-year-old kid walks in your office and shows you the answer, you might not have the humility to listen. And I didn't, I mean, I invested, but I didn't, I didn't tune to what he got right, which was trust. And so I really want to encourage anyone listening who's pursuing something to pursue it like a scientist with a white lab coat. And while you're passionate about entrepreneurial, you have to be dispassionate about the idea you're pursuing, which it's, that can be tough intellectually to grok. But a second time that I got to a B plus, and I'd say a B plus is really dangerous. I mean tribe was a B plus because there was a lot of positive signal. You know, it was very viral but it had no retention. I had another one called tag sets which I founded in between tribe and Zynga which was a publisher and user directed ad network when blogs were big or you know, someone like Miley Fool could have instead of just plugging AdSense in the idea that you could use tag sense, and you could put tags up and direct the kinds of ads that would display, and we were moderately better performance than AdSense. And publishers really liked it. So we signed up publishers, we signed up AdSense, Peter Thiel had one breakfast with me and said, Mark, great, how could I not back you? I'll give you $5 million. I had a great CTO team go, right? It was ready to go and I pulled the plug. Who does that? I pulled the plug because on the one hand, I had been in this abyss for a few years. I was desperate to get out of it. And that's dangerous. The same in dating. When you have been in a relationship in a while, it could be desperate for your next relationship and dump too quickly. Similarly, when we really are looking for a life raft of our next thing, we don't have a tough enough filter or lens sometimes. And so you really gotta be careful that you don't take the next thing that comes along. And that was the case with me. And so it was really because I stopped and I said, you know, I see how tag sense could be a decent business. It's never gonna be huge. I'm not passionate about it. I'm not doing it. I pull the plug. I had a great CTO and team. They all left. They went on to be successful. But that created the space for me to do Zynga, which was a much better move. And so there's examples like that. Those are probably the two that come to my mind most.

好的，好的，太迷人了。那么，伙计，你和我，我们申请大学的时候，是用打字机打的。我猜。我知道我是。从那以后，在你的职业生涯中，你经历了个人电脑、软件、电子表格、互联网、社交媒体、移动技术，现在又是 AI，你几乎经历了这一切。对于投资者来说，在平台转变变得明显之前识别它们，试图找到下一个大想法的剧本是什么？

OK, OK, fascinating. And so, guys, you and me, when we applied to college, we did it on a typewriter. I'm guessing. I know I did. Since then, in your kind of professional life, you've seen the PC and software and spreadsheets and the internet and social media and mobile technology and now AI, what's the plan you've kind of been there for all of it? What's the playbook for an investor in recognizing platform shifts before they're obvious, trying to identify that next big idea?

当然。好吧，我不认为有什么单一的剧本。不过我会告诉你我的方法，那就是真正滋养你的好奇心和热情。所以发展，我喜欢这种新媒体东西。它不再叫那个名字了。但我喜欢它。

Sure. Well, I don't think there's any one playbook. I'll tell you though, my approach, which is to really feed your curiosity and your passion. And so developing, I love this new media stuff. It's not called that anymore. But I love it.

我爱的不是技术本身，而是用户应用。我热爱的是它如何真正有意义地改变我们的生活。我算是这方面的学生。所以我很早就以爱好者和用户的身份接触这些平台，我在书里也提到过，我称之为“登陆新星球”。你越是能发展自己的兴趣，或者找到它与你的热情交汇的地方，就越好。因为你会自然而然地沉浸其中。而且你会更早地成为那个新星球或新平台的原住民。通常一开始它更像一个爱好，有点不靠谱，作为消费者，它不一定算得上合理利用时间。网络肯定不是。AOL 快得多也容易得多，用网络毫无道理。大多数新技术都是这样，即使是 GPT 刚出来的时候。它感觉有点像玩具。你会觉得，看，它能开个还不错的玩笑。它不像现在这样具有根本性。即使在今天，我试过 Vibe coding，我发现那很难也很令人沮丧。最终我觉得 Vibe coding 不值得我花时间，即使从爱好者的角度也是如此。但我确实发现 Claude Cowork 和智能体这个概念，我们可以深入聊聊。但即使是 Claude Coding，我虽然失败了，也是善用时间。现在我在 co-work、持久化的 Markdown 文件和智能体这类东西上找到了自己的最佳点，玩得很开心。但这些都是关于建立你的阿尔法，比如参与这些事情。我在书中谈到并想鼓励人们去做的关键一点，即使是为了你的投资思维，就是建立你的产品思维。即使你不是产品制造者，也要试着以第三人称看待自己。有些人用电影或音乐来做这件事，他们试着判断：我喜欢这部电影，它会大卖吗？所以要校准你的品味。当你真正喜欢某样东西时，彼得·林奇是投资界第一个说这话的人，对吧？买你了解和喜欢的东西，然后持有。这并不坏。我想的是，在消费者层面上，什么是“抽屉股票”，什么适合我的数字生活栈，10 年后我还会用什么？我发现自己是大众市场的一个很好的代表。所以我相信 Twitter。当 Twitter 股价跌到 12 美元时，每个分析师都建议卖出。你可以在 X 上查证我。我自豪地全力买入，我说我要买，杰克·多尔西在 45 秒内转发了我的推文，因为我是那天或那周唯一的积极声音。投资者有充分的理由不喜欢这家公司，对吧？他们支出失控。他们的股票薪酬比 EBITDA 还大。但这并没有阻止我，因为我说这就像他们拥有很棒的地产。他们在曼哈顿市中心拥有很棒的土地。他们管理得不好。好吧，我认为杰克·多尔西作为企业管理者并不出色。但从消费者的角度看，我相信 10 年后我还会用 Twitter 作为我获取新闻的第一渠道吗？如果我觉得有地震，我会去看吗？是的。实际上，即使在今天，我相信，我不太用 Instagram 了。我知道我不用 Facebook，那个蓝色应用，你可能也不用。我 Instagram 降到一个月一次。我更相信 10 年后我会用 X 而不是任何其他社交媒体。所以从我的角度看，我说我就持有它，不回头。因为我认为 365 天留存率和 10 年留存率都会存在。所以这是一块宝地，土地价值会上升，即使管理不善。今天的 Snapchat 也有同样的韧性。我们也可以聊聊那个。但所以从投资的角度，我以第三人称把自己看作消费者，我观察周围的人，试着校准。我还要说，鼓励你看看你 iPhone 的主屏幕。这是我的。我对消费领域的未来如此乐观的原因是，如果你看看，我主屏幕的一半是空的，装满图标的那一半大多是手机自带的通用工具应用，比如播客、天气、相机。这告诉我，这些互联网宝藏，这些我们无法想象没有它们的生活的服务，将会有渐近的长期用户留存。它们最终会覆盖地球上每一个呼吸的人，这是曲线下的面积。这些宝藏还没有被发明出来，这就是我对消费领域未来乐观的原因。我比金融市场和 co-tune 乐观得多。我不知道你有没有看到 co-tuse 对 AI 的 TAM 预测，他们说 TAM 是 6 万亿美元。我认为他们给的最大一块是 2.5 万亿美元的编码，最小的一块是消费领域，5000 亿美元，也就是 0.5 万亿。我根本不同意。如果你看看互联网的发展方式，我不认为企业和基础设施压倒了消费领域。如果你看看市值，这些公司，他们期望 AI 也会这样发展。我只是觉得它还没有被发明出来，我们可以深入探讨。我的观点是，我看什么能进入我手机的主屏幕，好吗？如果有东西进入我手机的主屏幕，比如，现在我有 GPT 和 Claude，还有 Signal，我以前说这些有 10 亿美元的粘性价值。现在它们可能有 100 亿美元的粘性价值。我基于这个盲目投资了 RIA。RIA。我当时单身，离婚了，我开始用 RIA，我开始每天用，我打电话给公司说，你们的产品太棒了，我能投资吗？他们真的立刻回邮件了，结果我认识那个刚加入他们 VC 的人，他们做了种子轮然后放弃了，我投了 300 万，我甚至没问估值。他们的种子轮是 3000 万，他们告诉我 6000 万，我说，之后他们开始增长，然后我和 Reed 的基金先发制人地又加了 1100 万，今天那家公司的下一轮估值可能达到 20 亿。我不是说我是了不起的投资者，因为任何人都能做到。我的意思是任何人都能看到你用什么，然后冷邮件联系公司。如果他们的邮件在合适的日子到达，而你够早，他们可能会回复。是的。

I'm not in love with the technology. I'm in love with the user applications. I'm in love with how can it really change our lives in meaningful ways? And I'm kind of a student of that. And so I'm very early to these platforms as a hobbyist and user, and I talked to my book about that, and I call that landing on new planets. And the more you can develop your, or find where it intersects your passions, the better. Because you'll just be there. And I like to, you'll be native to that new planet or that new platform earlier. And it usually starts out much more like a hobby, and it's flaky, and it doesn't necessarily make sense as a good use of your time as a consumer. And the web for sure didn't. AOL was so much faster and easier. It didn't make any sense to use the web. And it's been like that with most new technologies, even with GPT when it first started. It felt like a bit of a toy. And you were kind of like, look, it can make a joke that's not bad. It was not fundamental the way it is now. And even today, I've tried Vibe coding. I find that very hard and frustrating. And I ultimately didn't find Vibe coding a good use of my time, even from a hobbyist standpoint. But I did find Claude Cowork and this concept of agents, we can get into it. But even Claude Coding, which I failed at, good uses of my time. And now I found my sweet spot at the moment around co-work and persistent, marked down files and agents and that kind of thing, which I'm having a lot of fun with. But so that's all at this kind of build your alpha, like get involved in these things. And the key thing that I talk about in the book and I want to encourage people to do, even for your investment mind, is build your product mind. Even if you're not a product maker, think about, like, look at yourself in the third person. Some people do this with movies or music and they try to see if I like this movie is it gonna be a blockbuster hit or not. And so calibrate your taste. And when you really love something and Peter Lynch was the first one to say this in investing, right? buy what you know and love and hold it. It's not bad. I think of what's a drawer, stock, at a consumer level to where, what fits in my digital life stack, what will I be using in 10 years? And I find that I'm a good proxy for the mass market. And so I believed in Twitter. When Twitter hit $12 a share, every analyst had a sell on it. You can fact check me on X. I proudly backed up the truck and said I'm buying Jack Dorsey retweeted me in 45 seconds because I was the only positive voice they had that day or that week. And there was good reason for investors not to like the company, right? They were spending out of control. Their stock based comp was bigger than their e-bit dot. But I didn't stop me because I said it's like they own this great real estate. They own this great land in the middle of Manhattan. they're not managing it well. Okay, and I don't think Jack Dorsey was managing it very well as a business. But from a consumer, did I believe I'd be using Twitter in 10 years for my news and the first place, if I thought there's an earthquake, I'm gonna look, yes. I actually, even today, believe, I don't really use Instagram anymore. I know I don't use Facebook, the Blue App, you probably don't either. I'm down to once a month on Instagram. I'm a bigger believer that in 10 years I'll be using X than any other social media. And so from my standpoint, I said, I'm just going to own that and not look backwards. Because I think that the day 365 retention, in the day 10 year retention on this, is going to be there. And so it's a moaning land in the land is going to go up in value, even if it's not being managed well. It's the same resilience Snapchat today. we could get into that one too. But so from an investing standpoint, I think of myself and the third person as a consumer, and I look at people around me, and I try to calibrate. I'll also say, you know, encourage you to look at the front page of your iPhone. There's mine. And the reason I'm so optimistic about the future of consumer is that if you look at it half of my home page is empty, the half that's full of icons, they're mostly generic utility apps that came with the phone like podcasts and weather, camera. And that tells me that these internet treasures, these services we can't remember life before or imagine life without, that will have asymptotic, you know, long term user retention. They eventually have everyone who's breathing on the planet is the area under that curve. have yet to be invented and that's why I'm optimistic about the future of consumer. I'm much more optimistic than financial markets than co-tune. I don't know if you saw co-tuse market TAM for AI, but they said they called the TAM 6 trillion. I think they put the biggest piece 2.5 trillion was coding and they put the smallest single piece was consumer at 500 billion at .5 trillion. And I just fundamentally disagree. If you look at the way the internet's played out, I don't think that enterprise and infrastructure have dwarfed consumer. If you look at the market caps, these companies to the degree that they're expecting it to work out that way with AI. I just think it hasn't been invented yet, and we can get into that. And my point is, I look at what makes it to the front of my phone, okay? And if something makes it to the front of my phone, like, you know, now I've got GPT and Claude, you know, signal, I used to say those had a stick value of $1 billion. Now they probably have a stick value of $10 billion. I blindly invested in RIA on that basis. RIA. I was single, I was divorced, I started using RIA, I started using every day, I called me out of the company and said, your product's phenomenal, can I invest? They actually emailed me right back, turns out I knew the guy who just joined their VCs had done a seed round and then given up on them, and I put 3 million in, I didn't even ask for evaluation. Their seed round was 30, they told me 60, I said, they started growing after that and then my fund I had with Reed reinvent. We preemptively added another 11 million and today that company their next valuation market probably be 2 billion and not saying I'm like an amazing investor because anybody you know anybody could do this. I mean anyone can see what you use, you know, cold mail the company. And if their mail comes in on the right day and your early, you know, they might respond. Yeah.

你刚才提到了你和 Reinvent 做的一些投资。我对其中几个很好奇，比如 Joby Aviation，它有点像垂直起降空中出租车，还有 Waymo，我们都知道，Aurora 是一家自动驾驶卡车公司，我想，现在和 Paccar 有合作，这有点像他们的价值，Peterbilt。跟我讲讲其中一些吧，而且很多时候这些公司后来通过 SPAC 上市，是你和公司一起搞定的。

And you just touched on investments from that you did with re-invent. Curious about a couple of them, you are, let's see, Jobe Aviation, which is like a vertical air taxi and Waymo, we all know about Aurora, is like an autonomous driving, trucking company, I think, and there's a partnership now with PackR, which is kind of worth them, Peter Belt. Tell me a little bit about some of those, and a lot of times those then trade publicly via SPACs that you worked out with the companies.

请讲讲其中一些，以及你特别看好的那些。

Tell me a little bit about some of those and the ones that you're particularly, kind of expect enough.

我和里德·霍夫曼以及迈克尔·汤普森创立 Re-Invent Capital 时的前提是——我们自认为方向正确且行动得早，但我们没有顺势募集更大规模的基金，这很可惜。我们相信我们正进入一个大规模风险投资的新时代。所以我们说，这不会只是像成长型私募投资那样，把公司折现到 IPO 就算完，业务模式已经完全定型。那真的是一个成长故事，而且会转变成一个盈利故事。它会是一只蓝筹成长股，不会有巨大的波动。回顾过去，尽管有互联网泡沫崩盘和亚马逊的大起大落，历史上科技 IPO 的成长投资大约是三倍回报，他们按三倍来承销。我们说，我们要找那些技术或市场已被验证、已达到规模，但仍具有风险投资式机会的公司。好坏两面都有：意味着未来会有很大波动，这对公开市场不利；但也有 10 到 100 倍的风险投资式上行空间，而且我们能开出更大的支票，承受这种波动。这就是 Re-Invent 的基本前提，我认为它已经被 AI 验证了，我们今天看到了这一点，看到了在规模化公司以及 Anthropic 和 SpaceX 上取得的惊人回报。事实上，我们投资了 SpaceX。我觉得 RIA 更像是一笔经典的风险投资，它并不真正符合我们 Re-Invent 的标准，但我非常看好它。你知道，RIA 在用户或收入上还没达到规模，但我相信它，幸运的是那笔投资成功了。但后来当我们发现 Joby 和 Aurora 时——里德是 Aurora 的董事会成员，也是早期投资人——那些符合标准，它们是风险投资式的投资，但规模非常大。我们相信它们的技术已经得到验证，现在需要去改进，市场已经存在。类似 OpenAI 和 Anthropic，我们并不真正质疑市场是否会想要飞行出租车，也不真正质疑自动驾驶卡车是否有市场。更多的问题是它们何时能把技术推向市场。技术已验证，但上市时间不确定，无论是监管问题还是规模化构建技术的能力。以 Joby 为例，它们需要通过 FAA 认证，现在差不多完成了；它们需要证明能进行载人飞行，这已经做到了。所以那些完全符合我们的标准。然后我们看到了用 SPAC 赞助和承销 IPO 的机会。不是所有 SPAC 都成功了，大多数都没成。尽管这两家公司目前都低于 10 美元的 SPAC 发行价，但 Joby 曾涨到接近两倍。因为它们是非常增长型、未来增长型的故事，它们的交易更像生物科技股，对利率非常敏感，因为它们是风险偏好型交易。所以你会看到它们贝塔值很高。当风险偏好型交易看涨时，因为利率低、人们乐观，它们在股票上会超额表现；但也会受到最严重的打击。不过我们仍然在基金和个人层面持有这些股票，我仍然长期看好它们，它们拥有不可思议的技术和公司，以及几乎无限大的市场。这就是 Re-Invent，我认为我们现在看到这种大规模投资类别更加真实了，它不仅仅是 IPO 前的成长投资。

So the premise that Reed and I had, and Michael Thompson when we created Re-Invent Capital was, we, and I credit us with being right and early, but we didn't follow it and raise much bigger fund, which is too bad. But we believe that we're entering a new era of venture at scale. So we said, this isn't going to just look like growth, private growth investing, where you're just kind of discounting it to the IPO. And the business has been totally figured out. It's really a growth story, and it's going to flip to an earnings story. It's going to be a blue chip growth stock, not huge volatility. If you look backwards, despite some big swings with the .com crash and Amazon, historically tech IPOs for growth investment were like a three-ax. They'd underwrite it at a three-ax. We said, we are going to look for companies that have proven their tech or proven their market, they've hit scale, but they still have a venture like opportunity. How do them for good and bad? Meaning a lot of volatility ahead, and that's bad for public markets. But a venture like 10 to 100x upside as well, and we can write bigger checks and withstand that volatility. And that was the fundamental premise of reinvent, which I think has been proven out with AI and we're seeing that today and we're seeing the amazing returns that have gone at scale and and thropic and not in space X. In fact, we invested in space X. I'd say RIA was more of a classic venture investment. It really didn't fit into our reinvent profile, but I believed in it so much. You know, that RIA wasn't at scale yet in users or revenues, but I believed in it and you know luckily that one worked out, but then we when we found Joby Aurora Read was on the board of Aurora and had been an original investor Those fit it those were venture-like investments but but doing Things at very large scale We believed that they had proven the technology piece out and now they had to go Improve that that the market was there and kind of similar to to open AI and anthropic, we didn't really question whether the market would want flying taxis. We didn't really question whether the market would be there for self-driving trucks. It was more when could they get the tech to market. The tech was proven the time to market was not, whether it was regulatory or ability to build that tech out at scale in the case of JOBY, they needed to go through FAA certification, which they're almost done with. They needed to prove that they could do manned flights, which they've done. And so those fit perfectly into our criterion's spec, and then we saw an opportunity to sponsor and underwrite IPOs with SPACs. Not all, you know, most SPACs didn't work out. And while even though both of those currently are trading below their $10 SPAC price, Joby was up to almost double theirs. And they, because they're such growth, future growth stories, they trade almost more like biotechs where they're very dependent on interest rates because they're a risk on trade. And so you'll see that they're very high beta. And when the risk on trade is bullish, because rates are low and people are optimistic, they overdeliver on the stock. And then they also get hit the hardest. And so, but we still hold those in the fund and personally. and I'm still just a long-term believer there, incredible technology and incredible companies and kind of endless-sized markets. So that was reinvent and I think we're seeing now that kind of category of investing at scale is much more real, it's not just pre-IPO growth investing.

当然，当然。我读到过，早期你甚至说过最初对 AI 持怀疑态度。你和里德·霍夫曼、山姆·奥特曼有过对话，并没有立刻被说服。但后来你转变了。显然你现在有很多大型 AI 投资。是什么让你转变的？我认为对投资者来说，保持健康的怀疑是好事，但也不要被最初的看法蒙蔽，以至于后来不接纳新想法。是什么让你对 AI 变得更乐观？

Sure, sure. And I've read that you know, early on, I think you even talked about it being initially kind of skeptical of AI. You had conversations with Reid Hoffman and Sam Altman. And we're not kind of immediately convinced. And yet then you came around. And obviously you now have a lot of big AI type investments. What was it? And I think that for investors to have a healthy skepticism is a good thing, but also not be so blinded by your initial take, that you don't then kind of warm to an idea. What was it that kind of made you become more positive on AI?

嗯，我觉得很尴尬的是，他们就在我面前进行这些对话，而我却充耳不闻。我是说，现在很难想象，对吧？但当时我不理解 AI 的消费级应用。直到 ChatGPT 出现才变得明显。他们谈论的方式，他们非常相信 AGI，他们在谈论安全性。那是 OpenAI 的基本创始前提，无论对埃隆、山姆还是里德来说，都是：我们希望保持这项技术的开放，让每个人都能使用，不被单一企业巨头拥有，我们希望它对世界保持安全。他们是对的，这显然已经成为一个巨大的问题。我们现在看到白宫在某种程度上监控和监管它。所以他们是对的。我没有理解，我只是没有足够关注，没有看到它真的接近交付，比我想象的更接近 AGI。直到 GPT 出现，我才看到它清晰的消费级应用。即便如此，也经过了几次迭代才从玩具变成真正有用的东西。但我很快就看到了。当我们到 GPT-3 时，我开始使用它。我看到我的家人在桌子底下用它来查证我说的话。当它传播到我的伴侣希拉里、我的女儿们那里，当我不得不和女儿讨论用这个做作业的道德和伦理问题时，我想，好吧，这真的很强大，这真的会有所作为，我不能忽视它。然后很快就从那里发展起来了。对我来说，神奇的时刻大概是 Midjourney。我是说，先是 Dolly，你知道，如果你记得那个，OpenAI 推出了自己的图像生成方式，它们真的很神奇。但 Midjourney 太神奇了，现在依然如此，它让我看起来——我觉得我们所有人都看起来比实际更有创造力。它生成的图像比我的提示词更好。没有多少产品能给你比你要求的更好的东西。这就是我对 Midjourney 的体验。那对我来说是一个“天哪”的时刻。当我给希拉里做了一个标志时，希拉里觉得她在这个世界上的使命是成为世界的垃圾收集者。她有一个巨大的启示，她说，总得有人来收集垃圾，那是她的工作。所以她有兴趣寻找各种非营利方式来资助更好的垃圾收集、清除和处理方法。她做这件事太棒了。我用 Midjourney 给她做了一个标志。第一次尝试，它就做出了一个非常好的标志，让她惊叹不已。那是一只秃鹫，本来就是收集垃圾的鸟，飞过城市，是绿色的，那成了她的标志。我还用它重新设计过房间。

Well, I'd say it's embarrassing that they were having these conversations right in front of me, and I was tuning it out. I mean, it's hard to imagine, right? But it was, and it, I didn't understand the consumer application of AI. It wasn't obvious until chat GPT came out. And the way they talked about it, they believed so much in AGI, they were talking about the safety. And that was the fundamental, the founding premise, whether it was for Elon or Sam or Reid, behind Open AI, was we want to keep this technology open, accessible to everyone not owned by a single corporate overlord, and we want to keep it safe for the world. They were right, and that's become obviously a huge issue. We see now the White House monitoring and regulating it in some way. So they were right. I didn't get, I just wasn't paying enough attention to see that it really was close to delivering much closer than I gave it credit on the AGI. And then it wasn't until GPT that I saw the clear consumer application of it. And even then, it just took a few iterations before it moved from being a toy. But I quickly saw it. When we got to GPT-3, I started using it. I saw my family fact checking me under the table with it. When it spread to my partner, Hillary, my daughters, when I had to have a conversation with my daughter about the morality and the ethics of using this with your homework, I was like, okay, this is really powerful, this is really going somewhere and I can't afford to ignore it. And then it quickly moved from there. I'd say the magic moment for me was probably mid-journey. I mean, it was first it was Dolly, you know, when if you remember that where opening, I put out their own way to make images and they were really magical. But then mid-journey was so magical and it still is and it makes me look, I think all of us look more creative than we really are. So it comes up with images that are better than my prompt. And there's not many products that deliver you something better than what you asked for. And that's my experience with Midjourney. And that was like an OMFG moment for me. When I made Hillary a logo, Hillary's, she feels like her calling in this world is to be the world's trash collector. She had a huge download. She's like, someone's got to collect the trash and she, that's her job. So she's interested in looking at all kinds of nonprofit ways to fund better ways to collect and get rid of trash and dispose of trash. And it's amazing that she's doing that. I use midjourney to make a logo for her. And in my first try, it made a logo so good that she was blown away. And it's a vulture, which is already the trash collecting bird, flying over a city and it's green and that became her logo. And I've also used it to redesign rooms.

我是说，我可以一直说下去，浪费你的时间。但那确实是一个神奇的时刻。而且我后来不断遇到这样的时刻。对我来说，我确实设法拼凑出了一个 AI 助手。它不太好。我在 20 分钟内编码了一个第一人称射击游戏。当我说编码时，我的意思是我用提示词让它生成的。那真的很令人印象深刻。虽然还不够好到我会发布或展示给你，但那是完整的游戏。那是一个“卧槽”的时刻。然后我日常最常用的场景是，我一边走路一边和它说话。我设置了一些智能体。我有一个产品经理叫 Carmen，以我女儿的名字命名。我有一个设计主管叫 Hillary。我有一个工程负责人，以我儿子 Wyatt 的名字命名。George 是我的总经理。我提示他们所有人，让他们互相辩论，然后回来找我。这太惊人了。好到让我觉得，为什么我不一直用这个？所以我觉得，而且我要说，我还有一个 20 或 30 年的前提。自从我们有了这个设备，我认为它给我们带来了一种潜在的抑郁。我不知道你怎么看，Rich，但你走在中央公园里，每个人都在盯着手机，我觉得他们没有好好利用时间。我觉得他们一开始是带着希望的。你要回复一条重要的消息，也许有人在 X 上回复了你，或者什么重要的事，那是工作在做。你很快就变成了无意识刷屏，之后你感觉不好。你在上面待得越久，而不是享受公园，而且，我很久以前就想过，这个设备可以让我们变得消费型或生成型。在 AI 出现之前，我没有“生成型”这个词。我不是编造或创造这个词的。但它是我想要的词。我认为当我们生成并把想法发布到世界上时，我们比像僵尸一样被动消费时感觉更好。而且我认为 AI 在很多方面是史蒂夫·乔布斯梦想的实现，是他“不同凡想”和“保持创造”的理念。这个想法是，在我们的设备上五分钟内，我们真的可以创造出一些能走向世界、能改变世界的东西——虽然它不常改变世界，但有可能。我认为在某种程度上兑现这个承诺，是对我们文化以及我们与这个设备、这个网络互动的根本性转变。我认为这太深刻了。我认为我们需要 10 年才能完全理解它的影响。所以无论如何，这就是为什么我是一个 AI 乐观主义者和最大化主义者。抱歉回答太长了。你可以剪辑我。

I mean, I could go on and on and waste your time with it. But that was a real magical moment. And then I keep having them. For me, I did manage to put together a coded AI assistant. It's not very good. I coded a first-person shooter game in 20 minutes. And when I say coded, I mean I prompted it. And it was really impressive. Not good enough that I would publish it or show you, but it was the whole thing. And that was a holy shit moment. And then the thing I use, my go-to daily use case, is I walk around and I talk to it. And I have agents set up. I have a product manager named Carmen after my daughter. I have a head of design named Hillary. I have an engineering lead named after my son Wyatt. George is my GM. And I prompt all of them and have them debate things with each other and come back to me. And it's pretty phenomenal. It's so good that I feel a sense of, why aren't I using this all the time? And so I feel, and I'll say this, there's another premise I've had for 20 or 30 years. Since we got this device, I think that this has given us a latent depression. I don't know about you, Rich, but you walk around Central Park and everyone is staring at their phone, and I don't think they're using their time well. I think they start off with hope. You're going to respond to an important message, maybe someone responded to you on X or something important, and that is work getting done. You quickly devolve to doom scrolling, and you don't feel good about yourself afterwards. And the longer you're on it, versus enjoying the park, and there's, I thought a long time ago, this device can make us consumptive or generative. And I didn't have the word generative until AI came along. I didn't make that word up or coin it. But it's the word I wanted. And I think we feel better about ourselves when we are generating and putting ideas out in the world than just passively consuming like zombies. And I think that AI is kind of, in a lot of ways, the fulfillment of Steve Jobs' dream, his idea of think different and be creative. The idea that in five minutes on our device, we actually could create something that could go somewhere and could change the world—or it doesn't often change the world, but it's possible. And I think delivering on that promise in some way is such a fundamental shift in our culture and in our interaction with this device, this network. I think it's so profound. I think it's going to take 10 years for us to even fully understand its impact. So anyway, that's why I'm an AI optimist and maximalist. Sorry for the long answers. You can edit me down.

不，不，这很棒。很吸引人。你知道，我们大多数听众是投资者，不是企业家，尽管他们对创业方面很着迷。有没有某些信号告诉你，一家公司已经从有趣的想法或概念变成了不可避免的业务？有没有一个你识别出的门槛？

No, no, it's great. It's fascinating. You know, most of our listeners are investors, not entrepreneurs, although they're fascinated by the entrepreneurial aspect of things. Are there certain signals that tell you that a company has gone from, you know, interesting idea or concept to this is an inevitable business? Is there like a threshold that you've identified?

我从 Zynga 的经历中获益良多，我试图在书中提到一些这样的标志，但有很多迹象表明这是一艘火箭船。首先是牵引力。好吧。我可能不比你们或你的听众有更好的想法。什么消费应用会成功？好吧。但我能看到指标。我能发现，我能看到，指标往往讲述一个故事。你可以看很多不同的东西。你可以看他们在 App Store 里多快获得正面评价，你可以读评论，感受其中的热情。有定性的指标。然后有真正的指标。你可以看到自然安装量、日活用户与月活用户的比率。任何时候你看到日活/月活达到 60%，你就可以盲目投资。当你看到自然增长，60% 尝试过的人每天回来。那是我第一次看到 Facebook 时的情况。那是 Napster。那是 RIA。你可以盲目投资。当有人告诉你，我只需要更多钱买服务器，因为我打开的所有服务器都被用户占满了。你可以盲目投资。这些是种子阶段非常关键的标志。我刚投资了 FOMO，一个社交交易应用，他们的指标高得离谱。当你看到变现真正起作用时，当你看到它刚流行起来并且翻倍时，变现会讲述一个故事。这样的标志很多，但非常罕见。好吧，我刚随口说了几个，但你可能每三到五年才看到一次这样的标志，好吗？我的意思是，你不会每年都看到。你幸运的话能看到一次，好吗？而且这些都是瞬间的。对于后期公司，我刚投资了 Revolut 这一轮，他们是一家欧洲私人网上银行。他们大约每六个月做一轮。我跟踪了。他们不断超越自己的数字。当你看到一家公司在这么短的时间内超越自己的数字，我相信你可以盲目投资。不管估值是多少。我就会投资，因为那是 Zynga。所以这些是火箭船的迹象，而且他们不像 Cisco 过去那样管理“beat and raise”。在公开市场上有一种模式，有点假装是火箭船。但我们看到了 NVIDIA。如果你回头看，当 NVIDIA 刚刚碾压他们的数字，然后给出新的指引，然后再次碾压，当你看到那个，你就投资。即使今天在公开市场，我觉得它们今天非常迷人，而且有这么大的争论。我从未见过更聪明、更激烈的辩论。这是 AI 泡沫吗？还是被低估了？两边都有非常聪明的投资者。这就是为什么这个不同。这不像 .com 泡沫。最聪明的人称它为泡沫，他们是对的。而在另一边，在狂热的一边，没有聪明人。我的意思是，不是针对 Henry Blodges 这样的人，他著名地称其为市场顶部，称其为牛市。今天，我认为这是一场真正聪明的辩论，而且是一种信念，你可以站在任何一边。你看，如果你相信 AI 会在短期内兑现，这些公司购买的 token 和公司花费的服务实际上花得值，或者如果他们必须继续购买这些 token，他们必须处于前沿才能在其行业中领先。而且这会持续下去。那么这些公司在代际层面上被低估了，因为你看他们的 PEG 比率。他们就像，好吧，在视频领域，如果他们的市盈率是 15 或 18，增长率是 60%，你不会看到那个，对吧？但内存股也一样。

I get so much from my Zynga experience, and I try to get to some of those markers in the book, but there are so many signs that it's a rocket ship. The first is traction. Okay. I probably don't have any better idea than you do or your listeners. What consumer app is going to work? Okay. But I can see the metrics. I can spot, I can see, the metrics often tell a story. And you can look at a bunch of different things. You can look at how quickly they've gotten positive reviews in the App Store, you can read reviews and see and feel the passion in them. There's kind of qualitative metrics. And then there's real metrics. And you can see organic installs, DAUs to MAUs. Anytime you see 60% DAUs to MAUs, you can invest blindly. When you see organically, that 60% of the people who have tried this coming back every day. That was Facebook when I first saw them. That was Napster. That was RIA. And you can kind of invest blindly. When someone tells you, I just need more money for servers because all the servers I turn on are filled up with users. You can invest blindly. Those are kind of seed stage really key markers. I just invested in FOMO, a social trading app, their metrics were off the charts. When you see monetization really working, so when you see that it's just catching on and they're doubling, there's a level of heat that monetization tells a story around. There are so many markers like that, and they're so rare. Okay, I just rattled them off, but you might see those markers every three to five years, okay? I mean, you're not going to see them every year. You're lucky you see them once, okay? And those are all in moments. With later stage companies, I just invested in this round of Revolut, their private online banking company for Europe. They've been doing around every six months. I've tracked. They keep beating their own numbers. When you see a company beating their own numbers after such short periods of time, I believe you can invest blindly. It doesn't matter what the valuation is. I'll just invest because that was Zynga. So those are signs of a rocket ship, and they're not managing it the way that Cisco used to do with beat and raise. And there was a whole model of that in the public markets that was kind of faking that rocket ship. But we saw that with NVIDIA. If you look backwards, when NVIDIA was just crushing their numbers, and then they give new guidance, and then crushing that, when you see that, you just invest. And then even today in the public markets, I think they're so fascinating today, and there's such a debate. It's, I've never seen a more intelligent, more heated debate. Or is this an AI bubble? Or is it undervalued? And you've got really smart investors on both sides of that. That's what makes this one. This is not like the .com bubble. The smartest people called it a bubble, and they were right. And there were not smart people on the other side on the exuberant side. I mean, nothing against the Henry Blodges of the world who kind of famously called it the top of the market, called it a bull market. Today, I think it's a really intelligent debate, and it's a belief, and you could be on either side. It's look, if you believe that AI is going to deliver in the short term, that the tokens these corporations are buying and that the companies are spending on services are actually being well spent, or if they have to keep buying these tokens, they have to be at the edge to be in the lead in their industry. And that's going to keep going. Then these companies are undervalued at a generational level because you look at their PEG ratios. And they're like, okay, in video, if they're at 15 or 18 PE and a growth rate of 60%, you don't see that, right? But in the same with the memory stocks.

但如果你相信 AI 基础设施的采购会耗尽，如果你觉得这些公司明年无法再次加码，无论是 Meta、Google 还是 SpaceX，如果他们无法再进行那一轮投资，那它可能会受挫或动摇。然后那些称之为“泡沫”的人将在短期内被证明是对的。我仍然认为从长期来看，即使有挫折，也没有多少人真正反对，长期来看这对未来经济太根本了。但这是一个信念交易。我想说的是，我处理它的方式，以及我会鼓励我的朋友和家人的方式，有点像人们过去说你应该把 1% 的钱放在比特币里，以防它是一个看涨期权，以防比特币是真的。我不会在这个交易上过度集中，如果它失败了你无法承受回撤，但我也不会完全没有敞口，因为它可能让你错失机会。所以，我的意思是，我对我管理的投资组合所做的是，我对大部分进行了领口策略。所以我明年的敞口大概是上涨 40% 到 60%，下跌 15%。因为我在想，我会错过上涨吗？也许会，但如果出现回调，你知道，我不想担心它。

But if you believe that the AI infrastructure purchases are going to run out, if you're like, these companies aren't going to be able to step up again next year, whether it's Meta or Google or SpaceX, if they're not going to be able to do that round again, it could stumble or falter. And then the people who call this quote-unquote bubble will be proven right in the short term. I still think in the long term, even if there are stumbles, not many people even disagree, then the long term this is just so fundamental to the future economy. But that's a belief trade. And I would say the way I'm approaching it and the way I would encourage my friends and family is kind of the way people used to say you should put 1% of your money in Bitcoin in case it's a call option, in case Bitcoin is real. I wouldn't concentrate heavily on this trade where if it falters, you can't handle the drawdown, but I also wouldn't have zero exposure to it because it could get away from you. So, I mean, what I've done with my portfolio that I manage is I've collared most of it. So most of my exposure in the next year is kind of like up 40 to 60% down 15. So, cause I'm like, am I gonna miss anything on the upside? I maybe, but if there is a, if there were a correction, you know, I don't wanna worry about it.

对，对。太精彩了。好吧，我意识到我占用了大量时间，但我们还可以再聊一个小时。我的意思是，我还有大约 40 个问题可以问你，但我们甚至还没谈到这本书，显然我想传达很多东西，我希望它和人们今天投资和构建 AI 的方式有关。

Right, right. Fascinating. Well, I realize I've taken a ton of time, but we could do this for another hour. I mean, I've got like 40 other questions I could ask you, but we didn't even get into the book, which obviously there's a lot that I'm trying to convey and I hope it relates to the way people are investing in building AI today.

是的，这本书刚刚出版。书名是《Life at the Speed of Play》。我是 Mark Pincus，在三四十年的大部分时间里，我既是企业家，也是投资者，现在又成了作者。能多次和你对话真的非常有趣，Mark，非常感谢。

Yeah, well, the book has just come out. It's called Life at the Speed of Play. It's Mark Pincus who has been for the better part of three to four decades an entrepreneur and an investor and now an author and it's just been really fascinating having you on multiple conversations, Mark, really appreciate it.

是的，顺便说一句，我们甚至还没谈到我最喜欢的公开市场话题之一，那就是“破碎互联网”和 Snapchat。所以我认为我们应该预留一个第二部分，到时候我们真正深入探讨那个“破碎互联网”，因为我只想说一分钟。

Yeah, and by the way, we didn't even get into one of my favorite public market topics, which is the Broken Internet and Snapchat. So I think we should earmark a second one, part two at the time, a part two, where we really dive in on that, just that broken internet, because I'll just say a minute on it that.

是的，我也这么认为。我在 Zynga 经历了所谓的“破碎互联网”交易。所以我认为我在一个公开市场投资者无法理解的层面上理解了它，当你是一只抽屉股票时。我相信 Zynga 就是一只抽屉股票。好吧，我相信《与朋友拼词》，我们所有的核心特许经营权，我们称之为“永久特许经营权”，我们最初的 Zynga 扑克游戏今天仍然蓬勃发展。Zynga 今天作为 Take-Two 的一部分蓬勃发展，它合并了。所以当我 2015 年回来担任 CEO 时，我们的股价是 1.75 美元。我们以银行里的现金交易。你可以闭上眼睛买那只股票，不用注意。最终，到收购时，它涨了五倍，如果你持有它直到收购，那非常成功，Strauss 完全正确。你今天可能会得到，我不知道，一个 ADACS 或什么的，10 倍。所以我开始发展这个“破碎互联网”的想法，如果它是一个拥有我认为不会消失的特许经营权的消费公司，如果创始人还在，创始人拥有足够的控制权来确保公司做出正确的艰难决定，进行削减和长期押注，那么我认为你可以买入并忘记。它是一只抽屉股票。我不知道它什么时候会扭转局面，但我知道它会。那就是 Twitter。那就是 Spotify，当它们的交易价格低于 IPO 价格时。我想就在两年前。那就是 Facebook。它们跌破了 IPO 价格。但即使在两三年前，你可以在它们失误时以每股 88 美元买入。而且这些错位非常极端，因为你在转移投资者基础。你有这种蓝筹成长型投资者，他们不会持有转型或价值型股票。那不是他们的论点。所以他们不得不卖出。没有买家。所以这是一把落下的刀。唯一的买家最终是短期对冲基金。他们像潮水一样。他们来来去去。他们买你的股票。他们给你发某种假信，总是说，你应该削减成本，你应该做股票回购来证明你相信你的股票。他们只是想让股价在那个季度上涨然后卖出。作为创始人，你实际上必须忽略他们。但我相信你不能忽略你的工程师。你不能忽略你最好的员工，如果他们从你的股票中得不到上涨空间，他们最终不会留下。所以，你知道，我的意思是，Snapchat 和 Elon 出现之前的 Twitter 愿意承受每年支付 EBITDA 和股票薪酬的痛苦，比我曾经希望或想象的更久。Snapchat 现在也在做同样的事情。我相信 Evan 作为产品创始人，我认为他很出色。我不认为他做出了正确的决定。我不在那个位置上。所以我像其他人一样是事后诸葛亮。从外部看，我看着那个。我认为他做了一次相对较小的裁员，自疫情以来他几乎让员工基数翻了一番。我认为他做了一次小裁员，可能 12% 或 15%。我认为他可以裁掉那家公司一半的人，而他的收入或产品质量不会有任何区别。Twitter 变得更好了，我认为。大多数人认为 X 自从 80% 的裁员后变得更好了。我认为 Snap 就是那家公司，我理解他不想迎合华尔街，他想考虑他的 AR 眼镜的长期上涨空间。但我认为如果那家公司变得精简，我认为他们会有更好的机会去追求他巨大的想法。所以我是一个忠诚但沮丧的持有者。我认为他拥有如此宝贵的资产，即使他再花一年时间修复它，它也会有巨大的上涨空间。那家公司今天估值大约 70 亿或 80 亿美元。我认为如果他表现出任何兴趣，它可能成为一台现金机器。我的意思是，他们可能有巨大的利润率。我认为他们可以更多地变现，他们可以增长。你知道，我不认为他们的受众会消失。所以当他愿意专注于此时，那个机会就在那里。我不是想当沙发 CEO。但从投资者的角度来看，如果你有耐心，你买入一些我称之为“破碎互联网”的东西，我认为当他们在运营上修复它时，它们会提供大约两倍或三倍的回报，然后是一个创始人做更大事情的看涨期权。所以这就是我对“破碎互联网”的论点。我认为两年前的 Roblox，你知道，错过了他们的季度，然后被错位了。我认为这种情况不断发生在这些伟大的公司身上。如果我们足够密切地关注，我认为我们有代际性的买入机会。

Yeah, well, too. Well, I lived through what I call the Broken Internet trade at Zynga. So I think I get it on a level that public market investors can't when you are a drawer stock. And I believe that Zynga was a drawer stock. OK, I believe Words with Friends, all of our core franchise, we call them forever franchises, our original Zynga Poker game is still thriving today. Zynga is thriving today as part of Take-Two, it merged. And so back when I came back as CEO in 2015, we were a $1.75 stock. We were trading for cash in the bank. And you could have closed your eyes, bought that stock, and not paid any attention. And ultimately, up to the acquisition made a five-ax and then if you'd held it through the acquisition, which was very successful, Strauss was exactly right. You'd be at, I don't know, an ADACS today or something, 10X. So I started developing this idea of broken internet, which is if it's a consumer company that has a franchise that I don't believe is going away, if the founder is still there, the founder has enough control to make sure that the company makes the right hard decisions to make cuts and long-term bets, then I think you can just buy it and forget. It's a drawer stock. And I don't know when it's going to right the ship, but I know it will. And that was Twitter. That was Spotify when they traded below their IPO price. Just, I think, two years ago. That was Facebook. They went below their IPO price. But even two or three years ago, you could have bought them at $88 a share when they missed. And there's these dislocations that are extreme because you're shifting investor bases. You've got this blue chip growth investor that won't own a turnaround or a value play. That's not their thesis. So they kind of have to sell. There is no buyer. So it's a falling knife. The only buyers are eventually short-term-focused hedge funds. They're like the tides. They come and go. They buy your stock. They send you some kind of fake letter saying, that always is like, you should make cuts, and you should do a stock buyback to prove that you believe in your stock. They just wanted to go up that quarter and sell. You actually have to ignore them as a founder. But I believe you can't ignore your engineers. You can't ignore your best employees who ultimately aren't gonna stay if they have no upside in your stock. And so, you know, I mean, Snapchat and Twitter before Elon came along was willing to withstand that pain of paying out their EBITDA and stock-based comp every year, much longer than I would have hoped or imagined. Snapchat is doing the same now. And I believe in Evan as a product founder, I think he's brilliant. I don't believe he is making the right decisions. I'm not in the chair. So I'm Monday morning quarterback, like everybody else. From the outside, I look at that. And I think he did a layoff of a small relative, he's almost double the employee base since the pandemic. And I think he did a small layoff, maybe 12 or 15%. I think he could lay off half that company and not see a difference in his revenues or in the product quality. Twitter got better, I think. Most people think X has gotten better since the 80% layoff. I think Snap is that company, and I get that he doesn't want to cater to Wall Street and he wants to think about the long-term upside in his AR goggles. But I think if that company got fit, I think they would have a better chance to pursue his gigantic idea. And so I'm a loyal but frustrated holder in that. And I think he owns such valuable real estate that even if he takes another year to fix it, it's going to have massive upside. That company's valued at like seven or eight billion today. I think if he showed any interest and it could be a cash machine. I mean, they could have huge margins. I think they could be monetizing more, they could be growing. You know, I don't think their audience is going away. So that opportunity is there for him when he cares to focus on it. I'm not trying to be a couch CEO. But from an investor's standpoint, if you're patient and you buy some of these what I call broken internet, I think they offer kind of a two or three X when they operationally fix it and then a call option on the founder doing something bigger. So that's my argument on the broken internet. And I think Roblox two years ago, you know, missed their quarter and got dislocated. I think it keeps happening to these great companies. And if we watch closely enough, I think we have generational buying opportunities.

太精彩了。好的。好吧，我希望听众们能理解这一点。风险自负。没错。好吧，Mark，再次感谢你抽出时间。太精彩了。再次强调，这本书叫《Life at the Speed of Play》。

Fascinating. Okay. Well, I hope the listeners pick up on that. I hate your own risk. Exactly. Well, Mark, thank you again for taking the time. Fascinating. And again, the book is called Life at the Speed of Play.

过去 10 天左右涌现出来，到处都在发展。保重。感谢你参与这次访谈。

Come out in the last 10 days or so and develop a lot of everywhere. Great take care. Thanks for doing this.

谢谢，Mark。

Thanks Mark.